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Abstract
An increasing number of products are exclusively digital items, such as media
files, licenses, services, or subscriptions. In many cases customers do not
purchase these items directly from the originator of the product but through a
reseller instead. Examples of some well known resellers include GoDaddy, the
iTunes music store, and Amazon.
This thesis considers the concept of provenance of digital items in reseller
chains. Provenance is defined as the origin and ownership history of an item. In
the context of digital items, the origin of the item refers to the supplier that created
it and the ownership history establishes a chain of ownership from the supplier to
the customer. While customers and suppliers are concerned with the provenance
of the digital items, resellers will not want the details of the transactions they have
taken part in made public. Resellers will require the provenance information to
be anonymous and unlinkable to prevent third parties building up large amounts
of information on the transactions of resellers. This thesis develops security
mechanisms that provide customers and suppliers with assurances about the
provenance of a digital item, even when the reseller is untrusted, while providing
anonymity and unlinkability for resellers .
The main contribution of this thesis is the design, development, and analysis
of the tagged transaction protocol. A formal description of the problem and
the security properties for anonymously providing provenance for digital items
in reseller chains are defined. A thorough security analysis using proofs by
contradiction shows the protocol fulfils the security requirements. This security
analysis is supported by modelling the protocol and security requirements
using Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) and the Failures Divergences
Refinement (FDR) model checker. An extended version of the tagged transaction
protocol is also presented that provides revocable anonymity for resellers that
try to conduct a cloning attack on the protocol. As well as an analysis of the
security of the tagged transaction protocol, a performance analysis is conducted
providing complexity results as well as empirical results from an implementation
of the protocol.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Provenance is defined as the origin and ownership history for an item. In art
history the provenance information for a painting is used to help decide whether
the piece is real or a forgery. Locally, the notion of provenance attracted attention
when in 1985 Karl Sim was arrested for art forgery after copying and selling
art works by famous New Zealand painters such as Charles F. Goldie, Frances
Hodgkins, Rita Angus and Colin McCahon. By signing the artist’s name on the
painting he successfully passed himself off as the artist and sold the art works at
auction. The number of forgotten masterpieces appearing in the same place with
no provenance information alerted authorities to the forgeries.
The concept of provenance can be applied to data as well as art work. Data
provenance provides provenance meta data for scientific workflows [34, 87, 92],
databases [3, 91], geographic information systems (GIS) [53], andweb services [39,
89]. This thesis examines the concept of provenance for digital items such
as digital media or more abstract products such as an access ’right’, a license,
a service, or a subscription. In many cases customers purchase digital items
through resellers instead of directly from the suppliers of the items. Some well
known resellers that exist only as on-line traders include Amazon, iTunes, and
domain name resellers, such as GoDaddy.
A simple approach to achieving digital provenance in reseller chains is to
introduce a license server that acts as a trusted third party. This license server
can check at every step in the transaction that the item is legitimate and that it
has not been sold to multiple customers. A downside of this approach is the
potential for privacy breaches because the license server has control over a large
amount of data both on the details of transactions conducted and the identities
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of the parties involved. A better option is to provide verification of the actions of
any third party in the protocol without reducing privacy.
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Figure 1.1: The Reseller Model
The basic reseller model is shown in Figure 1.1. This work refers to each
individual party in the model as a link and the entire path from the supplier
to a customer as a chain. There are three parties involved:
• The Supplier: Suppliers are the original creators or holders of the rights for
an item.
• The Reseller: The reseller or middleman has a set of customers who
purchase goods from them as well as a set of suppliers that the reseller
purchases the goods from. There may be multiple resellers between the
supplier and the customer.
• The Customer: Any party that is interested in purchasing an item produced
by a supplier and sold by resellers.
This thesis defines the term secure provenance where correct provenance
information is supplied in the presence of active adversaries without reducing
3privacy for participants in the protocol. Secure provenance provides customers
with confidence in the origin and ownership history for a digital item even when
the reseller they are dealing with is untrusted.
The approach taken in this thesis differs from the use of digital certificates
and Digital Rights Management (DRM) in crucial ways. Most Internet resellers
use a digital certificate to prove their identity and to provide information on
their physical location and contact details. Digital certificates do not provide
mechanisms to establish the provenance of items as they are intended as a way
of establishing identity.
DRM is an aggregation of security technologies to allow content owners to
maintain persistent ownership and control of their content. A DRM system
usually wraps the content in a secure container that prevents unauthorised users
from accessing the content. Most DRM systems assume the reseller is trusted
but this work assumes an untrusted reseller and does not provide methods to
establish the provenance of an item.
When providing provenance information, there are many ways an adver-
sary could create false provenance information or incorrectly modify existing
provenance information. In this thesis, I consider attacks that fit into one of the
following four categories:
1. Spoofing. The adversary claims to be the supplier or tries to subvert the
protocol to make it appear that they are the supplier. In this way the
adversary may be able to take payment for an item without ever paying
the supplier while the customer believes they have correct provenance
information.
2. Counterfeiting. The adversary sells the customer an item but never buys it
from the supplier. There are several ways an adversary could counterfeit
provenance information for an item including:
• Fabrication. The adversary fabricates provenance information for an
item from scratch (or having seen the structure of other provenance
information over the network).
• Cloning. The adversary sells an item they have purchased from the
supplier to multiple customers. The adversary will have legitimately
purchased the item initially but is trying to sell multiple copies when
it has only purchased one.
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• Network Sniffing. The adversary sees legitimate provenance infor-
mation for another reseller or customer being sent over the network,
copies it, and sends it to a customer.
3. Identity Revelation. An adversary learns the identity of a participant in
the protocol that is not its neighbour in the chain. The participants in the
protocol will know the identity of their neighbours in the chain, for example,
a customer will know the identity of the reseller it is purchasing an item
from.
4. Linkability. An adversary links together the actions of a party, other than the
supplier, in two separate runs of the protocol. The adversary will not need
to discover the identity of the participant, just link their actions together.
The supplier is excluded from these attacks as the supplier is always the
participant that first generates the provenance information for the item,
although they may be anonymous.
1.1 Use Cases
To motivate the requirements and provide context for providing provenance for
digital items in reseller chains three example use cases are considered.
Use Case 1 - Online Music Stores
Online music stores are a development from the traditional bricks and mortar
music store. A bricks and mortar music store sells tapes, CDs, and records to
customers as physical items. Once a customer has purchased an item, they can
play it in any location that the license applies (licenses often do not apply for
public performance of the work or use in a film). In many cases, when the
customer has finished with the item, they can sell it back to the music store who
sells it as a second hand item to other customers. Alternately, the customer can
sell the physical item directly to another customer. When a physical music store
does not have an item, they have to order it in and it is sent to them through the
postal service.
An online music store sells customers a digital copy of the physical items sold
by a physical music store. These digital items contain the music tracks, and a
digital version of any accompanying booklets or information. Unlike a bricks
1.1. USE CASES 5
and mortar music store, an online store cannot ’sell out’ of a digital item as the
customer is sent a copy of an item. The online music store can keep making
as many copies of the digital item as they need. To provide the most efficient
service to customers, the online music store may want to pre-purchase a bulk set
of licenses for the item in one go. These can then be sold to the customers with
no interaction from the supplier.
Customer in Europe
Music Store
EMI
Universal
Warner
Sony BMG
Customer in New Zealand
Customer in United States
Figure 1.2: An Online Music Store
The Apple iTunes music store has become the largest music retailer in the
United States [4] with sales of over five billion songs [5]. While customers may
have a strong incentive to trust such a large business, there are many smaller
music stores that may not have the same amount of pre-existing trust. A customer
who finds a track cheaper at another store requires mechanisms to verify the
provenance of the item.
Digital rights management (DRM) was used by the iTunes music store to limit
the number of times their customers can make a compact disc copy of purchased
songs and the number of computers the customers can access purchased songs
from. However, DRM does not provide methods to establish the provenance of
an item.
Use Case 2 - eBook Resellers
A bricks and mortar book store sells books and magazines to customers. Similar
to the bricks and mortar music store, a book store must order in stock to sell to
customers and can possibly sell out of a title or have to order in extra stock. A
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large number of second hand book stores exist where customers can take their
unwanted books to resell to other customers.
In the digital model, publishers produce eBooks which are then sold either
direct to customers or through a reseller as shown in Figure 1.3. There may be
several resellers in between the customer and the publisher. An eBook reseller
takes books that they have either self published or brought from a publisher and
sells them to a set of customers. Examples of eBook resellers include Amazon,
Barnes and Noble, and O’Reilly. Some eBooks are protected by DRM that limits
printing, copying, and redistribution. Increasingly eBooks are being sold to
customers using eBook readers such as the Amazon Kindle, smart phones, and
the Apple iPad. As many eBook readers have the capability to remotely disable
access to an eBook, the customer has a strong interest in verifying the provenance
for the eBooks they purchase. As many of these devices are low power devices,
any protocol for establishing the provenance of eBooks must be as efficient as
possible.
Customer 
eBook Reader
Publisher
Reseller Reseller
...
Figure 1.3: An eBook Reseller Chain
Combining the properties of the bricks and mortar book store and the online
eBook resellers would give several advantages. When selling eBooks, the reseller
cannot run out of stock as a new copy of the item can be copied. When using
an online reseller, customers can purchase eBooks 24 hours a day 7 days a week
rather than having to wait for the physical book store to be open. Customers
would benefit if they could resell eBooks they had finished reading in the same
way as they can now with a physical book.
Use Case 3 - Domain Name Registrars
Figure 1.4 shows the parties in the domain name marketplace. Domain name
registrars are Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
registered companies or organisations that sell top level domain names either to
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customers or to domain name resellers. A domain name reseller sells domain
names to either customers or other resellers. There may be several domain name
resellers between the customer and the domain name registrar. A customer may
not know how many resellers are between it and the registrar, or what registrar
the reseller is using. The reseller may want to keep the identity of the registrar
it uses private to prevent a customer from going straight to the registrar to get a
better deal. Customers can switch their domain names between different resellers
or registrars. Some examples of domain registrars are GoDaddy, OnlineNIC, and
Domainz. Domain name resellers include ImHosted.com and ResellerClub.com.
D o m a in
N a m e
R e g is tra r
C u s to m e r
D o m a in
N a m e
R e s e lle r
D o m a in
N a m e
R e se lle r
D o m a in
N a m e
R e se lle r
Figure 1.4: Domain Name Resellers
Domain name resellers have not always acted honestly. Registerfly was a
domain name registrar accredited by ICANN with over 200,000 customers [41].
Customer complaints with Registerfly included allegations of fraud, incorrectly
altering “whois” data, and suspension of accounts in retaliation for complaints
about over charging. ICANN eventually terminated Registerfly’s accreditation
on March 31st 2007 [49].
1.2 Requirements
Based on the use cases presented, I now list the requirements for a protocol for
anonymously establishing provenance in reseller chains.
• R1: Establish Provenance of Digital Items: The central requirement must
be to enable customers to establish the provenance of digital items they
are purchasing. The customer does not need to know which suppliers or
resellers are in the chain, but they must be confident in the provenance of
the digital items they purchase in the presence of malicious resellers.
• R2: Support Multiple Resellers between the Supplier and the Customer:
There may be several resellers between the supplier and the customer. The
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protocol must be able to establish the provenance of an item when there are
a dynamic number of resellers between the supplier and the customer.
• R3: Support Customer Reselling of Items: Customers should be able to
resell a digital item they do not require. In this scenario, the customerwould
be acting as a reseller and on selling to another customer.
• R4: Provide Anonymity: Suppliers and resellers in the reseller chain need
to be anonymous to prevent a customer or reseller from trying to skip the
middleman and contacting a reseller or supplier who is further up the chain
to obtain a better deal.
• R5: Unlinkability of Actions by Resellers: To prevent a third party from
building up detailed records of past transactions of a particular reseller or
customer, the transactions of a reseller or customer need to be unlinkable
between separate transactions.
• R6: Efficient for Low Powered Devices: As some customers will be using
low powered devices, the protocol needs to be efficient for customers.
• R7: Agnostic to Item Delivery Method: Many methods are used to deliver
digital items from direct downloads to peer to peer systems. The protocol
needs to establish the provenance of a digital item without relying on a
specific delivery method.
• R8: Allow Bulk Buying of Items: A reseller may wish to bulk purchase a set
of items so they do not have to keep interacting with the supplier to sell an
item to a reseller. If a protocol supports bulk buying then the supplier can
be offline when the customer is purchasing items from a reseller.
1.3 Thesis Summary
This thesis examines the problem of providing secure provenance for digital
items in reseller chains. Current schemes that can provide provenance in reseller
chains are presented. These schemes are evaluated and compared based on the
requirements presented in this chapter. This evaluation concludes that none of
the current systems are able to fulfil all the requirements.
Using terms for expressing provenance models, a model of the provenance
information for digital items in reseller chains is then constructed. This model
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shows the conflict between providing complete provenance information and
privacy. To provide secure provenance a formal definition of secure provenance is
required to evaluate the protocols provided in this thesis and provide convincing
arguments that these protocols are secure. The formal secure provenance
definition is built on the formal definitions of spoofing, fabrication, cloning,
network sniffing, identity revelation, and linkability attacks.
The tagged transaction protocol is developed to provide secure provenance
for digital items in reseller chains. The tagged transaction protocol provides
confidence in provenance information in the presence of active adversaries, pro-
vides anonymity and unlinkability for participants, supports customer reselling
of items, and offline suppliers after the item has initially been sold. The tagged
transaction protocol does not provide enforcement of the terms of licenses. The
tagged transaction protocol uses a third party called the Tag Generation Centre
(TGC) and data structures called tags to provide provenance information. A
thorough security analysis of the tagged transaction is presented showing that the
tagged transaction protocol provides secure provenance. The tagged transaction
protocol is analysed using the Failures Divergences Refinement (FDR) state based
model checker to show that it provides security against spoofing, fabrication,
cloning, and network sniffing attacks.
This thesis also develops a second protocol to provide secure provenance
called the extended tagged transaction protocol. The extended tagged transaction
protocol has the same features as the tagged transaction protocol but also
provides revocable anonymity for resellers who try to perform cloning attacks.
The extended tagged transaction protocol uses ideas from digital cash where
customers and reseller withdraw coins from the TGC and spend these coins when
they regenerate tags. If a customer or reseller clones a tag, the digital coin can
be used to revoke the identity of the customer or reseller but does not reveal
identity or linkability information when the coin is used once. The extended
tagged transaction protocol has had a thorough security analysis and has also
been analysed using the FDR model checker.
The use of the TGC introduces a trusted third party. Two mechanisms have
been developed to verify the actions of the TGC: (1) The use of a public bulletin
board where the TGC publishes all its actions; and, (2) Distribution of trust
over multiple TGC replicas where, as long as a threshold value of the TGCs are
honest, customers, resellers, and suppliers can have confidence in the provenance
information provided. Mechanisms to provide an anonymous communication
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channel are also considered to provide anonymity for customers, resellers, and
suppliers.
The performance of the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged
transaction protocol are examined in terms of computational complexity, commu-
nication complexity, and experimental performance. Both the tagged transaction
protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol have been implemented
in Java. This implementation has been used to perform experiments to examine
the effects of cryptographic key size, number of resellers, the threshold number
of TGCs when using a distributed TGC, and the anonymous communication
channel on the performance of the protocols.
The ideas and mechanisms developed in the tagged transaction protocol to
provide secure provenance in reseller chains for digital items have been applied
to providing secure provenance in web services. The web services model has
several differences to the digital item model. Web services provide a service that
is on going as opposed to the one off nature of transactions for digital items. Web
services also do not have the same privacy requirements as reseller transactions.
A solution is presented and analysed in terms of the security properties of
the protocol. A definition and discussion of exclusion attacks where a service
provider does not provide all the inputs it uses to provide the service in the
provenance information is also presented.
1.4 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are:
1. Formalising the requirements and algorithms for a protocol for anony-
mously providing provenance in reseller chains. Based on the possible
attacks, this results in a formal definition of secure provenance.
2. Development of the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged
transaction protocol. Both protocols use tags and a third party called
the Tag Generation Centre (TGC) to anonymously provide provenance in
reseller chains. This contribution has been published as a paper “A Protocol
for Anonymously Establishing Digital Provenance in Reseller Chains” in
Financial Cryptography 2011 [68] and has been patented as “NZ 585382:
Method for Providing Anonymous Authentication”.
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3. Security analysis of the tagged transaction protocol using arguments by
contradiction and model checking.
4. Implementation and performance measurements of the tagged transaction
protocol showing the effects of key size, number of resellers, the choice of
distribution, and anonymous communication channel used.
5. Application of the ideas from the tagged transaction protocol to provide
secure provenance in web services. This includes the definition and
discussion of methods to prevent exclusion attacks. This work has been
published as a paper “Verifying Digital Provenance in Web Services” in the
Privacy and Provenance in the Cloud 2011 workshop [69].
1.5 Thesis Organisation
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents related
work, Chapter 3 provides the formal definition of secure provenance, Chapter
4 presents the tagged transaction protocol and the security analysis of the
tagged transaction protocol, Chapter 5 presents the extended tagged transaction
protocol and the security analysis of the extended tagged transaction protocol,
Chapter 6 presents ways to provide an anonymous communication channel and
mechanisms to verify the actions of the TGC, Chapter 7 presents the details
of the implementation of the tagged transaction protocol and details of the
performance results, Chapter 8 presents the application of the ideas from the
tagged transaction protocol to providing provenance for web services, and
Chapter 9 presents conclusions and future work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
Data provenance is a wide area of research that includes work on provenance
in Geographic Information Systems (GIS), scientific workflows, databases, and
attack tracing. Data provenance records the origin and modification history of
data. One of the earliest works in data provenance was by Lanter for GIS [53]
in 1991. In this work, provenance of spatial GIS data was represented as a
bi-directional graph where nodes represent a map layer and edges represent a
transformation from onemap layer to another. A frame object was also associated
with each map layer that recorded additional provenance information about the
layer.
Scientific workflows provide means for scientists to perform advanced scien-
tific tasks in a collaboratory environment. A collaborative environment is realised
by the use of publicly accessible data sources, Gridmiddleware, andweb services.
These environments can span multiple organisations or groups of researchers.
Provenance information allows researchers to reproduce results or detect which
data sets an erroneous result has affected. There have been several provenance
systems designed to work with scientific workflows including Chimera [34] and
myGrid [87, 92].
Chimera provides provenance information for data intensive applications.
Provenance is recorded as data derivation steps from one data set to another.
On demand regeneration of data is possible using the provenance information.
Users can query the Chimera provenance system for a directed acyclic graph
that represents the tasks executed to create a specified data product. myGrid
executes workflows and automatically generates provenance records based on
the data set used, execution times, andworkflow. Every entry in the experimental
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components store has a provenance object associated with it. Scientists can make
annotations to provenance logs with information such as the hypothesis of the
experiment and any thoughts and opinions.
Tioga provides an environment to graphically compose data and programs
in a database environment [3, 91]. The provenance information is represented
as inverse functions. For a function with input I that produces I1 the inverse
function takes I1 and produces I . For functions that do not have a direct inverse
Tioga introduces the concept of a weak inverse function.
Provenance information has also been used to detect the source of attacks in
Grid nodes [38]. The Grid node keeps a record of the file and process identifiers
when a file is read or written and when a process is created. When a Grid node
detects an attack, the provenance graph for the process or file is then extracted
assisting in the identification of the source of the attack.
The Open Provenance Model (OPM) aims to design a shared provenance
model for all provenance systems [59]. The use of a shared provenance model
allows the interchange of provenance information between different provenance
systems. The OPM does not provide details on how provenance systems should
be implemented. OPM defines three main entities. An artifact is piece of state
which could be some data or a physical object. A process is a series of actions
that act on an artifact to produce a new artifact. An agent is an entity that
controls a process. The OPM then provides a series of terms that define causal
relationships between artifacts, processes, and agents. Provenance information
is then represented as a directed graph where artifacts, processes, and agents are
nodes and causal relationships are edges.
The open provenance model is applied to distributed systems in work by
Groth et al [40]. Messages sent between parties are modelled as artifacts sent
between processes. The data items in the message are attributes that are extracted
from received messages. They use a D-Profile to represent distributed systems
in the OPM that provides a more compact representation than the fundamental
OPM constructs but can be expanded into an OPM graph.
A high-level view of the security issues when providing provenance informa-
tion in a distributed environment is presented by Tan et al [89]. They discuss the
issues of access control for provenance information, trust issues with provenance
providers and stores, accountability of provenance information, and long term
storage of provenance information. In the context of this work the issues of
trust for provenance providers and stores and accountability of provenance
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information are both of interest. Accountability is normally addressed through
digital signatures. Another issue is the trustworthiness of the provenance
store. This work uses mechanisms to provide verification of the third parties
acting as the provenance stores. Long term storage of provenance information
is an interesting area with important problems as the amount of provenance
information gathered will keep increasing. Other issues include the format of
data that may change and the updating of keys that are used to sign or encrypt
provenance information. Long term storage of provenance information is out of
the scope of this work.
Access control for provenance stores is addressed in a number of works [12,
22, 89]. Provenance information may contain sensitive information. Access
control methods are considered that provide access in varying levels of granu-
larity. Provenance information differs from traditional data in that it is about
relationships and is not a single piece of data. The data resulting from a process
and the provenance information for the process may also have different privacy
requirements. Access control for provenance systems is out of the scope of this
work.
2.1 Specific Systems
This section compares protocols that can be used to provide provenance for
digital items in reseller chains. Two Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems
are included for completeness. These protocols are then compared based on the
requirements listed in Section 1.2. After the comparison, a protocol that provides
provenance in web services in the presence of active adversaries is examined and
compared to the approach in this thesis.
2.1.1 Apple Fairplay System
In the Apple Fairplay system, Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) format audio
streams are encrypted using a master key. This master key is also encrypted and
stored with the encrypted song. The key required to decrypt the master key is
called a user key. When a user purchases a song, a user key is generated for them
and the song encrypted with the master key and the master key encrypted with
the user key are sent to the iTunes music player. The iTunes music player stores
the user key and it is also stored on the iTunes server. Using the user key, the
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iTunes music player can decrypt the master key for the song and then play the
encrypted audio stream. When a user registers a new computer with the iTunes
store, the iTunes store sends the user generated keys corresponding to that user.
The Apple Fairplay system provides no way for the user to check the provenance
of the item they are receiving, they have to trust that the iTunes music store is
sending them legitimate content that it has purchased from the correct supplier.
There is no mechanism for customers to resell content.
2.1.2 Open Mobile Alliance DRM
The Open Mobile Alliance have a DRM system that makes use of a trusted DRM
Agent and a third party known as the Rights Issuer (RI) [66]. Content that has
been protected is encrypted using a key that is delivered in a rights object. When
a DRM Agent downloads content, it contacts the RI responsible for that content.
The rights object for that content is then sent to the DRM Agent encrypted using
a key bound to the DRM Agent. The DRM Agent can then decrypt the rights
object to access the content. The Open Mobile Alliance DRM system depends
on a trusted DRM Agent and a trusted RI. It does not provide any mechanisms
to verify the provenance of the media. There is no mechanism for customers to
resell content.
2.1.3 Superdistribution
The concept of superdistribution was invented in 1983 by Ryoichi Mori who
originally termed it the Software Service System as it was envisaged as a way
of delivering software similar to the way the water system delivered water [60].
A superdistributionmodel involves the buyers of digital goods in the distribution
process [82]. A superdistribution model involves a content distribution scheme
and a remuneration scheme. The content distribution scheme can be any
technology such as peer to peer (p2p) transfers, http transfers, or blue tooth.
Each digital good distributed over the content distribution scheme contains
license information that describes how the content may be used, by whom,
and what remuneration must be paid and how. The remuneration scheme
provides mechanisms for the buyer of a digital good to make a payment for
the redistribution of a digital good and for the payment to be correctly split
amongst the parties specified in the license. The mechanisms to anonymously
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establish provenance for digital items in reseller chains can be applied to the
superdistribution model.
2.1.4 The Paradiso System
The Paradiso system lets customers purchase not only songs and videos from
suppliers but also reseller rights so they can sell a certain number of the
purchased songs and videos to other customers [61, 62]. This system enables
any customer to become a reseller taking advantage of word of mouth and taste-
orientated marketing. Once a customer has bought the rights to redistribute a
certain number of copies from the supplier, they can distribute these without
having to contact the supplier.
The Paradiso system is designed to be run on media devices, like the iPod or
Zune, with a trusted computing module (TCM) to enforce the contracts between
supplier and customer. Each player has a private key that is stored in the secure
hardware of the TCM that is loaded on by the manufacturer. All private key
operations are performed in the secure hardware. All songs are stored encrypted
with an individual symmetric key which is stored in the secure hardware.
To purchase a song and the rights to resell it N times, the player sends
a request to the content provider or supplier containing the request for the
purchase as well as the player’s public key. Once the payment from the customer
has cleared, the provider encrypts the content with a newly generated symmetric
AES key. The content provider then sends the encrypted content along with the
symmetric AES key and any reselling rights encrypted with the player’s public
key. The reselling and license information are signed using the supplier’s secret
key. Once the device receives the license information, it checks that it has been
signed by a valid reseller, and then stores the license information (still encrypted
with the player’s public key) to insecure memory.
The Paradiso system can be used to provide secure provenance information
provided a valid TCM is present in the device. While currently the Paradiso
system does not provide provenance information it could be included with the
license information. The Paradiso system does not provide any anonymity or
unlinkability for participants.
While the Paradiso system has many attractive properties, its security rests
on a valid TCM. Providing every device (computer, media player, netbook) has
a TCM, Paradiso will effectively allow reselling of media without the input of
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the original content provider. The Paradiso system can be used to provide secure
provenance information provided a valid TCM is present in the device.
2.1.5 The Potato System
Fraunhofer and a spin-off company 4FriendsOnly have developed a music
redistribution protocol called the potato system [1, 75]. The central idea of the
potato system is to reward users with a percentage of the song payment for
redistributing content. The users of the potato system do not just pay for content,
they also pay for a re-distribution license. They can then re-distribute the song
as many times as they like and will be rewarded a set proportion of the purchase
cost each time the song is purchased by a user they have distributed the song
to. Content in the potato system is transferred over peer to peer (P2P) networks,
although to transfer or purchase content requires interaction with the centralised
potato system web interface.
Nutzel et al describe using a signed media format for the potato system [64].
In a signed media format (SMF) the media content is symmetrically encrypted
using the advanced encryption standard (AES). The key for the AES encryption
is then encrypted with the private key of the last buyer. A SMF consists of the
encrypted media, the encrypted AES key, the public certificate of the last buyer,
the license from the accounting server, and a signature of the license by the
accounting server. The license includes the name of the content owner, a hash
of the content, the name of the last buyer, the price model used for this media file,
the link to buy the file, and other information. The accounting server in this case
is the potato system. By using a SMF, any player that wants to play the media
has to decrypt the content using the public certificate of the last buyer and can
pop-up a window asking if the user wants to purchase a re-distribution license if
the last buyer was not the current user.
While the potato system allows for redistribution of content using P2P
networks, interaction with a trusted third party in the form of the potato system
web interface is required to purchase songs. The potato system is an interesting
example of the use of financial rewards as opposed to strong cryptographic
methods. The potato system could provide provenance information along with
the chain of ownership and license information for the song provided when
a song is purchased or listened to. This provenance information would be
created and updated by the centralised potato system web interface. Like the
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rest of the potato system the provenance information would not be protected by
cryptographic methods but using financial rewards.
2.1.6 Contracts for a Distribution Chain
Durfee et al have designed and implemented a protocol using contracts for
distribution chain security [31]. A contract is a sequence of string tokens written
in a contract language that lists the rights granted to the holder of the contract. A
contract is created for a digital work by the content provider or author. A contract
may include terms that detail obligations to pay royalties to the content provider,
or an expiration date for the right to use the digital work. A contract can be
obfuscated to hide sensitive values in the contract by using commitment values.
Once a contract has been created by a content provider for a reseller it is sent
to a contract certifier who checks the contract is well formed and signs it with a
digital signature. The contract certifier is a third party that certifies any newly
created contracts to ensure that a new contract is faithful to any existing contracts
on the digital work. Contracts sent to the contract certifier can be obfuscated to
hide any sensitive data and shown to be valid using zero knowledge proofs that
a committed value lies in a certain range.
When a reseller has a digital work and certified contract from the content
provider, they can then create a new contract and on sell the digital work to
a customer. A new contract is created by sending the contract certifier an
obfuscated version of the new contract along with the signed obfuscated original
contract. The contract certifier then checks that the new contract is faithful to
the old contract using zero knowledge proofs for proving relations on committed
numbers [17] to verify obfuscated fields. The contract certifier then signs the new
obfuscated contract and sends it to the reseller.
When a customer acquires the digital work from the reseller, the reseller also
sends them the signed obfuscated contract from the contract certifier as well as
an unobfuscated contract. The customer then checks that the new contract is
the same as the new obfuscated contract and that the new obfuscated contract
has been signed by a contract certifier. The customer will only accept digital
works that are accompanied by a valid contract that has been signed by a contract
certifier.
The authors also suggest a similar protocol that does not involve a contract
certifier. The contracts are chained together and the zero knowledge proofs that
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the older contracts are faithful to the new contracts are attached to the contract.
This increases the size of the contracts but has the advantage of removing the
third party.
This work is set in the domain of reseller transactions. Rather than looking at
anonymously establishing the provenance of the digital items, they concentrate
on establishing the correctness of the license while hiding sensitive data. This
protocol could be used in conjunction with a protocol for providing provenance
for digital items to provide a method for resellers to alter the terms of the license
but restricting the modifications to only allow valid modifications for that license.
2.1.7 A Decentralised and Secure Electronic Marketplace
Serban et al introduce the concept of a decentralised electronic marketplace
(DEM) where transactions are subject to a set of trading rules [85]. Trading rules
define the DEM and may be different for different marketplaces. The trading
rules are implemented using a mechanism called Law Governed Interaction
(LGI). LGI is a mode of interaction that allows an open group of distributed
heterogeneous agents to interact with each other with confidence that the agents
are all following the law of the marketplace. In LGI, a law is formulated using an
event-condition-action pattern. Apart from the agents taking part in transactions
in the marketplace, there are also a set of trusted controllers that enforce the law
of the marketplace. Every agent is assigned a controller, and all messages for the
marketplace are sent through the agent’s controller.
The controllers in LGI store information on the local state of the agent they
are monitoring. This enables a controller to pick up on actions that are not
allowed according to the trading laws governing the marketplace. For example,
if a reseller tried to sell a license for digital media they did not own or tried to sell
a license twice to different customers the controller would detect this and prevent
it. The controllers are assumed to be trusted if they have a certificate signed by
the certification authority for this marketplace which is specified in the trading
laws. Several agents in the DEM can share the same controller.
For agents in a DEM to have confidence that other agents in the DEM
are obeying the trading laws, the controllers need to be trusted. The authors
suggest the controllers need to be provided as a public utility by a large financial
or governmental institution that can act as a trusted third party and has no
interest in the computing activities regulated by its controllers. When reselling
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digital content in DEM the trusted controllers could be used to create and
update provenance information. Provided the distributed controllers are acting
correctly DEM can provide correct provenance information for digital items. The
controllers build up a large amount of information on the transactions being
done and the identities of the participants in the transactions. If a single party
is in charge of the controllers, this single party gains all the information on the
transactions happening in the marketplace.
2.1.8 IEEE P1817 Working Group
The IEEE P1817 working group has produced an initial description of a system
to allow consumers perpetual ownership and unrestricted use of copyrighted
materials [67]. The only limitation put on the use of copyrighted material is that
a key is required to use a product. The idea of the working group is to allow
users to use, share, lend, give, and resell, but not copy, digital materials. While
the P1817 standard provides options for customers to resell content it relies on a
trusted player to store cryptographic keys and not allow them to be copied. The
working group is still in its early stages and it will be interesting to see how this
develops in the future.
2.1.9 Anonymous Credentials
The Idemix system [13] developed by Camenisch et al is an implementation
of an anonymous credential system [15]. A credential system has users and
organisations. Credentials are issued by organisations to users. Users then
demonstrate possession of these credentials to other organisations. When using
anonymous credentials, users are known to organisations by pseudonyms and a
series of independent transactions by a user are unlinkable. A user has different
pseudonyms with different organisations. Credentials can be multiple use or one-
show. In this thesis I concentrate on one-show credentials as these can be used to
implement a protocol for anonymously establishing digital provenance in reseller
chains. If a user can prove possession of a one-show credential for an item, then
the provenance of the item can be established.
In anonymous credentials, each organisation has a private and public key.
Each user has a private key. A pseudonym for a user is a name by which the
user is known to an organisation and is formed by a user generated section and
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an organisation generated section. A pseudonym is tagged with a validating tag
that is statistically independent of the user’s private key. A credential is a tuple
that cannot be forged for a correctly formed validating tag. To show possession
of a credential a user takes part in a protocol with the organisation using zero
knowledge proofs of knowledge.
Extensions to the basic anonymous credential protocol support one-show
credentials with optional local revocability (revealed to the issuing organisation)
and global revocability (revealed to all parties) when a user tries to use a one-
show credential multiple times. All-or-nothing non transferability prevents
credential poolingwhere, if a user lends a credential to another user, all the details
about the lending user are revealed to the other user allowing identity theft.
One-show anonymous credentials can provide anonymous digital prove-
nance in reseller chains. When using one-show credentials, the organisation
that generated the original tag would have to be online to verify and generate
a new anonymous credential. Anonymous credentials do not support supplier
anonymity as only the users are anonymous and not the organisations.
2.1.10 Comparison and Discussion
Table 2.1 shows a comparison of related work. The first column of the table lists
the name of the protocol. The second column lists the trust model or what trusted
party and/or cryptographic techniques the protocol uses. The third column lists
whether the protocol can be adjusted to provide secure provenance information.
The fourth column lists whether the protocol provides verification of any third
parties, the fifth whether the protocol supports offline suppliers, and the sixth
column indicates if the protocol supports anonymous suppliers. The final column
indicates whether the protocol supports customer reselling of content.
While the protocols discussed in this chapter achieve some of the goals of a
reseller verification protocol all have disadvantages. The Apple Fairplay system
relies on a trusted reseller and does not provide any methods to establish the
provenance of digital items. The Open Mobile Alliance DRM relies on a trusted
player. Neither of the DRM system provide the option for the customer to resell
content.
The Paradiso system is heavily reliant on a TCM and does not provide the
option for an anonymous supplier. However, the Paradiso system can provide
secure provenance information and provides support for customer reselling of
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Protocol Trust Can Provide 3rd Party Offline Anonymous Customer
Model Provenance Verifiable Supplier Supplier Reselling
Apple Fairplay Trusted Reseller X X
and Encrypted Media
Open Mobile Alliance Trusted Player and X X X
DRM and Rights Issuer
Paradiso System [62, 61] Trusted Computing X X X
Module
Potato System [1, 75] Financial X X X
Incentives
IEEE P1817 [67] Trusted Player X
Decentralised Electronic LGI and X X
Marketplace [85] Controllers
Idemix [13] Anonymous X X X
Credentials
Tagged Digital Signatures and X X X X X
Transactions Verifiable Third Party
Table 2.1: Comparison of Related Work
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items with an offline supplier. The potato system takes in to account financial
motivations and rewards for users of the system and can provide provenance in-
formation but uses a centralised trusted third party to verify reseller transactions.
The Decentralised and Secure Electronic Marketplace (DEM) takes the trusted
third party and distributes it across a number of hosts. While the distribution
of the agents provides better reliability with no central point of failure, there is
still no method to verify the agents and they act as a black box. The owners of the
controllers can also build up data on the transactions in themarketplace andwhat
parties were involved. DEM can be used to provide provenance information for
digital items.
Anonymous credentials provide mechanisms to anonymously establish
provenance for digital items in reseller chains. Anonymous credentials provide
both anonymity and unlinkability for customers and resellers. However, they do
not provide anonymity for suppliers or support for offline suppliers.
2.1.11 Provenance in Web Services
Although there has been research in the area of provenance for web services [39,
89] there has been little work in providing provenance for web services in the
presence of active adversaries. Hasan et al have constructed a protocol for
securely collecting provenance information from distributed sources [43, 44].
Each document in the system has a provenance chain. This chain is composed of
provenance records. When a document is modified, a new provenance record is
added to the provenance chain for that document. A provenance record contains
the identity of the principal modifying the document, a (possibly encrypted)
representation of the actions performed on the document, a hash of the final value
of the document, a hash of some of the contents of the provenance record and
some of the contents of the previous record in the chain signed by the principal
modifying the document (checksum), and a public key certificate of the principal
signed by a trusted certificate authority.
The trust model in this scheme looks at both integrity and confidentiality
properties. A set of auditors are used to check if provenance chains are plausible.
The auditors are assumed to perform and report back the results of reports
correctly. The integrity properties include detecting an adversary adding or
removing provenance records from the provenance chain and detecting an ad-
versary modifying the provenance chain. The confidentiality properties prevent
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unauthorised auditors from accessing sensitive provenance records. Provenance
records can be set to be accessible to a certain subset of auditors, but at least one
auditor must be able to access every provenance record in the provenance chain.
Digital signatures and the hash values of the final document in the provenance
records are used to detect tamperingwith the provenance records. If an adversary
adds or removes provenance records from the middle of the chain, it will be
detected as the signed checksums in the chainwill not follow on from one another.
To check that the provenance chain is for the correct document, an auditor checks
the hash of the document in the final provenance record in the provenance chain
is the same as the current version of the document.
The protocol for providing provenance in web services developed in this
thesis and this protocol both use a similar data structure to represent provenance
information. Both use a chain of provenance information composed of individual
provenance records. In contrast to the work in this thesis, the threat model of
the work by Hasan et al does not include exclusion attacks. Exclusion attacks
involve an adversary taking some data and removing all provenance data from
it and claiming it as their own. In this thesis I do not include the confidentiality
requirements of the work by Hasan et al.
2.2 Summary
This chapter has presented the related work for provenance in reseller chains.
An initial overview of systems that provide data provenance for geographic
information systems, scientific workflows, databases, and tracking the source of
attacks in Grid nodes. This overview shows that the area of digital provenance
research is an expansive one. Provenance systems are an important part of
many Grid computational systems. The Open Provenance Model (OPM) has
been briefly described. The OPM has been applied to the problem of distributed
computing in other work. In this thesis the OPM is used to model information
for provenance of digital items in reseller chains and provenance in web services.
A survey of systems that can be used to provide provenance in reseller chains
has been presented. No single system is able to fulfil all the requirements
established in Section 1.2. Many of the protocols rely on some trusted third party.
These range from a trusted computing module (TCM), to a trusted player, or a
set of trusted controllers. The anonymous credential system can anonymously
26 CHAPTER 2. RELATEDWORK
establish provenance for digital items in reseller chains. However, anonymous
credentials do not support anonymous suppliers or offline suppliers.
A protocol for providing provenance for web services has been presented.
This protocol uses similar data structures and methods to the protocol developed
in this thesis but does not discuss exclusion attacks.
Chapter 3
Domain and Threat Model
This chapter defines the domain, provenance, and threat models for anony-
mously establishing digital provenance in reseller chains. These models show in
what domain the protocol operates, what provenance information is provided,
and what threats the protocol protects against. Finally, I construct a formal
definition of secure provenance.
The domain model shows the parties involved in the protocol. The roles of
the parties in the protocol are then defined.
To provide digital provenance information in reseller chains, the required
provenance information needs to be enumerated. The definitions and actions
defined by the Open Provenance Model (OPM) are applied to model the problem
of providing provenance in reseller chains.
Before designing the protocol, a threat model is needed to define any as-
sumptions made about the participants in the protocol, and what environment
the protocol is running in. For example, does the protocol assume passive or
active adversaries? The threat model lists the assumptions about the attacks the
protocol prevents and under what circumstances an attack is considered to be
successful.
A security analysis of the resulting protocol requires a formal definition of
secure provenance. This formal security definition is built from the definitions of
the algorithms involved in the protocol and the possible attacks on the protocol.
3.1 Domain Model
A participant in the reseller domain takes one of three roles:
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• The Supplier: Suppliers are the original creators or holders of the rights for
an item.
• The Reseller: The reseller or middleman has a set of customers who
purchase goods from them and a set of suppliers that the reseller purchases
the goods from.
• The Customer: The customer purchases items from a reseller that are
produced by a supplier.
A customer may change roles to become a reseller. For example, once a
customer has purchased an item, it can on-sell this item, in which case the
customer takes the role of the reseller. The changing of roles supports customer
reselling of items.
Customer
Supplier
Provenance 
Information Reseller
1 1 1 1..*
verifies modifies
1
1
creates
Figure 3.1: Domain Model
Figure 3.1 shows the domain model for provenance in reseller chains. A
supplier creates provenance information for an item. For each transaction, a
single supplier generates a single piece of provenance information. Resellers
modify the provenance information generated by the supplier. Many resellers
may modify a single piece of provenance information to support multiple
resellers between the supplier and the customer. A single customer will verify
a single piece of provenance information.
3.2 Provenance Model
The Open Provenance Model (OPM) defines a set of terms and relationships to
record provenance of items [59]. These terms and relationships are used to create
a provenance graph that shows the provenance information for an item. If a
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verifier can reconstruct the provenance graph for an item, they can show the
provenance information for the item. The following terms are defined:
• Artifact: An immutable piece of state.
• Process: An action or series of actions performed on or caused by an artifact.
• Agents: A contextual entity controlling a process.
The Open Provenance Model also defines actions used to model provenance
information. The role of the process or agent performing the action parametrises
the actions:
• wascontrolledby(Role): A process is controlled by an agent. The Role
parameter is the role the agent is taking in the protocol.
• wasgeneratedby(Role): An artifact is generated by a process. The Role
parameter is the process generating the artifact.
• usedby(Role): An artifact is used by a process. The Role parameter is the
process that uses the artifact.
Using these terms and definitions, I construct a provenance model for the
domain of reseller transactions. Thismodel instantiates the OPM terms (as shown
in Figure 3.2):
• Artifact: An artifact is an item that the supplier produces and sells, via
resellers, to the customer.
• Process: A process is either “Create” where a supplier generates an item or
“Resell” where a reseller resells an item.
• Agents: All agents are suppliers or resellers. Customers do not feature as
agents as they do not create provenance information.
The constructed model of provenance information in reseller chains instanti-
ates the OPM actions as:
• wascontrolledby(Role): The process of “Create” is controller by a supplier
and “Resell” is controlled by a reseller. The roles are defined as either
“Supplier” or “Reseller”.
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Figure 3.2: Provenance Graph for Tagged Transaction Protocol
• wasgeneratedby(Role): The item is generated by the supplier. The role is
defined as “Create”.
• usedby(Role): The item is used by the “Resell” process. The Role parameter
is “Resell”.
Figure 3.2 shows a provenance graph of provenance in reseller chains. The
item is created by the create process that is controlled by the supplier. The item is
then used by the resell process, controlled by a reseller, where the item is resold
down the reseller chain.
To preserve the privacy of parties taking part in the transactions a verifier
needs to be prevented from being able to reconstruct the entire provenance graph
with all identities. However, to verify the provenance of the items purchased, a
verifier needs to be able to have confidence that this provenance graph can be
constructed. This work presents two methods of managing this conflict:
1. The customer reconstructs all the provenance information without learning
the identities of the parties involved in the protocol, or any information to
link together actions of a participant in different runs of the protocol.
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2. The customer relies on a third party or a threshold value of a group of
independent third parties to verify this provenance information and trusts
the results it receives.
Chapter 6 describes these approaches as well as the architecture and verification
of the TGC in more detail.
3.3 Threat Model
I make the following assumptions about adversaries and participants in the
protocol design. The reseller is a polynomially bounded active adversary. The
customer and supplier are also polynomially bounded. If the reseller is selling
item x, then the reseller cannot collude with the supplier for item x, but can try
to impersonate the supplier. If the reseller could collude with the supplier for
item x, then the supplier could convince a customer that a malicious reseller is
acting correctly. The verification of the reseller relies on the supplier wanting to
prevent and, if possible, discover malicious resellers for the items it sells. While
the reseller selling item x cannot collude with the supplier for x, the reseller may
collude with any other supplier to try to convince the customer that the other
supplier is the valid supplier for item x.
The customer does not collude with the reseller. If the customer was prepared
to collude with the reseller, then they would have no incentive to take part in
any verification protocol; either they would seek out a malicious reseller to avoid
having to pay full price for the item, or they would acquire the item illegally.
While neither the supplier nor the customer collude with the reseller, it is not
assumed that both are honest. Either the supplier or the customer may try to
discover the identity of anonymous participants in the protocol. Additionally,
either the customer or supplier may try and link together actions of other
participants in the protocol. As the customer is able to resell the item after
purchasing it from a reseller, when the customer plays the role of a reseller it
should be prevented from being able to perform attacks on the protocol.
There may be a third party who tries to discredit a participant in the protocol
by impersonating them. For example, a reseller r1 may try to pose as another
reseller r2 and act in a malicious way so that the verification protocol fails and it
appears r2 is untrustworthy when it is really an act of sabotage by r1.
The adversary follows a Dolev Yao model [30]. In the Dolev Yao model,
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the adversary has full control of the network and can intercept messages, read
messages, drop messages, or insert fake messages. Denial of service attacks,
where an adversary may either drop all messages for a participant in the protocol
or bombard a participant with too many messages, are not considered an attack
unless they result in a spoofing, counterfeiting, identity revelation, or linkability
attack.
Side channel attacks are not considered. There are many potential side
channel attacks that could be made on a protocol for providing provenance in
reseller chains. For example, if an adversary knows the most common times for a
New Zealand participant to be involved in a protocol, the adversary may be able
to gain some information about what country (or time zone) a participant is in
based on the time of the protocol’s execution. This is just one example and there
are many varied side channel attacks that have been applied to many different
security protocols.
As customers directly deal with resellers, a group of customers can link
together the actions of a reseller with respect to this group. As the customers have
to directly deal with the reseller to browse their store and arrange a purchase,
there is no way to prevent the customers from learning the identities of the
resellers they are purchasing items from. This is considered a side channel
attack as the identity revelation is not a direct effect of the protocol to establish
provenance.
When an anonymous communication channel is used, it is assumed to be
a perfect anonymous channel. The design and implementation of anonymous
communication channels is beyond the scope of this work.
3.4 Protocol Definition
In this section, I present a high level description of a protocol for anonymously
establishing digital provenance in reseller chains. This high level description of
the protocol is implementation independent; a variety of implementations could
fulfil the requirements of the description. This work provides implementations
of protocols that fulfil these requirements. The following notation describes the
protocol. The value item is a unique identifier for the item. The notation pk
represents a public key and sk represents a private key. The variable data is
information that is used to generate the license that verifies the provenance of
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item.
A protocol for anonymously establishing digital provenance in reseller chains
is defined as a set of five multi-party algorithms.
1. Setup(k): a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm that sets up keys
and global parameters necessary for the protocol with security parameter k.
2. Register(item, pkitem): a polynomial time algorithm where the supplier
for item registers it with some public information pkitem where only the
supplier knows the corresponding private information skitem. Returns 1 or
0 to indicate success or failure of the registration.
3. Generate(item, data, skitem): a PPT algorithmwhich returns license for item.
The algorithm generates license using the secret information for the item
skitem and data.
4. Regenerate(item, licenseold, dataold, datanew): a PPT algorithmwhich returns
licensenew for item. The algorithm generates licensenew using datanew as well
as licenseold and dataold from an existing license for item.
5. V erifyLicense(item, data, license): a polynomial time algorithm that veri-
fies the correctness of license for item and data and returns 1 or 0.
The use of the Generate and Regenerate algorithms will result in a set of
licenses {license1, ..., licensen} with corresponding data values {data1, ..., datan}.
These values form a well defined sequence from i = 1, ..., n. The following
formula express the correctness property:
V erifyLicense(item, datai, licensei) = 1
where license1 = Generate(item, data1, skitem)
and licensei = Regenerate(item, licensei−1, datai−1, datai)
3.5 Security Properties
The security of a protocol for anonymously establishing digital provenance in
reseller chains consists of ensuring security against spoofing, fabrication, cloning,
network sniffing, identity revelation, and linkability attacks. Let k be a suitable
security parameter as used in the Setup method. As it is assumed the supplier
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for item is honest for transactions involving item, the Setup(k)method generates
item, pkitem, and skitem.
The following definitions use the public (pkTGC) and private key (skTGC) of the
Tag Generation Centre (TGC)which is a third party used in the tagged transaction
protocol. While these parameters are specific to the tagged transaction protocol
they can be substituted for any other protocol specific values when using the
following definitions for analysing other protocols. For the following definitions,
the TGC acts as a trusted third party. Subsequent work removes this assumption
(Chapter 6).
The notation Prob[x] indicates the probability of action x. The notation
Aa,b(params) indicates the adversary has access to the oracles a and b and the
data in params.
Oracles:
The adversary A has access to three oracles:
1. Oinit(item, pk) registers item using pk. Oinit simulates the Register algo-
rithm.
2. Ogen(item, data) generates a license for item using data. Ogen simulates the
Generate algorithm.
3. Oreg(item,Licenseold, data) generates a new license for item using data and
an old license Licenseold. Oreg simulates the Regenerate algorithm.
3.5.1 Prevention of Spoofing
To claim to be the supplier, the adversary A will have to register the item.
Any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A should have negligible
probability of completing the following experiment expspoofing:
Setup(k) → (skTGC , pkTGC , item, pkitem, skitem)
pkr ← A
Oinit(pkTGC)
expspoofing = Prob[1 ← Register(item, pkr)]
where Oinit cannot be used with item.
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3.5.2 Prevention of Fabrication
An adversary A should not be able to produce a valid tag for item and data
without knowledge of the secret key for the item skitem. Any PPT adversary
A should have negligible probability of completing the following experiment
expfabrication:
Setup(k) → (skTGC , pkTGC , item, pkitem, skitem)
Register(item, pkitem) → 1
license← AOgen,Oreg(item, data, pkitem, pkTGC)
expfabrication = Prob[1 ← V erifyLicense(item, data, license)]
where Ogen and Oreg cannot be used with item and data.
3.5.3 Prevention of Network Sniffing
In a network sniffing attack, the adversary sees a valid license on the network and
uses it to generate a new license. Any PPT adversary A should have negligible
probability of completing the following experiment expsniffing:
Setup(k) → (skTGC , pkTGC , item, pkitem, skitem)
Register(item, pkitem) → 1
licold ← Generate(item, dataold, skitem)
lic← AOreg(item, data, pkitem, pkTGC , licold)
expsniffing = Prob[1 ← V erifyLicense(item, data, lic)]
3.5.4 Prevention of Cloning
In a cloning attack, the adversary has access to a valid license which it uses to
create two new valid licenses. Any PPT adversary A should have negligible
probability of completing the following experiment expcloning:
Setup(k) → (skTGC , pkTGC , item, pkitem, skitem)
Register(item, pkitem) → 1
licold ← Generate(item, dataold, skitem)
lic1 ← A
Oreg(item, data1, pkitem, pkTGC , licold)
lic2 ← A
Oreg(item, data2, pkitem, pkTGC , licold)
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expcloning = Prob[1 ← V erifyLicense(item, data1, lic1)] AND
Prob[1 ← V erifyLicense(item, data2, lic2)]
3.5.5 Prevention of Identity Revelation
In an identity revelation attack, the adversary A finds the identity of a participant
in the protocol that is not its neighbour in the reseller chain. The adversary has
access to the setM of all messages sent as part of the protocol and the setN of the
identities of all parties involved in the protocol other than the TGC. The TGC is a
well-known party that signs messages and is not involved in the transactions so
it is excluded from the definition of identity revelation. The symbol idm denotes
the identity of the sender of the messagem and Prob[idm] denotes the probability
of identifying the sender ofm. Identity revelation is defined in terms of A finding
the identity of the sender of a message. Formally, any PPT adversary A should
have negligible probability of completing the following experiment expidentity:
Givenm ∈M
expidentity = Prob[idm]−
1
|N |
3.5.6 Prevention of Linkability
Unlinkability ensures that a user may make multiple uses of resources or services
without others being able to link these uses together (ISO 15408 standard [50]). In
a linkability attack, the adversary A links together actions of a participant other
than the supplier or the TGC based on themessages posted as part of the protocol.
The supplier and the TGC are removed from the set of participants in this case. As
the supplier first generates all licenses for an item, linking together the actions of
the supplier is trivial. In fact, the protocol should ensure that the correct supplier
generates the initial license for an item.
The symbol M denotes the set of all messages sent as part of the protocol
and N denotes the set of the identities of all parties involved in the protocol
other than the TGC and suppliers. The value mi,r is defined as the messages
sent by participant i in run r of the protocol. Informally, the definition of
unlinkability involves the adversary not being able to tell the difference between
a set of messages sent by a random participant, and the set of messages sent
by a participant that they have seen messages from before. The adversary is
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given access to all messagesM . Initially, the adversary is also given access to the
identity of a participant i, and the messagesmi,r1 sent by participant i in run r1. A
second participant is randomly chosen that is different to the first participant and
a second run of the protocol that features both participants. Either 0 or 1 is chosen
with equal probability. The adversary is then given the challenge of deciding
whether a group of messages mxb,r2 was sent by participant i or j. Formally, any
PPT adversary A should have negligible probability of completing the following
experiment explink:
1. Select participant i, run r1, andmi,r1
2. Choose j ∈R N where i 6= j
3. Select run r2 which features participant i and j
4. Choose b ∈R {0, 1}
5. Set xb = i and x1−b = j
6. b′ ← A(i,mi,r1,mxb,r2,mx1−b,r2)
7. explink = Prob[b
′ = b]− 1
2
3.5.7 Security Definition
As a contribution of this work, I define the formal definition of security for
providing digital provenance in reseller chains. The formal definition uses the
definitions already presented to create a top level definition of secure provenance.
This definition can then be used to analyse the protocols constructed in this Thesis
to check they provide secure provenance.
Secure Provenance. Any probabilistic polynomial time adversary (PPT)A should have
negligible probability of completing a spoofing, fabrication, cloning, network sniffing,
identity revelation, or linkability attack.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, a domain model for reseller chains was presented. This domain
model shows the parties and roles involved in the protocol. A model and graph
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of provenance information for the reseller model was presented in the Open
Provenance Model format. This model shows the information necessary for a
verifier to construct the provenance information for a digital item. Themodel also
shows the conflict between providing provenance information and providing
anonymity for participants. This conflict is resolved using one of two methods:
removing the identifying information from the provenance information, and
having a third party or group of independent third parties verify the provenance
information.
An in depth threat model has been presented. The threat model explic-
itly states the assumptions made when constructing the protocol to establish
provenance information in reseller chains. The threat model also shows what
is considered an attack on the protocol and what parties may collude together.
I have defined a protocol for anonymously establishing digital provenance
in reseller chains as a set of five algorithms. These algorithms describe any
protocol that is designed to solve this problem and are not limited to the protocols
created in this thesis. The security properties are then formally defined as
prevention of spoofing, fabrication, cloning, network sniffing, identity revelation,
and linkability attacks. These security properties are used in the formal definition
of secure provenance. Using this definition, it can be shown whether a protocol
to establish provenance information in reseller chains is secure.
The next two chapters present two protocols that provide secure provenance
in reseller chains. The protocols are analysed against the specification provided
in this chapter.
Chapter 4
Tagged Transaction Protocol
This chapter presents the design and analysis of the tagged transaction protocol
for anonymously providing provenance of digital items in reseller chains. The
tagged transaction protocol uses a third party called the Tag Generation Centre
(TGC) to generate and sign tags. If a customer has a valid tag that is signed by
the TGC then they can be confident in the provenance of the item that the reseller
has sold them. The properties of the tagged transaction protocol include:
1. It provides a method for customers to check the provenance of an item they
are purchasing, even from an untrusted reseller.
2. It provides anonymity and unlinkability for customers and resellers that are
not neighbours in the reseller chain. It also provides optional anonymity for
suppliers. This prevents other parties from building up information on the
transactions of participants in the protocol.
3. It supports customer reselling of items. If a customer wishes to resell an
item they have purchased from a reseller, they can take the role of a reseller
and sell it to another customer.
4. It does not require the interaction of the supplier once the initial tag has been
generated. The resellers and the TGC co-operate to generate the subsequent
tags.
5. It does not provide enforcement of licenses.
The tagged transaction protocol does not include payment methods. The
implementation of a fair payment scheme is out of the scope of this work.
Chapter 5 describes an extended version of the tagged transaction protocol with
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the Tagged Transaction Protocol
revocable anonymity. Chapter 6 describes mechanisms to verify the actions of the
TGC while preserving the anonymity and unlinkability of the parties involved in
the transaction.
The tagged transaction protocol provides secure provenance information
at every step in a reseller transaction. When a customer or reseller receives
provenance information they will want to authenticate the item (make sure that
the item originally came from the correct supplier) and to authenticate the current
owner (make sure the reseller or supplier they are purchasing the item from has
a legitimate copy of the item with correct provenance information). While the
customers and resellers will want to authenticate this provenance information
the identities of the participants in the protocol should remain anonymous and
unlinkable between different runs of the protocol.
Figure 4.1 shows the operation of the tagged transaction protocol. Suppliers
and resellers create tags that are passed to the purchaser of an item, either a
customer or another reseller. There can be many resellers in the chain between
the supplier and the customer. The tagged transaction protocol has three main
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phases as shown by the numbers in Figure 4.1:
1. Registration Phase. The supplier initially registers the item with the TGC.
2. Supplier Generating Tag. The supplier and TGC take part in a protocol to
create a tag for an item.
3. Reseller Generating Tag. Resellers and the TGC take part in a protocol to
update the information in the tag. The reseller presents the TGC with a
valid tag before the TGC will update the information in that tag. This phase
is repeated as many times as required depending on the number of resellers
in the chain.
4.1 Definitions
In the tagged transaction protocol, tags are used to represent provenance infor-
mation and are passed from the supplier to the customer via resellers. A tag is
defined as a tuple:
tag = {A = pkx, B = Lx, C = pktag,r}
The parameters of the tag are:
• A = pkx: the public key for the item. This is registered with the TGC when
the supplier first creates the item. The TGC should only sign tags that have
the correct public key for the item in this entry.
• B = Lx = {id = H(x), License}skx : a license signed with the secret key
for the item x. This license contains information such as the identity of the
item id = H(x) and the other terms of the license. Section 4.1.1 discusses
identifying items and Section 4.1.2 discusses the structure of licenses.
• C = pktag,r: the one time public key for the participant r and tag tag.
To preserve the anonymity of the supplier, resellers, and customers, all
communication with the TGC must be done over an anonymous communica-
tion channel. Section 6.1 discusses mechanisms to implement the anonymous
communication channel. The signed license links this tag with the item being
sold. The license contains information to allow any party to check what item
the license is for and the terms of the license. A one time key is used for tags as a
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single key for each participant links together the transactions of that participant in
multiple runs of the protocol. Resellers and customers generate one time public
and private keys and the public key is embedded in the tag. For tag tag and
reseller r, the value pktag,r denotes the public key and sktag,r denotes the secret
key.
The tagged transaction protocol uses a digital signature scheme and an
encryption scheme. The TGC signs tags and the public signing key of the TGC
has to be well known to verify the signed tags. The public encryption key of the
TGC is also well known so that the supplier can encrypt messages to send to the
TGC. Before the protocol is run for the first time, the TGC generates and publishes
public encryption and signing keys. The notation {A}skB denotes the message A
signed using the key skB and {A}pkB denotes the message A encrypted using the
key pkB .
4.1.1 Identifying Items
To establish provenance of digital items, items need to be uniquely identified.
The requirement of identifying digital items is complicated by the fact that digital
items could be modified, either maliciously or as a requirement of functionality.
For example, a music file may be available for sale from a reseller in one of several
formats. To transfer between these formats, a new encoding is applied to the
file and the music file needs to be recognisable as the same digital item under
these transformations. Other transformations may be applied maliciously. For
example, a malicious reseller could cut a small period from the start or end of a
music file, or alternately they could add a small period to the start or end of the
song to try and make it appear as a new item that they can claim ownership
of. There are several techniques used to identify items ranging from simple
techniques such as hash values and string values, to stenographic techniques
such as digital watermarking.
Hash Values
A hash value is a basic form of identification where a cryptographic hash function
H , such asMD5 [76] or SHA-1 [32], is applied to the item x to produce the identity
id = H(x). A hash value is not robust under modifications or transformations of
the item it identifies. Any change to the item will result in a new identity. Hash
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functions are efficient to compute, a customer can easily check if the item they
have received is identified by a specific hash value.
String Values
A digital item may also be identified using string values. In its most basic form
a string value can be the title of the digital item, such as the name of a song. A
more complex representation of an item using string values may include extra
meta data such as the artist who recorded the song, the year of release, and the
album name. Meta data values are dependent on the type of item being identified,
with different types of items having different meta data. String values in the form
of XML files are used in the ISO standard 21000-3 Digital Item Identification [51].
An XML file is created that provides a description of the item and an identifier
in a standard identification scheme such as ISBN (International Standard Book
Number) or ISRC (International Standard Recording Code).
String values are robust under transformations applied to the file as they are
not calculated from the data of the item. When using string values to identify
items, customers may not know the exact name identifying an item. For example,
when given two different identifiers “Windows XP” and “Microsoft Windows
XP” it may be difficult for the customer to choose the correct identifier of the item
they wish to purchase.
Digital Watermarking
Digital watermarking is a stenographic technique that embeds information in
data by applying minor modifications to the data in a perceptually invisible
manner. The watermark information can be recovered from the modified data
by detecting the presence of these modifications. There have been many digital
watermarking schemes that have been put forward in the literature [9, 10, 24, 26,
42, 71, 84, 90]. There are many different techniques used to watermark media
files including least significant bit substitution [9, 26, 90], transform domain
techniques [10, 24], and spread spectrum techniques [42].
Digital watermarking may be symmetric or asymmetric. In a symmetric wa-
termarking system, the same key is used to both embed and detect a watermark.
In asymmetric watermarking, a different key is used to embed the watermark
than is used to detect it.
Digital watermarking requires themodification of the item to bewatermarked.
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Some items, such as a piece of software, may no longer function correctly when
they have been modified with a watermark.
A robust watermarking scheme preserves thewatermarkwhen different types
of transformation are applied to the watermarked item. Digital watermarks have
been shown to be secure against certain attacks to remove the watermark. How-
ever, digital watermarks are vulnerable to re-watermarking where an adversary
applies a new watermark to the data without removing the existing watermark.
Discussion
Uniquely identifying items is a difficult problem, especially when there are a
large number of different types of items that may have separate transformations
applied to them. There has been a lot of research work in the area [9, 10, 24, 26,
42, 51, 71, 84, 90]. In general the problem of uniquely identifying items is beyond
the scope of this thesis. However, in the protocols constructed in this thesis a
hash value is used as the identifier for an item. While hash values have problems
identifying items that have had a transformation applied to them, it is a simple
and efficient solution. When a single item has multiple different representations,
a group of hash values can be used to show an item is one of a group. Any
identification scheme could be substituted for the hash value, the constructed
protocols do not require a specific identification scheme.
4.1.2 Structure of Licenses
In the tagged transaction protocol, the supplier creates and signs a license for
the digital item being sold. This license should contain information to identify
the item, as well as any extra terms of the license such as duration of the license.
The main restriction on the license information is that the license cannot contain
any identifying information of the supplier, reseller, or any other parties in the
protocol. The exception to this rule is if the supplier is not anonymous, in which
case the license can include the identity of the supplier. The license may be a well
known license, a pre-defined license, or a one off license. A well known license
is a license that is used for many different items and is well known such as the
GNU General Public License (GPL) 1. A pre-defined license is a license that is
applied to many items of the same sort such as the End User License Agreement
1http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html
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for Windows XP Home 2. A one-off license is created fresh each time for one user
and one item.
As the tagged transaction protocol sends license information separately from
the digital items themselves, there is no need to embed the license information
in the items. The license information can be in a separate data structure. A
language for expressing license terms is a Rights Expression Language (REL). A
REL presents rights information in an unambiguous machine readable format.
The basic construct of a REL is a rights expression. A rights expression describes
some permission granted for some protected content and may include conditions
on the use of this permission. Several RELs have been developed including the
creative commons Rights Expression Language (ccREL) [2], Open Digital Rights
Language (ODRL) [65], and the MPEG-21 REL [52].
ccREL uses triples in the Resource Description Framework (RDF) format. RDF
is a framework for describing entities on the web and uses URLs (or URIs) to
address entities. An RDF triple for describing the license on a web page would
have the URL of the web page, a URL defining the term license, and a URL
pointing to the license for the web page. RDF triples can be represented in
various ways but a common method is the use of XML. ccREL also provides
definitions of features for providing information on the licensed content as well
as any requirements or prohibitions on the license. While the ccREL is primarily
designed to work with the creative commons license, it can be used with any type
of license.
ODRL uses a Policy object as its core structure [65]. This policy can have
attributes that describe the license such as permissions and prohibitions. A policy
can be structured as an offer where rights are granted if the party performs
certain duties. These duties can be actions such as paying a set amount for the
permission to play a media file. Once the policy has been accepted, an agreement
policy is created. This agreement policy must contain an identifier for the party
the agreement is with. This party field would invalidate our requirement for
anonymity of the parties in the protocol. However, a policy can also be created
in a ticket form which grants the rights in the policy to the holder of the ticket.
ODRL policies can be expressed in XML.
The core element of the MPEG-21 REL is a license [52]. A license contains
one or more grants and an issuer. The issuer is the party that issued the license
and signs the license and timestamps the license. One or more issuers may sign
2http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/eula/home.mspx
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the same license. A grant comprises four parts: a principal the grant is issued
to, the resource the grant is for, the right the principal has on the resource, and
any conditions on the grant. To provide anonymity for the tagged transaction
protocol, the principal would need to be generic or obfuscated in some way. The
MPEG-21 REL can be expressed in XML.
Any of the RELs examined here can fulfil the requirements to express licenses
in the tagged transactions protocol. Licenses can be formatted in XML documents
that are sent to the customers. The choice of which REL to use can be left to
the supplier. There are no restrictions on the type of license, other than the lack
of identifying information. The supplier will want to choose a REL that is well-
supported so that it can be sure that customers will be able to interpret the license
when they receive it. The choice of REL may also be influenced by the type of
license, for example, a supplier that uses a creative commons license may want
to use ccREL as its design is closely aligned to the creative commons license.
4.1.3 Digital Signature Scheme
The tagged transaction protocol requires a digital signature scheme that is secure
against existential forgeries under adaptive chosen message attacks. There are
several well known digital signature schemes that provide this security property.
The main signature schemes fall in to two families: El-Gamal based signatures,
and RSA based signatures.
Tahir El-Gamal introduced El-Gamal signatures in 1984 [37]. The El-Gamal
family of signatures rely on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms
over finite fields. The original signature scheme is subject to existential forgery
attacks. Pointcheval et al developed a modified version of the signature scheme
that is provably secure in the random oracle model against existential forgeries
under adaptive chosen message attacks [74]. Schnorr developed a variant of
the El-Gamal signature scheme that produces a shorter signature [83]. The
Schnorr signature scheme has also been shown to be secure in the random
oracle model against existential forgeries under an adaptive chosen message
attacks [74]. Another popular variant of the El-Gamal signature scheme is the
Digital Signature Standard (DSS) defined in the document FIPS 186-3 [63]. The
DSS requires more computation to compute and verify signatures than either the
modified El-Gamal or the Schnorr signature schemes.
The RSA family of signatures was introduced by Rivest et al in 1978 [77]. It
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was the first practical implementation of a digital signature scheme. The family of
RSA signatures relies on the difficulty of factorising large numbers. The original
RSA signature scheme was subject to selective chosen message attacks. Further
work incorporated a randomised padding scheme known as the probabilistic
signature scheme (PSS) [7]. The PSS scheme makes use of two hash functions
and the RSA function to produce randomised signatures. The PSS scheme
has been shown to be secure in the random oracle model against existential
forgeries under adaptive chosen message attacks and is the basis for the PKCS
signature scheme [80]. The RSA-PSS signature scheme is more efficient than
the El-Gamal family of signatures, requiring only one modular exponentiation
and the execution of hash functions to sign and verify messages. The size of
the keys in the RSA-PSS signature scheme is twice the size of the keys in the El-
Gamal family of signatures. The PKCS RSASSA-PSS digital signature scheme is a
well known implementation of the RSA-PSS signature scheme produced by RSA
Security [80].
The tagged transaction protocol uses the Schnorr digital signature scheme [83].
This scheme has been shown to be secure against existential forgeries under an
adaptive chosen message attack. The Schnorr signature scheme has the shortest
signature size of the El-Gamal family of signatures and requires one less modular
exponentiation to verify a signature than the modified El-Gamal scheme. The
RSA-PSS signature scheme has shorter signature lengths and requires only one
modular exponentiation to sign and verify signatures. However, once the initial
system wide parameters for the Schnorr signature scheme are set, generating a
new key pair only requires one modular division. The RSA-PSS scheme requires
two large primes to be generated to create a key pair. As the tagged transaction
protocol makes use of one time keys, the complexity of the key generation
algorithm is an important factor.
4.1.4 Encryption Scheme
The tagged transaction protocol requires an encryption scheme that provides
indistinguishability under adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA2).
The two most commonly used encryption schemes are the RSA encryption
scheme and the El-Gamal encryption scheme.
The RSA encryption scheme was developed by Rivest et al in 1978 [77]. The
RSA cryptosystem relies on the difficulty of factorising large numbers. The
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original RSA scheme was subject to chosen plaintext attacks. To provide IND-
CCA2 security, various padding schemes have been developed. The most
common of these are Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [6] and
the Probabilistic Signature Scheme with message Recovery (PSS-R) [8, 23]. RSA
with the OAEP padding scheme, RSA-OAEP, has been shown to be IND-CCA2
secure in the random oracle model [6, 36, 86]. PKCS RSAES-OAEP is a well
known encryption standard based on RSA-OAEP produced by RSA Security [80].
The first efficient public key cryptosystem with IND-CCA2 security was the
Cramer Shoup public key cryptosystem [25]. The Cramer Shoup cryptosystem
is an IND-CCA2 enhancement of the El-Gamal cryptosystem [37]. To provide
IND-CCA2 security, the Cramer Shoup cryptosystem uses a hash value and
adds several extra modular exponentiations to both encryptions and decryptions.
General methods for converting one way trapdoor functions to IND-CCA2
encryption schemes have also been developed [35, 73]. These general methods
can be applied to encryption schemes, such as the El-Gamal encryption scheme,
to provide IND-CCA2 security and are more efficient than the Cramer Shoup
cryptosystem.
In the tagged transaction protocol, I make use of the PKCS RSAES-OAEP
encryption scheme. PKCS RSAES-OAEP has been shown to be IND-CCA2 secure
in the random oracle model. To encrypt and decrypt in the PKCS RSAES-
OAEP encryption scheme requires just one modular exponentiation. This is
more efficient than any of the El-Gamal based encryption schemes. While the
key generation for PKCS RSAES-OAEP requires more computation than for El-
Gamal based schemes, the key generation only needs to be done once by the TGC.
The tagged transaction protocol performs many more encryption and decryption
operations than key generation making the efficiency of the encryption and
decryption operations more important than the efficiency of the key generation.
4.2 Registration Phase
This section presents the registration phase of the tagged transaction protocol.
There are two separate registration options. The first option provides anonymity
for suppliers while the second option does not support anonymous suppliers.
The registration process is shown in Figure 4.2. Both of the options involve the
supplier first producing the item x. The supplier will then generate the identity
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Supplier TG C
1) {id=H (x), pkx}pkTG C
2) {id=H(x), pkx}skTGC
Figure 4.2: Registering the Item with the TGC
of the item id = H(x) and a secret key (skx) and public key (pkx) for the item. The
public key and identity of the item are then registered with the TGC by sending
the TGC the message {id, pkx}pkTGC . The message is encrypted with the public
encryption key of the TGC. This is to prevent an adversary from intercepting
the message, changing the public key for the item and sending the message
on to the TGC. After a successful registration the TGC returns a signed receipt
{id, pkx}skTGC or if the registration fails the TGC returns 0. If an anonymous
supplier is required, the communication between the supplier and TGC must be
done over an anonymous communication channel.
The anonymous supplier option uses a first-in first-registered style of regis-
tration. When the supplier is anonymous there are no checks the TGC can do to
verify that the supplier registering the item is the correct supplier. When supplier
anonymity is required the supplier should register the item before making it
public to prevent an adversary registering the item before the supplier.
When supplier anonymity is not required the TGC may convince itself with
out of band checks that the party registering the item is the correct supplier
similar to checks done by a certification authority. This approach prevents denial
of service, or brute force, attacks on the registration step where an adversary
floods the TGC with registration requests in the hope of registering a real item.
4.3 Supplier Generating Tag with TGC
To initially generate a tag a protocol takes place between the reseller, the supplier,
and the TGC. The communication between the supplier and the TGC is done over
an anonymous channel if supplier anonymity is required as shown by dotted
lines in Figure 4.3. The generation of a new tag for an item by the supplier takes
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Reseller Supplier TGC
1) id=H(x), pktag,r
2) Lx={H(x),Licensex}skx
3) {Lx, pktag,r}skx
4) tag={pkx,Lx,pktag,r}skTGC
5) tag
6) tag
Figure 4.3: Supplier Generating Tag with TGC
place in the six steps shown in Figure 4.3.
1. The reseller sends a purchase request to the supplier containing the identity
of the item they wish to purchase id = H(x) and the one time public key
for the tag pktag,r. The reseller randomly picks a private key and uses this to
generate the public key.
2. The supplier signs a license for the item Lx = {id = H(x), Licensex}skx
where id = H(x) is the identity of the item and Licensex is the license for
the item.
3. The supplier then creates a signed tag request containing the license Lx and
the one time public key pktag,r all signed by skx and sends it to the TGC.
4. The TGC checks the one time public key pktag,r has not been used for this
item before and that the key is correct for this item. If these tests pass, the
TGC constructs and signs tag = {pkx, Lx, pktag,r}skTGC .
5. The TGC sends the tag to the supplier.
6. The supplier sends the tag to the reseller. The reseller checks the tag has
been signed by the TGC, that the license is for the correct item, and that the
tag contains the correct one time public key.
The supplier signs the license generation request with the secret key for the
item to prevent any other party from being able to generate tags for the item. The
reseller will only accept the tag if the tag is signed by the TGC and contains the
correct one time key.
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Customer Reseller TGC
1) id=H(x), pktag,c
tag={pkx,Lx,pktag,r}skTGC
2) {tag, pktag,c}sktag,r
3) If tag, pktag,r not seen before generate
tagc={pkx,Lx,pktag,c}skTGC
4) tagc
5) tagc
Figure 4.4: Reseller Generating Tag with TGC
4.4 Reseller Generating Tag with TGC
Now the tag for an item has been generated, signed, and sent to the reseller, the
reseller can use this tag to generate a new tag for a customer or another reseller
without interacting with the supplier.
The generation of a new tag by a reseller takes place in the five steps shown
in Figure 4.4. The communication between the reseller and the TGC is done over
an anonymous channel shown by dotted lines.
1. The customer sends a purchase request comprised of the identity of the item
they wish to purchase, and the one time public key for the tag pktag,c. The
customer randomly picks a private key and uses this to generate the public
key.
2. The reseller sends a message with the one time public key chosen by the
customer pktag,c and the tag signed using the one time secret key used in the
generation of the tag sktag,r to the TGC.
3. The TGC then checks whether the tag has been cloned. The tag signed by
the TGC contains a one time public key from the reseller. When the TGC
generates a new tag for a customer it records the signed message from the
reseller {tag, pktag,c}sktag,r . If a reseller tries to clone a tag then the TGC
will have two signed messages {tag, pktag,c1}sktag,r and {tag, pktag,c2}sktag,r .
The TGC presents these two signed messages as evidence the tag has
been cloned. If the tag has not been cloned the TGC generates a new tag
tagc = {pkx, L, pktag,c}skTGC .
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4. The TGC sends tagc to the reseller.
5. The reseller sends tagc to the customer.
The message {tag, pktag,c}sktag,r from the reseller to the TGC is signed using the
one time private key for the tag. A reseller will need to know the one time private
key for the tag to generate a new tag with the TGC. This prevents a network
sniffing attack where an adversary sees a tag being sent over the network and
tries to use it to generate a new tag. The signing of the message also prevents
another reseller from being able to frame the original reseller in a cloning attack.
As the message needs to be signed by the one time private key another reseller
cannot modify the message sent to the TGC to alter the customer’s one time key,
or to fabricate a new tag signed using the one time private key. The signing of the
message also allows the TGC to prove to a third party that a tag has been replayed
by presenting the two messages {tag, pktag,c1}sktag,r and {tag, pktag,c2}sktag,r .
This step of the tagged transaction protocol is repeated as many times as
required. The customer will take the role of the reseller and generate a new tag
for another reseller or customer further down the chain of resellers.
4.5 Security Analysis
Thereom 1. The tagged transaction protocol provides Secure Provenance (Section 3.5.7)
in the random oracle model provided that the signature scheme used has provable security
against existential forgeries under adaptive chosen message attacks and the encryption
scheme used has provable security against IND-CCA2 attacks.
I use a reduction to contradiction style of argument to show the tagged
transaction protocol provides security against spoofing, fabrication, network
sniffing, and cloning attacks. I then make arguments showing the security of
the tagged transaction protocol against identity revelation and linkability attacks.
In this security analysis, the TGC is assumed to be acting as a trusted third
party. Chapter 6 removes this assumption and discusses methods to verify
the actions of the TGC. For the security analysis of the identity revelation and
linkability properties the following assumptions are made: a perfect anonymous
communication channel, an anonymous supplier, and the parties in the protocol
not revealing their identities or the identities of the parties with whom they
communicate. This security analysis does not consider side channel attacks.
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Figure 4.5: Simulator and Adversary for Signature Schemes
If the signature scheme provides security against existential forgeries under
adaptive chosen message attacks in the random oracle model, then a simulator
can be constructed that uses an adversary that breaks the signature scheme to
solve a hard problem. This argument for the Schnorr signature scheme was
first made by Pointcheval et al [74]. Figure 4.5 shows the setup for the random
oracle model reduction. There are two parties, a simulator and an adversary.
The adversary is assumed to be able to have a non-negligible advantage of
breaking the signature scheme by outputting a valid message signature pair. The
simulator provides the signature scheme and public key to the adversary. The
simulator provides a signing oracle to the adversary by signing messages sent
by the adversary. The input that the simulator provides to the adversary is
computationally indistinguishable from the input it would receive frommessages
signed by a party with knowledge of the private key. The argument is then
by contradiction. If the adversary can break the signature scheme, then the
simulator can use the output of the adversary to solve a hard problem (in
this case the discrete logarithm problem). Therefore, such an adversary cannot
exist if the problem is hard. The simulator has no knowledge of the inner
workings of the adversary which it treats as a black box. It is also important
to note that the simulator does not have access to the private signing key for the
signature scheme, however, it is able to simulate the signing in a computationally
indistinguishable way from a real signer. All input to and output from the
adversary goes through the simulator.
Figure 4.6 shows the setup for the tagged transactions reduction argument
in the random oracle model. The simulator is the same as in the analysis of the
security scheme. The adversary in this case is replaced by a tagged transaction
simulator and a tagged transaction adversary. The simulator provides the same
input to the tagged transaction simulator, namely a signature scheme and a
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Figure 4.6: Simulator and Adversary for Tagged Transactions
public key. The simulator also provides simulated signature queries to the tagged
transaction simulator. The tagged transaction simulator provides input to the
tagged transaction adversary that is computationally indistinguishable from the
input it would receive in an actual run of the tagged transaction protocol. If
the adversary can break the security of the tagged transaction protocol, then the
tagged transaction simulator can output a valid message signature pair for the
signature scheme. If the tagged transaction simulator can output a valid message
signature pair, then the original simulator can solve a hard problem. While the
argument I have made corresponds to the signature scheme, a similar argument
can be made regarding the encryption scheme.
The tagged transaction simulator provides the tagged transaction adversary
with inputs that are computationally indistinguishable from the inputs it would
receive in an actual run of the protocol. If the tagged transaction adversary breaks
the security of the tagged transaction protocol in this simulated run, then the
tagged transaction simulator can provide an output that can be used to solve one
of two problems thought to be hard:
1. The tagged transaction simulator breaks the security of the signature
scheme. When given public key pk and access to a signing oracle provided
by the original simulator, the tagged transaction simulator outputs a valid
message signature pair (m,σ)with non negligible probability wheremwas
not used in a query to the signing oracle.
2. The tagged transaction simulator breaks the security of a IND-CCA2 secure
cryptosystem. The tagged transaction simulator is given a public key pk and
access to the encryption and decryption oracles provided by the original
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simulator. The tagged transaction simulator can then make multiple calls
to the encryption and decryption oracles. The tagged transaction simulator
then generates two values m0 and m1 that have not been used in queries to
the oracles and sends them to the original simulator. The original simulator
generates b ∈R {0, 1} and cb = E(mb) and passes cb to the tagged transaction
simulator. The tagged transaction simulator can break the IND-CCA2
cryptosystem if it can guess the value b with probability greater than 1
2
.
When providing inputs to the tagged transaction adversary and analysing the
identity revelation and unlinkability properties, the security arguments involve
showing computational indistinguishability of elements in a group. For a cyclic
group G of order q with generator g, when given an element z chosen at random
from Zq, the element g
z is uniformly distributed in G. Two elements uniformly
distributed in G are computationally indistinguishable. If two elements a1 and
a2 are chosen at random from Zq, the elements g
a1 and ga2 are computationally
indistinguishable. If two private keys for the Schnorr signature scheme are cho-
sen at random, the public keys are computationally indistinguishable. A random
element from G and a Schnorr public key are computationally indistinguishable.
4.5.1 Spoofing
In a spoofing attack, the tagged transaction simulator is given as input the public
key for the encryption scheme pke and access to the encryption and decryption
oracles provided by the original simulator. The tagged transaction simulator
is then challenged to break the security of the encryption scheme. The tagged
transaction simulator generates the values id0, id1, and pkitem randomly and
constructs m0 = (id0, pkitem) and m1 = (id1, pkitem). The tagged transaction
simulator then sends m0 and m1 to the original simulator which returns cb =
{mb}pke where b ∈R {0, 1}.
Oracles:
The tagged transaction simulator implements the Oinit oracle. The tagged
transaction simulator records in a list the input values (idi and pki) it receives.
When a query is submitted that uses inputs already in the list, the tagged
transaction simulator returns 0. If a query is submitted that does not appear
in the list the tagged transaction simulator sends the message {idi, pki} to the
encryption oracle which will return {idi, pki}ske .
Input:
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The tagged transaction simulator provides input to the adversary that is
computationally indistinguishable from the input it would receive in an actual
run of the protocol. The tagged transaction simulator provides as input to the
adversary pkTGC = pke. The tagged transaction simulator also provides as input
to the adversary cb = {idb, pkitem}pke . As the adversary is assumed to be in
the Dolev Yao model, they have complete control over the network and can
intercept the registrationmessage sent from the supplier to the TGC. Themessage
cb = {idb, pkitem}pke is computationally indistinguishable from the real message
sent from the supplier to the TGC.
Adversary:
Suppose adversary A passes the experiment with non negligible probability.
The probability of the adversary guessing item is negligible (2−k where the
output space of the hash function is k). As the adversary succeeds with non
negligible probability, it must have modified the message cb = {idb, pkitem}pke to
cA = {idb, pkA}pke to register the item. The tagged transaction simulator queries
the decryption oracle with the message cA = {idb, pkA}pke . If cA decrypts to
(id0, pkA) then b = 0 otherwise b = 1.
4.5.2 Fabrication
In a fabrication attack, the tagged transaction simulator is given as input the
public key for the signature scheme pk and access to the signing oracle provided
by the original simulator. The tagged transaction simulator is then challenged
to break the security of the signature scheme by outputting a valid message
signature pair. The tagged transactions simulator generates the values item,
data = pkr, and skitem randomly using the random oracle of the original simulator.
As item is the output of a hash function it is computationally indistinguishable
from a random value. The value skitem is then used to generate the value pkitem.
Oracles:
The tagged transaction simulator implements the Ogen and Oreg oracles. To
simulate Ogen in a manner that is computationally indistinguishable from the
real protocol, the tagged transaction simulator records in a list the input values it
receives. The adversary will send the message {id, pktag,r} where itemi = id and
datai = pktag,r. If the values itemi and datai have not been used before the tagged
transaction simulator submits the message:
m = {pkitem, Lx, datai = pktag,r}
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to the signing oracle and returns:
tag = {pkitem, Lx, datai = pktag,r}sk
The value Lx = {item,Licensex}skitem can be generated by the tagged transaction
simulator as it has access to the values item and skitem.
To simulate Oreg in a manner that is computationally indistinguishable from
the real protocol, the tagged transaction simulator records in a list the input
values it receives. The adversary will send the message:
{{pkitem, Lx, pktag,r}skTGC , pktag,c}sktag,r
where itemj = item in Lx, dataj = pktag,c, and
licold,j = {pkitem, Lx, dataold = pktag,r}skTGC
If the values itemj , licold,j , and dataj have not been used before and the message
is correctly signed with sktag,r, the tagged transaction simulator submits the
message:
{pkitem, Lx, dataj = pktag,c}
to the signing oracle and returns:
{pkitem, Lx, dataj = pktag,c}skTGC
The value Lx = {item,Licensex}skitem is the same value that appears in licold,j .
Input:
The tagged transaction simulator provides input to the adversary that is
computationally indistinguishable from the input it would receive in an actual
run of the protocol. The adversary is given as input the values item, data, pkitem,
and pkTGC = pk.
Adversary:
Suppose adversary A passes the experiment with non negligible probability.
The adversary is then able to fabricate a valid tag with non negligible probability:
tag = {pkitem, Lx, pkr}sk
The simulator can then return this to the original simulator as it has a valid
message signature pair:
({pkitem, Lx, pkr}, tag)
The value {pkitem, Lx, pkr}will not have been used in a query to the signing oracle
as neither the Ogen or Oreg oracles can be used with the value data = pkr.
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4.5.3 Network Sniffing
In a network sniffing attack, the tagged transaction simulator is given as input the
public key for the signature scheme pk and access to the signing oracle provided
by the original simulator. The tagged transaction simulator is then challenged
to break the security of the signature scheme by outputting a valid message
signature pair. The tagged transactions simulator generates the values item,
skTGC and skitem randomly using the random oracle of the original simulator. As
item is the output of a hash function it is computationally indistinguishable from
a random value. The values skitem and skTGC are then used to generate the values
pkitem and pkTGC .
Oracles:
The tagged transaction simulator implements theOreg oracle. To simulateOreg
in a manner that is computationally indistinguishable from the real protocol, the
tagged transaction simulator records in a list the input values it receives. The
adversary will send the message:
{tag = {pkitem, Lx, pktag,r}skTGC , pktag,c}sktag,r
where itemi = item in Lx, datai = pktag,c, and
licold,i = tag = {pkitem, Lx, dataold = pktag,r}skTGC
If the values itemi, licold,i, and datai have not been used before and the message is
correctly signed with sktag,r, the tagged transaction simulator signs the message:
{pkitem, Lx, datai = pktag,c}
using the key skTGC it generates and returns:
{pkitem, Lx, datai = pktag,c}skTGC
The value Lx = {item,Licensex}skitem is the same value that appears in licold,i.
Input:
The tagged transaction simulator provides input to the adversary that is
computationally indistinguishable from the input it would receive in an actual
run of the protocol. The adversary is given as input the values item, data = pk,
pkitem, and pkTGC . The tagged transaction simulator also gives the simulator
access to the old license by constructing the input:
{pkitem, Lx, data = pk}skTGC
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This can be constructed because the tagged transaction simulator has access to the
values pkitem, data, and the value Lx = {item,Licensex}skitem can be generated by
the tagged transaction simulator as it has access to the values item and skitem.
Adversary:
Suppose adversary A passes the experiment with non negligible probability.
Then the adversary has returned the value:
tagA = {pkitem, Lx, pkr}skTGC
There are then two possible options: either the value tagA was output from the
Oreg oracle, or it was fabricated by the adversary. If the value:
tagA = {pkitem, Lx, pkr}skTGC
was output from the Oreg oracle, then this adversary can be used to break the
security of the signature scheme by completing an existential forgery using
the key sk. Since the adversary is polynomially bounded, it can only make a
maximum of n queries to the Oreg oracle where n is polynomially bounded. The
tagged transaction simulator then goes through this list of input values it has
received for the Oreg oracle. Either one of the values in the input will be:
{tagi = {pkitem, Lx, pk}skTGC , pktag,c}sk
or the adversary has fabricated a tag which is detailed in the next paragraph. If
the value:
{tagi = {pkitem, Lx, pk}skTGC , pktag,c}sk
is in the input, then the tagged transaction simulator can use this as a valid
message signature pair:
({tagi, pktag,c}, {tagi, pktag,c}sk)
If the adversary has fabricated a license, the tagged transaction simulator
re-runs the adversary but changes the input to item, data = pktag, pkitem, and
pkTGC = pk, where item, sktag and skitem are randomly chosen and pktag and
pkitem are generated from sktag and skitem. The tagged transaction simulator also
gives the simulator access to the old license by constructing the input:
{pkitem, Lx, data = pktag}sk
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using the signing oracle. The Oreg oracle is also changed. Rather than signing the
message:
{pkitem, Lx, datai = pktag,c}
itself, it will submit it to the signing oracle to sign and return:
{pkitem, Lx, datai = pktag,c}sk
This adversary is then used to break the security of the signature scheme by
completing an existential forgery using the key sk = skTGC . As the adversary
has fabricated a license, they return the value:
tagA = {pkitem, Lx, pkr}sk
that has not been generated by a call to the Oreg query or provided as input. The
tagged transaction simulator can use this message as a valid message signature
pair:
({pkitem, Lx, pkr}, tagA)
4.5.4 Cloning
In a cloning attack, the tagged transaction simulator is given as input the public
key for the signature scheme pk and access to the signing oracle provided by the
original simulator. The tagged transaction simulator is then challenged to break
the security of the signature scheme by outputting a valid message signature
pair. The tagged transactions simulator generates the values item, sktag and skitem
randomly using the random oracle of the original simulator. As item is the output
of a hash function it is computationally indistinguishable from a random value.
The values skitem and sktag are then used to generate the values pkitem and pktag.
Oracles:
The tagged transaction simulator implements theOreg oracle. To simulateOreg
in a manner that is computationally indistinguishable from the real protocol, the
tagged transaction simulator records in a list the input values it receives. The
adversary will send the message:
{tag = {pkitem, Lx, pktag,r}skTGC , pktag,c}sktag,r
where itemi = item in Lx, datai = pktag,c, and
licold,i = {pkitem, Lx, dataold = pktag,r}skTGC
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If the values itemi, licold,i, and datai have not been used before and the message
is correctly signed with sktag,r, the tagged transaction simulator submits the
message:
{pkitem, Lx, datai = pktag,c}
to the signing oracle to sign and returns:
{pkitem, Lx, datai = pktag,c}skTGC
The value Lx = {item,Licensex}skitem is the same value that appears in licold,i.
Input:
The tagged transaction simulator provides input to the adversary that is
computationally indistinguishable from the input it would receive in an actual
run of the protocol. The adversary is given as input the values item, data = pktag,
pkitem, and pkTGC = pk. The tagged transaction simulator also gives the simulator
access to the old license by constructing the input:
tag = {pkitem, Lx, data = pktag}skTGC
using the signing oracle as the tagged transaction simulator has access to the
values pkitem, data, and the value Lx = {item,Licensex}skitem .
Adversary:
Suppose adversary A passes the experiment with non negligible probability,
then this adversary can be used to break the security of the signature scheme by
completing an existential forgery using the key skTGC = sk. If the adversary has
passed the experiment, it will have returned two tags:
tag1 = {pkitem, Lx, pkr1}skTGC
and
tag2 = {pkitem, Lx, pkr2}skTGC
There are three possible ways the adversary used the Oreg oracle to generate tag1
and tag2: the Oreg oracle output both tag1 and tag2, the Oreg oracle output one of
tag1 and tag2, the Oreg oracle did not output either tag1 or tag2.
Since the adversary is polynomially bounded, it can only make a maximum
of n queries to the Oreg oracle where n is polynomially bounded. If both tag1
and tag2 were output from the Oreg oracle, then the tagged transaction simulator
can go through the list of n queries to the Oreg oracle to find the queries with the
outputs of tag1 and tag2. The tagged transaction simulator can then repeat this
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step finding the queries with the outputs that are the same as the previous steps’
inputs. After a maximum of n steps, the tagged transaction simulator will have
two lists of query inputs and outputs:
list1 = ({input1,1, output1,1}, ..., {input1,i, tag1})
and
list2 = ({input2,1, output2,1}, ..., {input2,j , tag2})
As the Oreg oracle will not generate two new tags for the same values of itemi,
licold,i, and datai, the values:
input1,1 = {tag1,1 = {{pkitem, Lx, pk1,1}skTGC , pk1,2}sk1,1
and
input2,1 = {tag2,1 = {{pkitem, Lx, pk2,1}skTGC , pk2,2}sk2,1
must be different. If pk1,1 = data = pktag, then the tagged transaction simulator
uses:
({pkitem, Lx, pk2,1}, {pkitem, Lx, pk2,1}skTGC )
as a valid message signature pair for the original simulator. If pk2,1 = data = pktag,
then the tagged transaction simulator uses:
({pkitem, Lx, pk1,1}, {pkitem, Lx, pk1,1}skTGC )
as a valid message signature pair for the original simulator.
If one (or both) of the values tag1 and tag2 was not in the output from the Oreg
oracle, then the tagged transaction simulator can return a validmessage signature
pair to the original simulator. Suppose tag1 was not in the output of the Oreg
oracle, then the valid message signature pair is:
({pkitem, Lx, pkr1}, tag1)
If tag2 was not in the output of the Oreg oracle, then the valid message signature
pair is:
({pkitem, Lx, pkr2}, tag2)
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4.5.5 Identity Revelation
To show that nomessage in the protocol reveals any information about the sender
of the message, I construct a simulator that can simulate the messages that are
sent in the protocol with no knowledge of the identity of any of the participants
of the protocol. The simulator creates messages that are computationally indistin-
guishable from the messages in an actual run of the protocol. The simulator has
access to the item x and the public variables pkTGC , p, q, and g. The simulator also
has access to a signing oracle for the TGC. This means the simulator can use the
oracle to signmessages using the secret key skTGC . The TGC is not an anonymous
party in the protocol so knowledge that the message was signed by the TGC does
not reveal any information about the other parties in the protocol.
Many of the messages in the protocol are constructed by taking a random
number x and raising a generator of the group g to the power of x to calculate
y = gx mod p. If the simulator and a real participant in the protocol both calculate
these values (the simulator xs and ys = g
xs mod p and the actual participant x and
y = gx mod p), the values ys and y are computationally indistinguishable.
{id = H(x), pkx}pkTGC : The identity of the item id = H(x) is a constant that
can be constructed by the simulator as it has access to the item. The simulator
then constructs the public key for the item by choosing a random value skx and
calculating pkx = g
−skx mod p.
{id = H(x), pktag,r}: The identity of the item id = H(x) is a constant that can be
constructed by the simulator as it has access to the item. The simulator will then
construct the one time public key for the reseller and tag by choosing a random
value sktag,r and calculating pktag,r = g
−sktag,r mod p.
{Lx, pktag,r}skx : The value pktag,r has already been generated by the simulator.
The value Lx = {id = H(x), License}skx is a signed license signed by the key
skx already generated by the simulator. The value License is a license for item,
it may contain values such as the period of the license and other limitations.
To prevent identity revelation the license must be constructed without using an
identity information. If this is the case, the simulator can also generate the license.
{pkx, Lx, pktag,r}skTGC : The values pkx, Lx, and pktag,r have already been
generated by the simulator.
{tag, pktag,c}sktag,r : The values sktag,r and tag have already been generated by
the simulator. The simulator will then construct the one time public key for the
customer and tag by choosing a random value sktag,c and calculating pktag,c =
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g−sktag,c mod p.
4.5.6 Linkability
In any particular run of the protocol, a reseller or customer denoted r sends
{id = H(x), pktag,r} and (if the customer resells) {tag, pktag,c}sktag,r . The values
id = H(x) and Lx are constant for every participant (assuming no identifying
information in Lx). The variable values are pktag,r and pktag,c. The public keys
are computationally indistinguishable if the private keys are chosen randomly.
If an adversary is able to link together the actions of a participant in separate
runs of the protocol, then the adversary can distinguish between computationally
indistinguishable values.
4.6 Modelling
To check the security properties of the tagged transaction protocol, I use the
Failures Divergences Refinement (FDR) model checker [33, 78]. The FDR model
checker checks a Concurrent Sequential Processes (CSP) [46] model of a protocol
against a CSP specification. The FDR model checker was chosen because:
• It has been used extensively to analyse security protocols [29, 55, 57, 79, 81].
• It is supported by the Casper CSP compiler [56]. The Casper compiler takes
a protocol description and compiles it to a CSP file that can be checked by
FDR. The use of Casper makes it easier and quicker to construct CSPmodels
of protocols and specifications although Casper is limited to compiling
secret and authentication properties.
CSP models agents in the protocol as processes and messages are passed
between processes over channels. The adversary is modelled by a process which
starts with a set of initial knowledge. The adversary has the power to perform
any action that a real world attacker could perform if it was in complete control
of the network. These actions include:
• Intercept or overhear any messages sent over the network.
• Decrypt any messages that are encrypted with a key that the adversary
knows.
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• Fake new messages based on any information the adversary has or has
learnt.
• Replay any message, even if the adversary cannot decrypt the message.
When analysing security protocols, a CSPmodel of the protocol is constructed
and FDR checks that the model refines a CSP specification of the protocol. The
FDR model checker is used to check safety properties. An example of a safety
property for a security protocol is the failure of an adversary to discover a secret
value. A CSP model of the protocol with the secret value is constructed, and
the specification that states that the secret value should not be discovered by
the adversary. The FDR model checker will then check all possible states of
the protocol to see if the value is ever revealed to the adversary. When using a
state based model checker to analyse security protocols, any encryption or digital
signatures used are assumed to be perfectly secure. The FDR model checker
enumerates all possible states and transitions between the states to check the
specification against the model.
I have constructed three different models. One to represent the registration
phase of the protocol, one to represent the supplier generating a tag, and one to
represent a reseller generating a tag. The models do not examine anonymity or
unlinkability and concentrate on the properties of spoofing, fabrication, cloning,
and network sniffing. This chapter gives a brief description of the model of the
protocol, followed by a brief description of the CSP specification. Appendix A
shows the detailed CSP models and specifications of the tagged transaction
protocol.
4.6.1 Safe Simplifying Transformations
The initial work on using CSP to verify security properties concentrated on
small protocols like the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol [55]. Other
security protocols are more complex, often involving more fields, messages,
and layers of encryptions. Lowe et al have done work on safe simplifying
transformations to remove some of these complexities and allow model checkers
to check the security properties of more complex protocols without causing a
state explosion [48]. The concept of a safe simplifying transformation is to apply a
transformation to a protocol description to simplify the protocol while preserving
any insecurities. If an attack exists on the original protocol then the attack still
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exists on the simplified protocol.
Some examples of safe simplifying transformations include:
• Removing encryptions on fields in the messages.
• Removing hash functions on fields in the messages.
• Removing some atomic or hashed fields.
• Renaming atoms. An atomic field in a message can be renamed.
• Coalescing atoms. Two atomic fields in a message can be combined.
The transformations above are renaming of fields in messages within the
protocol, there are also structural transformations that have been shown to be
safe simplifications including:
• Splitting a message in two parts.
• Joining two messages into a single message.
• Redirecting a message that is sent via a third party so it is sent direct.
I make use of safe simplifying transformations to simplify the tagged transaction
protocol before using the FDR model checker.
4.6.2 Registration
In the registration phase of the tagged transaction protocol, the supplier is
registering the identity of a new itemwith the TGC alongwith a public key for the
item. The message from the supplier to the TGC is encrypted with the public key
for the TGC and the return message from the TGC is encrypted with the private
key of the TGC. The high level description of the protocol is:
Supplier → TGC : {item, itemkey}pkTGC
TGC → Supplier : {item, itemkey}skTGC
In this model, the identity of the item is represented as the set Items = {item}
and the keys for the item are represented by the set:
ItemKeys = {itemkey, intruderkey}
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Each participant in the protocol has a public and private key pair. The initial
knowledge of the adversary is intruderkey, pkTGC , and pkSupplier.
The registration step has to prevent a spoofing attack where an adversary
registers the item before the supplier. The specification states that if the TGC
receives a registration message for an item, the supplier must have sent the
registration message. The FDR model checker returns TRUE after 10 states with
20 transitions.
4.6.3 Supplier Generating Tag
In the second phase of the tagged transaction protocol, the supplier generates a
tag with the TGC. The reseller first sends the supplier the one time public key for
the tag. The supplier then generates a signed license for the item. The supplier
then sends a signed message with the license and the one time public key. The
TGC then creates and signs the tag and sends it back to the supplier who sends it
to the reseller. The high level description of the protocol is:
Reseller → Supplier : item, pktag,r
Supplier → TGC : {Lx = {H(x), Licensex}skx , pktag,r}skx
TGC → Supplier : {pkx, Lx, pktag,r}skTGC
Supplier → Reseller : {pkx, Lx, pktag,r}skTGC
I apply the following safe simplifying transformations before modelling the
supplier generating a tag with the TGC:
1. Removal of the encryption on the field Lx = {H(x), Licensex}skx to make it
{H(x), License}.
2. Removal of the atomic field License.
3. Removal of the atomic field H(x).
4. Removal of the atomic field item.
After the simplification the description of the protocol is:
Reseller → Supplier : pktag,r
Supplier → TGC : {pktag,r}skx
TGC → Supplier : {pkx, pktag,r}skTGC
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Supplier → Reseller : {pkx, pktag,r}skTGC
In this model, the set Tags = {pktagreseller, pktagwrong} represents the one time
keys for the tags. As these keys are never used for encryption or signing in this
part of the protocol they do not need to be represented as public and private
key pairs. The value pkx is represented as a public key with private key skx.
Each participant in the protocol has a public and private key pair. The initial
knowledge of the adversary is pktagwrong, pkx, pkTGC , pkSupplier, pkReseller, and
skReseller. The model of the protocol for CSP is:
Reseller → Supplier : pktagreseller
Supplier → TGC : {pktagreseller}skx
TGC → Supplier : {pkx, pktagreseller}skTGC
Supplier → Reseller : {pkx, pktagreseller}skTGC
The generation of a tag has to resist a fabrication attack where an adversary
generates a valid tag. The specification states that if the reseller receives a tag that
it accepts, the supplier must have sent a message to the TGC requesting the tag.
The FDR model checker returns TRUE after 111 states with 387 transitions.
4.6.4 Reseller Generating Tag
In the third phase of the protocol, the reseller generates a tag with the TGC. The
customer sends the one time key to the reseller who then forwards the one time
key and the tag signed with the private key for the tag to the TGC. The TGC then
checks that the tag has not been used before and generates a new tag that is sent
back to the reseller and then back to the customer. This model checks whether
the reseller can replay a tag as well as whether an adversary can network sniff a
license. The high level description of the protocol is:
Customer → Reseller : item, pktag,c
Reseller → TGC : {{pkx, Lx, pktag,r}skTGC , pktag,c}sktag,r
TGC → Reseller : {pkx, Lx, pktag,c}skTGC
Reseller → Customer : {pkx, Lx, pktag,c}skTGC
I apply the following safe simplifying transformations before modelling the
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reseller generating a tag with the TGC:
1. Removal of the encryption on the field Lx = {H(x), Licensex}skx to make it
{H(x), License}.
2. Removal of the atomic field License.
3. Removal of the atomic field H(x).
4. Removal of the atomic field item.
5. Redirecting a message sent via a third party to go direct. Message 3 is
redirected to go straight from the TGC to the customer and not via the
reseller.
This makes the high level description of the protocol after simplification:
Customer → Reseller : pktag,c
Reseller → TGC : {{pkxpktag,r}skTGC , pktag,c}sktag,r
TGC → Customer : {pkx, pktag,c}skTGC
I model the earlier generation of a tag ({pkx, pktag,r}skTGC ) by the introduction
of an extra set ActualTags = {tag, tag2, tagwrong, tagwrong2} which repre-
sents the tag that has been sent from the supplier to the reseller. To rep-
resent the reseller signing the tag with the one time key embedded in the
tag, the reseller signs the message with its own private key. Including the
complete generation of a tag makes the model intractable. The set Tags =
{pktag, pktag2, pktagwrong, pktagwrong2} represents the one time keys for the
new tags. The value pkx is represented as a public key with private key skx.
To model the possibility of a cloning attack, two runs of the protocol are run
at the same time. The initial knowledge of the adversary is tagwrong, tagwrong2,
pktagwrong, pktagwrong2, pkx, pkTGC , pkSupplier, and pkReseller. The model of the
protocol for CSP is:
Customer → Reseller : pktag, pktag2
Reseller → TGC : {tag, pktag, tag2, pktag2}skR
TGC → Customer : {pkx, tag}skTGC , {pkx, tag2}skTGC
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There are two specifications for the reseller generating the tag. The first
specification prevents cloning where an adversary creates two new tags from
the same initial tag. The specification states that if the customer receives two
tags, then two different values must have been signed by the TGC. The FDR
model checker returns TRUE after 457 states with 2005 transitions. The second
specification checks for a network sniffing attack where an adversary sees a tag
being sent over the network and tries to use it to generate a new tag. The
specification states that if a customer receives tags signed by the TGC then the
reseller must have sent a message to the TGC to request the generation of the tags.
The FDR model checker returns TRUE after 1423 states with 4835 transitions.
4.6.5 Remarks
Modelling a protocol using CSP can be used to show extra steps in the protocol.
If the protocol is still secure when encryptions or signatures have been removed,
then these extra operations are unnecessary to the security of the protocol. I have
used this technique to refine the tagged transaction protocol.
In the initial design of the tagged transaction protocol a zero knowledge proof
was used when the reseller generated a tag with the TGC. The reseller would
use a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm to prove to the
TGC that they knew the secret key that corresponded to the one time public key
in the tag. The TGC could then use the property of witness extraction to discover
the one time secret key if this tag was replayed. While modelling the protocol, I
discovered that this step is unnecessary and the digital signature of the tag and
new one time key are sufficient for the TGC to detect replay. The removing of the
zero knowledge proof makes the tagged transaction protocol more efficient.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, I have described and analysed the tagged transaction protocol.
The tagged transaction protocol is fully described including the registering of
items, the generation of tags by the supplier, and the subsequent generation
of tags by resellers. The security analysis shows that the tagged transaction
protocol is secure against spoofing, fabrication, cloning, network sniffing, identity
revelation, and linkability attacks in the random oracle model. Finally, the details
and results of the modelling of the tagged transaction protocol using the FDR
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model checker show the protocol prevents spoofing, fabrication, cloning, and
network sniffing attacks.
The tagged transaction protocol can prevent cloning attacks where an adver-
sary tries to submit the same tag twice. In the next chapter, I describe an extended
version of the tagged transaction protocol that not only detects cloning but is able
to reveal the identity of the reseller that tried to clone the tag.
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Chapter 5
Extended Tagged Transaction
Protocol
This chapter describes an extended version of the tagged transaction protocol
that provides revocable anonymity if a reseller tries to clone a tag. The extended
tagged transaction protocol uses restricted blind signatures to provide revocable
reseller anonymity while preserving anonymity and unlinkability. If a reseller
uses a tag once, the reseller will remain anonymous and its independent transac-
tions unlinkable. If the reseller tries to clone a tag by presenting the same tag to
the TGC more than once, the identity of the reseller is revealed.
The extended tagged transaction protocol uses ideas from digital cash where
a digital coin that is double spent reveals the identity of the double spender [18].
The TGCs acts as both the bank and the merchant. The reseller acts as the
customer. The reseller will “withdraw” a coin from the TGC. This coin is then
added to the tag that is signed by the TGC. As the TGC has blind signed the coin,
it cannot link the signed coin to the reseller that withdrew it. When the reseller
generates a new tag with the TGC, the reseller is “spending” the coin. If the
coin is spent more than once, the identity of the reseller is revealed otherwise no
information about the identity of the reseller is revealed.
The extended tagged transactions protocol uses the same protocols as the
tagged transaction protocol with some modifications. All resellers and customers
will have to register with the TGC. If the TGC detects a tag being cloned, it
revokes this registration. Both customers and resellers will need to acquire
identity tokens that have been blind signed by the TGC. Both the registration of
resellers and customers and the acquisition of identity tokens are new protocols.
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The protocols that involve the supplier and resellers generating tags with the
TGC have also beenmodified to use identity tokens. When the supplier generates
the tag with the TGC, they include an identity token from the reseller as well as
the one time public key for this tag. When a reseller generates a tag with the TGC
it takes part in a challenge-response protocol with the TGC to show that they own
the identity token in the tag.
5.1 Restricted Blind Signatures
Chaum introduced the idea of blind signatures in 1982 [18]. This work was
extended giving the first blind signature scheme based on RSA signatures [19].
In a blind signature scheme, the original message is blinded and the signer signs
the blinded message. The blinding is then removed and the signature checked
against the original message. Blind signatures were originally used in digital
cash schemes to provide unlinkability and anonymity for the user when a bank
blind signs a digital coin [20]. When blind signing a message, the signer does
not know any information about the structure of the message being signed. To
detect double spending of coins, the user encodes identifying information in the
blinded digital coin to be signed by the bank in such a way that double spending
the coin reveals their identity. In the paper by Chaum et al [20] they make use
of a cut and choose technique to make sure the correct identifying information is
encoded in a coin.
Restricted blind signatures were introduced by Stefan Brands [11]. In a
restricted blind signature scheme, the signer can restrict the structure of the
message being signed. In the withdrawal phase of the protocol, the bank inserts
the public key of the user in the message to be signed. As this message is then
blinded the bank can only discover the public key if it is spent twice. In digital
cash schemes, this allows the signer to be sure that the user is correctly including
information on their identity to detect double spending. The extended tagged
transactions protocol also requires the encoding of identification information in
the message to be blind signed.
Camenisch et al have produced a restricted blind signature scheme called CL-
signatures [16]. These restricted signatures have been used in digital cash [14]
and anonymous credential schemes [13, 15]. CL-signatures can be used to sign a
committed value and to prove knowledge of a signature using zero knowledge
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proofs.
In the extended tagged transaction protocol, the TGC acts as both the bank
and the merchant while the resellers and customers act as users. To generate
restricted blind signed values to use in the tags, customers and resellers take part
in a protocol with the TGC. This protocol can be done in advance. For example,
a customer or reseller may generate ten restricted blind signed values before
taking part in a transaction. For the extended tagged transaction protocol, the
restricted blind signature scheme must be efficient at verifying the signatures.
The restricted blind signature scheme by Brands [11] requires fewer operations
to verify the signature than CL-signatures [16] because Cl-signatures use zero
knowledge proofs to show the value was signed by the TGC.
Recently, Henry et al have introduced the notion of verifier efficient restricted
blind signatures (VERBS) [45]. VERBS require no modular exponentiation to
verify the signature. In the security analysis of VERBS, the authors do not show
the security of the restricted blind signature scheme equivalent to a known hard
problem but do discuss the security of VERBS. In the signature scheme of Brands,
the security is shown to be equivalent to solving the representation problem in
groups of prime order. For this reason, I make use of the restricted signature
scheme by Brands, but the VERBS signature scheme could also be used in the
extended tagged transaction protocol.
5.2 Definitions
The following notation is used to denote restrictive blind signatures:
• IDr the unique identity of the participant r. This corresponds to the account
number in digital cash. It is registered with the TGC and is revealed if a tag
is cloned.
• pkr the public key of participant r. This is used to sign identity token
requests to prevent an adversary from being able to generate tokens for
another party.
• tokentag,r an identity token for participant r and tag. On its own it does not
reveal any information about participant r.
• token′tag,r a blinded identity token for participant r and tag.
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• pkID and skID are the public and secret key of the TGC for blind signing
identity tokens. The value skID is known only to the TGC. The value pkID
is a well known public value.
In the extended tagged transaction protocol we add a new parameter to the
tag definition. The new parameter is a signature from the TGC on an identity
token that can be used to reveal the identity of a reseller that tries to clone a tag.
An extended tag is a tuple:
tag = {A = pkx, B = Lx, C = {tokentag,r}skID , D = pktag,r}
The definitions of the parameters in the tag are:
• A = pkx: the public key for the item. This is registered with the TGC when
the supplier first creates the item. The TGC should only sign tags that have
the correct public key for the supplier.
• B = Lx = {id = H(x), License}skx : a license signed with the secret key for
the item x. This license contains information such as the identity of the item
id = H(x) and any other important terms of the license. The structure of
licenses is discussed in Section 4.1.2. The identity of the item id = H(x)
is calculated using a well known hash function H . Identifying items is
discussed in Section 4.1.1.
• C = {tokentag,r}skID . The identity token for participant r and tag. The
identity token is signed using the secret key of the TGC for blind signatures
skID. The identity token does not reveal any information about the
participant unless the tag is cloned.
• D = pktag,r: the one time public key for the participant r and tag tag. The
reseller or customer randomly chooses sktag,r and uses it to generate the
public key.
5.3 Registering with the TGC
Initially customers and resellers will need to register with the TGC. This is the
same as opening a bank account in the digital cash scenario. This only needs to
be done once by every customer and reseller.
The process for resellers and customers to register with the TGC takes place
in two steps as shown in Figure 5.1.
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Reseller TGC
If ID r and pkr not registered before 
TGC stores ID r and pkr
1) Register ID r, pkr
2) Return success/failure
Figure 5.1: Registering with the TGC
1. The reseller or customer chooses an identity IDr and public key pkr and
sends these to the TGC.
2. The TGC checks whether the identity IDr and public key pkr have been
used before. If the identity and public key are unique, the TGC will store
these values and return a success message. If either the identity IDr or the
public key pkr are not unique, the TGC returns a failure message and the
reseller or customer generates new values and tries again.
5.4 Generating ID Token
Before a customer or reseller can request a tag, they must generate an identity
token signed by the TGC. The TGC will blind sign the identity token submitted
to them. The blind signature prevents the TGC from being able to link this
identity token to the reseller when the identity token is used at a later time to
generate a tag. A restrictive blind signature scheme is used so that customers and
resellers can only obtain identity tokens for identities for whom they know the
secret values.
The process for a reseller to generate a blind signed identity token with the
TGC takes place in five steps as shown in Figure 5.2.
1. The reseller generates a request for a signed identity token and authenti-
cates itself with the TGC by signing the message with its private key. The
TGC can look up the identity that corresponds to this public key.
2. The reseller generates a blinded identity token.
3. The reseller sends this blinded token item to the TGC.
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Reseller TGC
4) {tokenr’}skID
1) {generate request}skr
3) tokenr’
2) Generate tokenr and 
blinded tokenr’
5) Remove blinding to 
generate {tokenr}skID
Figure 5.2: Generating ID Token
4. The TGC blind signs the identity token.
5. The reseller removes the blinding on the signed identity token.
Due to the restricted blind signature scheme used it should not be possible for
the reseller to have a signed identity token that was not signed by the TGC. The
restricted nature of the blind signature scheme also prevents the reseller from
getting an identity token that does not contain information on the identity it
has registered with the TGC. The final signed identity token does not reveal any
information about the identity of the reseller.
It is worth noting that while the final signed identity token does not reveal any
information about the customer or reseller, the TGC learns how many identity
tokens have been generated by each customer and reseller. This information
could be used to infer howmany transactions each customer and reseller is taking
part in, although there does not need to be a one-to-one relationship between the
number of identity tokens generated and the number of transactions.
5.5 Supplier Generating Tag with TGC
To generate a tag for an item, a protocol takes place between the reseller, the
supplier, and the TGC. The communication between the supplier and the TGC is
done over an anonymous channel, if supplier anonymity is required, as shown by
dotted lines in Figure 5.3. Compared to the tagged transaction protocol, the only
differences are the inclusion of the signed identity token in the tag. The process
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Reseller Supplier TGC
1) id=H(x), {token tag,r}skID, pktag,r
2) Lx={H(x),Licensex}skx
3) {Lx, {token tag,r}skID, pktag,r}skx
4) tag={pkx,Lx,{token tag,r}skID, pktag,r}skTGC
5) tag
6) tag
Figure 5.3: Supplier Generating Tag with TGC
for a supplier to generate a tag with the TGC takes part in six steps as shown in
Figure 5.3.
1. The reseller sends a purchase request to the supplier containing the identity
of the item they wish to purchase id = H(x), the signed identity token
{tokentag,r}skID , and the one time public key for the tag pktag,r. The reseller
randomly picks a private key and uses this to generate the public key.
2. The supplier signs a license for the item Lx = {H(x), Licensex}skx where
H(x) is the identity of the item and Licensex is the license for the item.
3. The supplier creates a signed tag request containing the license Lx, the
signed identity token {tokentag,r}skID , and the one time public key pktag,r
all signed by skx and sends it to the TGC.
4. The TGC checks the one time public key pktag,r and the signed identity
token {tokentag,r}skID have not been used for this item before, that the
identity token has been signed using skID, and that the key is correct
for this item. If these tests pass the TGC constructs and signs tag =
{pkx, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}skTGC .
5. The TGC sends the tag to the supplier.
6. The supplier sends the tag to the reseller. The reseller checks the tag has
been signed by the TGC, that the license is for the correct item, and that the
tag contains the correct signed identity token and one time public key.
The supplier signs the license generation request with the secret key for the
item to prevent any other party from being able to generate tags for the item with
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Customer Reseller TGC
1) id=H(x), {tokentag,c}skID, pktag,c
tag={pkx,Lx,{tokentag,r}skID, pktag,r}skTGC
2) {tag, {tokentag,c}skID, pktag,c}sktag,r
5) If tag not seen before generate
tagc={pkx,Lx,{tokentag,c}skID,pktag,c}skTGC 
otherwise extract IDr
6) tagc
7) tagc
3) challenge
4) {challenge,response}sktag,r
Figure 5.4: Reseller Generating Tag with TGC
the TGC. The reseller will only accept the tag if the tag is signed by the TGC and
contains the correct signed identity token and one time key.
5.6 Reseller Generating Tag with TGC
Now the tag for an item has been generated, signed, and sent to the reseller,
the reseller can use this tag to generate a new tag for a customer or another
reseller without input from the supplier. The generation of a new tag is shown
in Figure 5.4. The communication between the reseller and the TGC is done
over an anonymous channel as shown by dotted lines. Compared to the
tagged transaction protocol, the extended tagged transaction protocol includes a
challenge response protocol on the signed identity token. If the tag has not been
cloned, no information is revealed about the identity of the reseller. If the tag is
cloned, the identity of the reseller is revealed by the challenge response protocol.
The generation of a new tag by a reseller takes place in the seven steps shown
in Figure 5.4.
1. The customer sends a purchase request comprised of the identity of the
item they wish to purchase, the signed identity token {tokentag,c}skID , and
the one time public key for the tag pktag,c. The customer randomly picks a
private key and uses this to generate the public key.
2. The reseller sends a message with the signed identity token {tokentag,c}skID ,
the one time public key chosen by the customer pktag,c, and the tag signed
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using the one time secret key used in the generation of the tag sktag,r to the
TGC.
3. The TGC sends the reseller a challenge value challenge.
4. The reseller sends the TGC a response value in a signed message
{challenge, response}sktag,r . The reseller can only provide the correct re-
sponse value if they know the secret value associated with the identity
value.
5. If the tag has not been cloned the TGC generates a new tag
tagc = {pkx, L, {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}skTGC
and saves the values {tokentag,r}skID and {challenge, response}sktag,r . If
the tag has been cloned, then the TGC will have saved the values
{tokentag,r}skID and {challenge2, response2}sktag,r from the previous run.
Using the value {tokentag,r}skID and the two challenge and response values
challenge, challenge2, response, and response2 the TGC extracts the identity
of the reseller IDr. The TGC presents the values IDr, {tokentag,r}skID ,
{challenge, response}sktag,r , and {challenge2, response2}sktag,r as proof the
tag has been cloned.
6. The TGC sends tagc to the reseller.
7. The reseller sends tagc to the customer. The customer only accepts the tag if
the tag is signed by the TGC and contains the correct signed identity token
and one time key.
In step 5 of the extended tagged transaction protocol, the identity of a reseller
that clones a tag is revealed. To reveal the identity of a reseller who clones a tag, a
challenge response protocol is used. The restricted blind signature {tokentag,r}skID
contains a commitment value. A challenge response protocol takes place between
the reseller and the TGCwhere the reseller shows the TGC that they know a secret
value embedded in the blind signature. When a challenge response protocol is
executed with the same commitment value and different challenge and response
values the secret value is revealed. If a challenge response protocol takes place
with a commitment value and only one challenge and response value then no
information about the secret value is revealed. This is a property of the restricted
blind signature scheme used. Blind signatures (and restricted blind signatures)
use this property to detect double spending when applied to digital cash.
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5.7 Security Analysis
Thereom 2. The extended tagged transaction protocol provides Secure Provenance
(Section 3.5.7) in the random oracle model provided that the signature scheme used has
provable security against existential forgeries under adaptive chosen message attacks,
the encryption scheme used has provable security against IND-CCA2 attacks, and the
restrictive blind signature scheme provides anonymity and unlinkability.
I use a reduction to contradiction style of argument to show the extended
tagged transaction protocol provides security against fabrication, network sniff-
ing, and cloning attacks. The security argument for the prevention of spoofing
is the same as for the original tagged transaction protocol shown in Section 4.5.
In this security analysis, the TGC is assumed to be acting as a trusted third party.
Chapter 6 removes this assumption and discussesmethods to verify the actions of
the TGC. For the security analysis of the identity revelation and linkability prop-
erties the following assumptions are made: a perfect anonymous communication
channel, an anonymous supplier, and the parties in the protocol not revealing
their identities or the identities of the parties they are communicating with. This
security analysis does not consider side channel attacks.
The tagged transaction simulator provides the tagged transaction adversary
with inputs that are computationally indistinguishable from the inputs it would
receive in an actual run of the protocol. If the tagged transaction adversary breaks
the security of the extended tagged transaction protocol in this simulated run,
then the tagged transaction simulator can provide an output that can solve a
problem thought to be hard.
The tagged transaction simulator breaks the security of the signature scheme
if, when given public key pk and access to a signing oracle provided by the
original simulator, the tagged transaction simulator outputs a valid message
signature pair (m,σ) with non negligible probability where m was not used in
a query to the signing oracle.
The tagged transaction simulator will need to be able to simulate the gener-
ation of blind signed ID tokens that are computationally indistinguishable from
the ID tokens generated in an actual run of the protocol. The tagged transaction
simulator initially generates a random private key skID = x and public keys
pkID = {g, g1, g2} for the restricted blind signature scheme. To register a reseller,
the adversary will send the message I to the tagged transaction simulator. The
tagged transaction simulator will check that Ig2 6= 1 and generate and return
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z = (Ig2)
x. As x is chosen randomly this is computationally indistinguishable
from an actual run of the protocol. To generate an id token, the tagged transaction
simulator will send the adversary the messages a = gw and b = (Ig2)
w where
w is chosen randomly. When the adversary sends the challenge message c, the
tagged transaction simulator returns the message r = cx + w mod q. As w is
chosen randomly this is computationally indistinguishable from an actual run of
the protocol.
When providing inputs to the tagged transaction adversary and analysing the
identity revelation and unlinkability properties, the security arguments involve
showing computational indistinguishability of elements in a group. For a cyclic
group G of order q with generator g, when given an element z chosen at random
from Zq, the element g
z is uniformly distributed in G. Two elements uniformly
distributed in G are computationally indistinguishable. If two elements a1 and
a2 are chosen at random from Zq, the elements g
a1 and ga2 are computationally
indistinguishable. If two private keys for the Schnorr signature scheme are
chosen at random, the public keys are computationally indistinguishable. A
random element from G and a Schnorr public key are computationally indis-
tinguishable. Computational indistinguishability is preserved under efficient
(Probabilistic Polynomial Time) operations.
5.7.1 Fabrication
In a fabrication attack, the tagged transaction simulator is given as input the
public key for the signature scheme pk and access to the signing oracle provided
by the original simulator. The tagged transaction simulator is then challenged
to break the security of the signature scheme by outputting a valid message
signature pair. The tagged transactions simulator generates the values item, pkr,
and skitem randomly using the random oracle of the original simulator. As item
is the output of a hash function it is computationally indistinguishable from a
random value. The value skitem is then used to generate the value pkitem.
Oracles:
The tagged transaction simulator implements the Ogen and Oreg oracles. To
simulate Ogen in a manner that is computationally indistinguishable from the
real protocol, the tagged transaction simulator records in a list the input values it
receives. The adversary will send the message:
{id, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}
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where itemi = id and datai = pktag,r. If the values itemi and datai have not been
used before and the value {tokentag,r}skID is correctly signed by the key skID, the
tagged transaction simulator submits the message
m = {pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}
to the signing oracle and returns
tag = {pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}sk
The value Lx = {item,Licensex}skitem can be generated by the tagged transaction
simulator as it has access to the values item and skitem.
To simulate Oreg in a manner that is computationally indistinguishable from
the real protocol, the tagged transaction simulator records in a list the input
values it receives. The adversary will send the message:
{{pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}skTGC , {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}sktag,r
where itemj = item in Lx, dataj = pktag,c, and
licold,j = {pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}skTGC
The tagged transaction simulator checks the message is correctly signed with
sktag,r and that {tokentag,r}skID and {tokentag,c}skID have been correctly signed by
the key skID. The tagged transaction simulator returns the challenge value d to
the adversary and waits for the adversary to reply with the responses r1 and r2.
If the response values are correct and the values itemj , licold,j , and dataj have not
been used before, the tagged transaction simulator submits the message
{pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,c}skID , dataj = pktag,c}
to the signing oracle and returns
{pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}skTGC
The value Lx = {item,Licensex}skitem is the same value that appears in licold,j .
Input:
The tagged transaction simulator provides input to the adversary that is
computationally indistinguishable from the input it would receive in an actual
run of the protocol. The adversary is given as input the values item, data = pkr,
pkitem, and pkTGC = pk.
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Adversary:
Suppose adversary A passes the experiment with non negligible probability.
The adversary is then able to fabricate a valid tag:
tag = {pkitem, Lx, {tokenr}skID , pkr}sk
with non negligible probability. The simulator returns this to the original
simulator as it has a valid message signature pair
({pkitem, Lx, {tokenr}skID , pkr}, tag)
The value
{pkitem, Lx, {tokenr}skID , pkr}
will not have been used in a query to the signing oracle as neither the Ogen or Oreg
oracles can be used with the value data = pkr.
5.7.2 Network Sniffing
In a network sniffing attack, the tagged transaction simulator is given as input the
public key for the signature scheme pk and access to the signing oracle provided
by the original simulator. The tagged transaction simulator is then challenged
to break the security of the signature scheme by outputting a valid message
signature pair. The tagged transactions simulator generates the values item,
skTGC and skitem randomly using the random oracle of the original simulator. As
item is the output of a hash function it is computationally indistinguishable from
a random value. The values skitem and skTGC are then used to generate the values
pkitem and pkTGC .
Oracles:
The tagged transaction simulator implements theOreg oracle. To simulateOreg
in a manner that is computationally indistinguishable from the real protocol, the
tagged transaction simulator records in a list the input values it receives. The
adversary will send the message:
{tag = {pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}skTGC , {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}sktag,r
where itemi = item in Lx, datai = pktag,c, and
licold,i = tag = {pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , dataold = pktag,r}skTGC
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The tagged transaction simulator checks the message is correctly signed with
sktag,r and that {tokentag,r}skID and {tokentag,c}skID have been correctly signed by
the key skID. The tagged transaction simulator then returns the challenge value
d to the adversary and waits for the adversary to reply with the responses r1 and
r2. If the response values are correct and the values itemj , licold,j , and dataj have
not been used before, the tagged transaction simulator signs the message
{pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,c}skID , datai = pktag,c}
using the key skTGC it generated and returns
{pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,c}skID , datai = pktag,c}skTGC
The value Lx = {item,Licensex}skitem is the same value that appears in licold,i.
Input:
The tagged transaction simulator provides input to the adversary that is
computationally indistinguishable from the input it would receive in an actual
run of the protocol. The adversary is given as input the values item, data = pk,
pkitem, and pkTGC . The tagged transaction simulator also gives the simulator
access to the old license by constructing the input:
{pkitem, Lx, {token}skID , data = pk}skTGC
as the tagged transaction simulator has access to the values pkitem, data, and
the value Lx = {item,Licensex}skitem can be generated by the tagged transaction
simulator as it has access to the values item and skitem. The tagged transaction
simulator will also need to generate the value {token}skID . The tagged transaction
simulator can generate this value as it has access to the secret key skID and can
generate token for a random user. This is computationally indistinguishable from
an actual run of the protocol as the actual user will have chosen the value in token
randomly.
Adversary:
Suppose adversary A passes the experiment with non negligible probability.
Then the adversary has returned the value
tagA = {pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pkr}skTGC
There are then two possible options: either the value tagA was output from the
Oreg oracle, or it was fabricated by the adversary.
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If the value
tagA = {pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pkr}skTGC
was output from the Oreg oracle, then this adversary can be used to break the
security of the signature scheme by completing an existential forgery using
the key sk. Since the adversary is polynomially bounded, it can only make a
maximum of n queries to the Oreg oracle where n is polynomially bounded. The
tagged transaction simulator then goes through this list of input values it has
received for the Oreg oracle. Either one of the values in the input will be:
{tagi = {pkitem, Lx, {token}skID , pk}skTGC , {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}sk
or the adversary has fabricated a tag which is the same as the case detailed in the
next paragraph. If the value
{tagi = {pkitem, Lx, {token}skID , pk}skTGC , {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}sk
is in the input, then the tagged transaction simulator can construct a valid
message signature pair
({tagi, {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}, {tagi, {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}sk)
If the adversary has fabricated a license, the tagged transaction simulator
re-runs the adversary but changes the input to item, data = pktag, pkitem, and
pkTGC = pk, where item, sktag and skitem are randomly chosen and pktag and
pkitem are generated from sktag and skitem. The tagged transaction simulator also
gives the simulator access to the old license by constructing the input
{pkitem, Lx, {token}skID , data = pktag}sk
using the signing oracle. The Oreg oracle is also changed. Rather than signing the
message
{pkitem, Lx, {token}skID , datai = pktag,c}
itself, it will submit it to the signing oracle to sign and return
{pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,c}skID , datai = pktag,c}sk
This adversary is then used to break the security of the signature scheme by
completing an existential forgery using the key sk = skTGC . As the adversary
has fabricated a license, they return the value
tagA = {pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pkr}sk
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that has not been generated by a call to the Oreg query or provided as input. The
tagged transaction simulator can use this message as a valid message signature
pair
({pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pkr}, tagA)
5.7.3 Cloning
In a cloning attack, the tagged transaction simulator is given as input the public
key for the signature scheme pk and access to the signing oracle provided by the
original simulator. The tagged transaction simulator is then challenged to break
the security of the signature scheme by outputting a valid message signature
pair. The tagged transactions simulator generates the values item, sktag and skitem
randomly using the random oracle of the original simulator. As item is the output
of a hash function it is computationally indistinguishable from a random value.
The values skitem and sktag are then used to generate the values pkitem and pktag.
Oracles:
The tagged transaction simulator implements theOreg oracle. To simulateOreg
in a manner that is computationally indistinguishable from the real protocol, the
tagged transaction simulator records in a list the input values it receives. The
adversary will send the message:
{tag = {pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}skTGC , {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}sktag,r
where itemi = item in Lx, datai = pktag,c, and
licold,i = {pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , dataold = pktag,r}skTGC
The tagged transaction simulator checks the message is correctly signed with
sktag,r and that {tokentag,r}skID and {tokentag,c}skID have been correctly signed by
the key skID. The tagged transaction simulator then returns the challenge value
d to the adversary and waits for the adversary to reply with the responses r1 and
r2. If the response values are correct and the values itemj , licold,j , and dataj have
not been used before, the tagged transaction simulator submits the message
{pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,c}skID , datai = pktag,c}
to the signing oracle to sign and returns
{pkitem, Lx, {tokentag,c}skID , datai = pktag,c}sk
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The value Lx = {item,Licensex}skitem is the same value that appears in licold,i.
Input:
The tagged transaction simulator provides input to the adversary that is
computationally indistinguishable from the input it would receive in an actual
run of the protocol. The adversary is given as input the values item, data = pktag,
pkitem, and pkTGC = pk. The tagged transaction simulator also gives the simulator
access to the old license by constructing the input
tag = {pkitem, Lx, {tokentag}skID , data = pktag}sk
using the signing oracle as the tagged transaction simulator has access to the
values pkitem, data, and the value Lx = {item,Licensex}skitem . To generate the
value {tokentag}skID the tagged transaction simulator will need access to the
identifier for the adversary I and the secret key skID. As the only method for
the adversary to register for a token is through the tagged transaction simulator,
the tagged transaction simulator has access to both I and skID.
Adversary:
Suppose adversary A passes the experiment with non negligible probability,
then this adversary can be used to break the security of the signature scheme by
completing an existential forgery using the key skTGC = sk. If the adversary has
passed the experiment, it will have returned two licenses:
tag1 = {pkitem, Lx, {tokenr1}skID , pkr1}sk
and
tag2 = {pkitem, Lx, {tokenr2}skID , pkr2}sk
There are three possible ways the adversary used the Oreg oracle to generate tag1
and tag2: the Oreg oracle output both tag1 and tag2, the Oreg oracle output one of
tag1 and tag2, the Oreg oracle did not output either tag1 or tag2.
Since the adversary is polynomially bounded, it can only make a maximum
of n queries to the Oreg oracle where n is polynomially bounded. If both tag1
and tag2 were output from the Oreg oracle, then the tagged transaction simulator
can go through the list of n queries to the Oreg oracle to find the queries with the
outputs of tag1 and tag2. The tagged transaction simulator can then repeat this
step finding the queries with the outputs that are the same as the previous steps
inputs. After a maximum of n steps, the tagged transaction simulator will have
two lists of query inputs and outputs:
list1 = ({input1,1, output1,1}, ..., {input1,i, tag1})
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and
list2 = ({input2,1, output2,1}, ..., {input2,j , tag2})
As the Oreg oracle will not generate two new tags for the same values of itemi,
licold,i, and datai, the values
input1,1 = {{pkitem, Lx, {token1,1}skID , pk1,1}skTGC , {token1,2}skID , pk1,2}sk1,1
and
input2,1 = {{pkitem, Lx, {token2,1}skID , pk2,1}skTGC , {token2,2}skID , pk2,2}sk2,1
must be different. If pk1,1 = data = pktag, then the tagged transaction simulator
uses
({pkitem, Lx, {token2,1}skID , pk2,1}, {pkitem, Lx, {token2,1}skID , pk2,1}sk)
as a valid message signature pair for the original simulator. If pk2,1 = data = pktag,
then the tagged transaction simulator uses
({pkitem, Lx, {token1,1}skID , pk1,1}, {pkitem, Lx, {token1,1}skID , pk1,1}sk)
as a valid message signature pair for the original simulator.
If one (or both) of the values tag1 and tag2 was not in the output from the Oreg
oracle, then the tagged transaction simulator can return a validmessage signature
pair to the original simulator. Suppose tag1 was not in the output of the Oreg
oracle, then the valid message signature pair is
({pkitem, Lx, {tokenr1}skID , pkr1}, tag1)
If tag2 was not in the output of the Oreg oracle, then the valid message signature
pair is
({pkitem, Lx, {tokenr2}skID , pkr2}, tag2)
5.7.4 Identity Revelation
To show that nomessage in the protocol reveals any information about the sender,
I construct a simulator that can simulate the messages that are sent in the protocol
with no knowledge of the identity of any of the participants of the protocol. The
simulator creates messages that are computationally indistinguishable from the
messages in an actual run of the protocol. The simulator has access to the item x,
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the public variables of the system pkTGC , p, q, and g and the public keys {g, g1, g2}
of the restricted blind signature scheme.
The simulator also has access to signing oracles for the TGC. This means the
simulator can use the oracles to sign messages using the secret keys skTGC and
skID. The TGC is not an anonymous party in the protocol so knowledge that the
message was signed by the TGC does not reveal any information about the other
parties in the protocol.
Many of the messages in the protocol are constructed by taking a random
number x and raising a generator of the group g to the power of x to calculate
y = gx mod p. If the simulator and a real participant in the protocol both calculate
these values (the simulator xs and ys = g
xs mod p and the actual participant x and
y = gx mod p), the values ys and y are computationally indistinguishable.
{id = H(x), pkx}pkTGC : The identity of the item id = H(x) is a constant that
can be constructed by the simulator as it has access to the item. The simulator
then constructs the public key for the item by choosing a random value skx and
calculating pkx = g
−skx mod p.
{id = H(x), {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}: The identity of the item id = H(x) is
a constant that can be constructed by the simulator as it has access to the item.
The value {tokentag,r}skID consists of the value token which is generated using
an identity value Is which the simulator generates at random. This identity
value is computationally indistinguishable from the identity value I that is
randomly chosen in an actual run of the protocol. All other values chosen to
compute {tokentag,r}skID are products of random values that are computationally
indistinguishable from an actual run of the protocol. The simulator can then use
the signing oracle to sign themessage tokentag,r. The simulator will then construct
the one time public key for the reseller and tag by choosing a random value sktag,r
and calculating pktag,r = g
−sktag,r mod p.
{Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}skx : The values {tokentag,r}skID and pktag,r have
already been generated by the simulator. The value Lx = {id = H(x), License}skx
is a signed license signed by the key skx already generated by the simulator. The
value License is a license for item, it may contain values such as the period of the
license and other limitations. To prevent identity revelation the license must be
constructed without using identity information. If this is the case, the simulator
can also generate the license.
{pkX , Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}skTGC : The values pkx, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID and
pktag,r have already been generated by the simulator. The message is then signed
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using the signing oracle.
{tag, {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}sktag,r : The values sktag,r and tag have already been
generated by the simulator. The simulator can construct the value {tokentag,c}skID
using a second constructed identity value Ic that is chosen randomly and the
signing oracle. The simulator will then construct the one time public key for the
customer and tag by choosing a random value sktag,c and calculating pktag,c =
g−sktag,c mod p.
{challenge, response}sktag,r : The simulator can generate the challenge value
using a hash function and the information on the date and time as well as the
tokentag,r previously created. The response value is generated using the values
used to generate tokentag,r. The message is then signed using the key sktag,r which
has already been generated by the simulator.
5.7.5 Linkability
To show the adversary does not have a chance greater than 1
2
of guessing the ran-
dom order, I show that all the messages sent by a reseller r are computationally
indistinguishable from the messages sent by another reseller c.
Constant values (id = H(x), Lx, and pkx) and computationally indistin-
guishable random values (pktag,r) do not provide linkability information between
different runs of the protocol. In any particular run of the protocol, a reseller
denoted r sends the following messages (if the customer resells):
{id, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}
{{pkx, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}skTGC , {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}sktag,r
{challenge, response}sktag,r
The values id = H(x) and Lx are constant for every participant (assuming
no identifying information in Lx). The public keys are computationally indistin-
guishable if the private keys are chosen randomly. I now concentrate on the iden-
tity token values {tokentag,r}skID , {tokentag,c}skID , and {challenge, response}sktag,r .
When given an identity token and two different challenge and response
values the identity is revealed by design, so I concentrate on the case where only a
single challenge response value has been issued for each identity token. Suppose
an adversary exists that can break linkability with non negligible probability, then
this adversary can be used to discern between computationally indistinguishable
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values. The adversary is initially given a signed identity token {tokentag1,r}skID .
The adversary is then given two other identity tokens {tokentag2,r}skID and
{tokentag,c}skID in a random order. The adversary should not have greater chance
of guessing the random order than 1
2
.
I now show that all elements in {tokentag1,r}skID , {tokentag2,r}skID and
{tokentag,c}skID are computationally indistinguishable. The value {tokentag1,r}skID
is composed of Atag1,r, Btag1,r, and sign{Atag1,r, Btag1,r}.
Atag1,r = (Irg2)
s where Ir = g
ur
1 , g1 and g2 are generators of the group
and ur and s are random variables. The value Ir is computationally indistin-
guishable from the value Ic. The values Atag1,r, Atag2,r, and Atag,c are composed
of Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) operations applied to computationally
indistinguishable values and so are computationally indistinguishable.
Btag1,r = g
x1
1 g
x2
2 where g1 and g2 are generators of the group and x1 and x2
are random variables. So the values Btag1,r, Btag2,r, and Btag,c are computationally
indistinguishable.
The signed message sign{Atag1,r, Btag1,r} contains four values ztag1,r, atag1,r,
btag1,r, rtag1,r. The four values are PPT operations applied to values that are either
randomly generated or a generator raised to the power of a random value. So
the values sign{Atag1,r, Btag1,r}, sign{Atag2,r, Btag2,r}, and sign{Atag,c, Btag,c} are
computationally indistinguishable.
The only other message sent in the protocol that could provide linkability
information is {challenge, response}sktag,r . The challenge value is a hash value
that can be calculated by any party with access to the identity of the TGC and the
current date and time. The response value is a combination of PPT operations
applied to random numbers, so the response values of different participants are
computationally indistinguishable.
5.8 Modelling
To check the security properties of the tagged transaction protocol, I use the
Failures Divergences Refinement (FDR) model checker [33, 78]. The FDR
model checker checks a Concurrent Sequential Processes (CSP) [46] model of a
protocol against a CSP specification. As discussed in Section 4.6, the adversary
has complete control of the network. I also make use of safe simplifying
transformations [48]. As the registration step has not changed, this model is
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not repeated. The two models I construct examine the properties of spoofing,
fabrication, cloning, and network sniffing.
5.8.1 Supplier Generating Tag
In the second phase of the extended tagged transaction protocol, the supplier
generates a tag with the TGC. The reseller sends the supplier the one time public
key for the tag and its identity token. The supplier then generates a signed license
for the item. The supplier sends a signedmessage with the license, identity token,
and the one time public key to the TGC. The TGC then creates and signs the tag
and sends it back to the supplier who sends it to the reseller. The high level
description of the protocol is:
Reseller → Supplier : item, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r
Supplier → TGC : {Lx = {H(x), Licensex}skx , {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}skx
TGC → Supplier : {pkx, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}skTGC
Supplier → Reseller : {pkx, Lx, {tokentag,r}skID , pktag,r}skTGC
I apply the following safe simplifying transformations before modelling the
supplier generating a tag with the TGC:
1. Removal of the encryption on the field Lx = {H(x), Licensex}skx to make it
{H(x), License}.
2. Removal of the atomic field License.
3. Removal of the atomic field H(x).
4. Removal of the atomic field item.
5. Removal of the encryption on the field {tokentag,r}skID to make it tokentag,r.
After the simplification the description of the protocol is:
Reseller → Supplier : tokentag,r, pktag,r
Supplier → TGC : {tokentag,r, pktag,r}skx
TGC → Supplier : {pkx, tokentag,r, pktag,r}skTGC
Supplier → Reseller : {pkx, tokentag,r, pktag,r}skTGC
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In this model, the set Tags = {pktagreseller, pktagwrong} represents the one time
keys for the tags . As these keys are never used for encryption or signing in this
part of the protocol they do not need to be represented as public and private key
pairs. Each participant in the protocol has a public and private key pair. The value
pkx represents the public key for the item and skx is represents private key. The
set Token = {tokenreseller} represents the identity tokens. The initial knowledge
of the adversary is pktagwrong, tokenreseller, pkx, pkTGC , pkSupplier, pkReseller, and
skReseller. The model of the protocol for CSP is:
Reseller → Supplier : tokenreseller, pktagreseller
Supplier → TGC : {tokenreseller, pktagreseller}skx
TGC → Supplier : {pkx, tokenreseller, pktagreseller}skTGC
Supplier → Reseller : {pkx, tokenreseller, pktagreseller}skTGC
The generation of a tag has to resist a fabrication attack where an adversary
manages to generate a valid tag. The specification states that if the reseller
receives a tag that it accepts, the supplier must have sent a message to the TGC
requesting the tag. The FDR model checker returns TRUE after 111 states with
387 transitions.
5.8.2 Reseller Generating Tag
The CSP description for the reseller generating a tag in the extended tagged
transaction protocol is now examined. The customer sends the reseller the one
time public key for the tag and its identity token. The reseller then sends the tag
from the supplier, the customer’s one time public key and the customer’s identity
token all signed by the one time private key of the tag to the TGC. The TGC then
sends a challenge to the reseller. The reseller returns a signed message with the
challenge and response values. The TGC creates and signs the tag and sends it
back to the reseller who sends it to the customer. The high level description of
the protocol is:
Customer → Reseller : item, {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c
Reseller → TGC : {{pkx, Lx, pktag,r}skTGC , {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}sktag,r
TGC → Reseller : challenge
Reseller → TGC : {challenge, response}sktag,r
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TGC → Reseller : {pkx, Lx, {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}skTGC
Reseller → Customer : {pkx, Lx, {tokentag,c}skID , pktag,c}skTGC
Before we model the reseller generating a tag with the TGC we apply the
following safe simplifying transformations:
1. Removal of the encryption on the field Lx = {H(x), Licensex}skx to make it
{H(x), License}.
2. Removal of the atomic field License.
3. Removal of the atomic field H(x).
4. Removal of the atomic field item.
5. Removal of the encryption on the field {tokentag,c}skID to make it tokentag,c.
6. Removal of the encryption on the field {tokentag,r}skID to make it tokentag,r.
7. Redirecting a message that is sent via a third party to go direct. We direct
message 5 to go straight from the TGC to the customer and not via the
reseller.
After the simplification the description of the protocol is:
Customer → Reseller : tokentag,c, pktag,c
Reseller → TGC : {{pkx, tokentag,r, pktag,r}skTGC , tokentag,c, pktag,c}sktag,r
TGC → Reseller : challenge
Reseller → TGC : {challenge, response}sktag,r
TGC → Customer : {pkx, tokentag,c, pktag,c}skTGC
I model the earlier generation of a tag ({pkx, tokentag,r, pktag,r}skTGC ) by the
introduction of an extra set ActualTags = {tag, tag2, tagwrong, tagwrong2} that
represents the tags that have been sent from the supplier to the reseller. To
represent the reseller signing the tag with the one time key embedded in the
tag, the reseller signs the message with its own private key. To include the
complete generation of a tag in this model makes the size of the model intractable.
The set Tags = {pktag, pktag2, pktagwrong, pktagwrong2} represents the one
time keys for the new tags. The set Token = {tktag, tktag2} represent identity
tokens. The set Challenge = {c1, c2} represents the challenge values and the
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set Response = {r1, r2} represents the response values. The item key pkx is
represented as a public key with private key skx. To model the possibility of a
cloning attack, two runs of the protocol happen at the same time. The initial
knowledge of the adversary is tagwrong, tagwrong2, pktagwrong, pktagwrong2,
tktag, tktag2, c1, c2, r1, r2, pkx, pkTGC , pkSupplier, and pkReseller. The model of the
protocol for CSP is:
Customer → Reseller : tktag, tktag2, pktag, pktag2
Reseller → TGC : {tag, tktag, pktag, tag2, tktag2, pktag2}skR
TGC → Reseller : c1, c2
Reseller → TGC : {c1, r1, c2, r2}skR
TGC → Customer : {pkx, tktag, pktag}skTGC , {pkx, tktag2, pktag2}skTGC
There are two specifications for the reseller generating the tag. The first speci-
fication prevents cloning where an adversary creates two new tags from the same
initial tag. The specification states that if the customer receives two tags, then
two different values must have been signed by the TGC. The FDR model checker
returns TRUE after 457 states with 2005 transitions. The second specification
checks for a network sniffing attack where an adversary sees a tag being sent
over the network and tries to use it to generate a new tag. The specification states
that if a customer receives tags signed by the TGC then the reseller must have
sent a message to the TGC to request the generation of the tags. The FDR model
checker returns TRUE after 1423 states with 4835 transitions.
5.9 Summary
This chapter has presented the extended tagged transaction protocol. The
extended tagged transaction protocol uses ideas from digital cash where double
spenders can be identified. In the extended tagged transaction protocol, if a
reseller tries to clone a tag their identity is revealed. Once the identity of a
malicious reseller is known, they can be prevented from generating more identity
tokens.
The extended tagged transaction protocol uses the TGC as both the bank and
the merchant in the digital cash model. A reseller or customer will need to obtain
a restricted blind signed identity token in a protocol with the TGC before they
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can purchase any items. This signed identity token is then added to the tags that
are generated and used by the extended tagged transaction protocol.
A thorough security analysis has been carried out showing that the extended
tagged transaction protocol prevents spoofing, fabrication, network sniffing,
cloning, identity revelation, and linkability attacks. Finally, the details and results
of the modelling of the extended tagged transaction protocol, using the FDR
model checker, show the protocol prevents spoofing, fabrication, cloning, and
network sniffing attacks.
The security analysis in the past two chapters assumes an anonymous commu-
nication channel and that the TGC is acting correctly. In the next chapter, I remove
the assumption that the TGC is acting correctly and discuss ways to provide an
anonymous communication channel and verify the actions of the TGC.
Chapter 6
Anonymity and Tag Generation
Centre Distribution and Verification
This chapter discusses methods to provide anonymous communication and the
distribution and verification of the Tag Generation Centre (TGC). When resellers
(and suppliers when they are anonymous) are communicating with the TGC
they use an anonymous communication channel. This prevents the TGC from
building up large amounts of data on the transactions of a reseller.
In previous chapters, the TGC has been assumed to be acting as a single
trusted third party. In this chapter, I remove this assumption and present different
methods for distributing the TGC over multiple parties and verifying the actions
of the TGC.Having the TGCdistributed overmultiple parties improves reliability
by not providing a single point of failure. Verifying the actions of the TGCmeans
that the TGC is no longer acting as a trusted third party. Properties of these
different methods are discussed, and in the next chapter the performance of the
methods are examined.
6.1 Anonymity
Research on anonymous communications began with a paper by David Chaum
in 1981 [21]. Since then there has been a large body of research both devel-
oping anonymous communication protocols and analysing and attacking these
protocols. Anonymity has been defined in work by Pfitzmann et al as the state
of not being identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set [72]. In the
tagged transaction protocol, the set of subjects includes resellers and anonymous
99
100 CHAPTER 6. ANONYMITY, DISTRIBUTION, AND VERIFICATION
suppliers.
For the tagged transaction protocol, I present three different methods of
providing an anonymous communication channel:
1. Anonymity is provided by the TGC which hides all identification informa-
tion about anonymous parties.
2. Anonymity is provided by a second party. This two party style of
anonymity prevents the TGC from learning the identities of anonymous
parties.
3. Anonymity is provided by an anonymous communication channel.
6.1.1 Anonymity provided by the TGC
Anonymity can be provided by the TGC. When the TGC provides anonymity,
anonymous parties in the tagged transaction protocol communicate directly with
the TGC. The TGC then knows the identity of all resellers and suppliers in the
protocol. When the TGC publishes or sends tags and other information, it does
not publish the identifying information of the participant that sent the message.
The messages sent as part of the tagged transaction protocol and the extended
tagged transaction protocol do not contain identifying information as shown in
Section 4.5.5 and Section 5.7.4.
While the anonymity provided by the TGC prevents any external observers
from learning the identities of the participants in the protocol, it does not prevent
the TGC from learning the identities. The TGC can then build up detailed records
of the transactions of each reseller and supplier in the tagged transaction protocol.
This may be commercially sensitive information and the TGC must be trusted to
not reveal it.
An advantage of the TGC providing anonymity is that any resellers that are
acting maliciously or incorrectly can be identified.
6.1.2 Two Party Anonymity
Two party anonymity uses a second party, an anonymity service, to provide
anonymity in communication between the resellers and anonymous suppliers
and the TGC. Figure 6.1 shows the process for sending messages between a
reseller and the TGC using two party anonymity. The reseller sends the message
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Figure 6.1: Two Party Anonymity
to the anonymity service which sends it on to the TGC. The TGC then replies to
the anonymity servicewhich forwards the reply on to the reseller. As all messages
to the TGC come from the anonymity service, the TGC can gain no information
on the reseller.
Some systems already provide such an anonymity service. An early example
is the anon.penet.fi relay (no longer running). Later examples that are still
running include Anonymizer1, KProxy2, and Hide My Ass!3 among many others.
Similar to anonymity provided by the TGC, the use of two party anonymity
allows the anonymity service to build up records of the participants in the tagged
transaction protocol. The use of the two party anonymity prevents external
parties from building up records of the actions of the participants in the protocol.
Depending on the terms and conditions of the anonymity service, a malicious
reseller can be identified.
6.1.3 Anonymous Communication Channel
Anonymous communication channels have been developed to prevent any party
being able to trace the identity of the senders of messages. These systems use a
group of servers or relays. No single server has the information to link the sender
of a message with the message that is received by the receiver. As long as one of
the relays in the chain is honest, it is hard to link the message and its sender.
Mix networks were first suggested by Chaum [21]. A mix network involves
a party sending an item to a mix node (or a series or cascade of mix nodes)
who then sends it to the addressee. The purpose of the mix node is to hide the
correspondences between the items in its input and those in its output. Figure 6.2
shows a cascade of mix nodes. Suppose we have a party A that wants to send a
1http://www.anonymizer.com/
2http://kproxy.com/
3http://hidemyass.com/
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Figure 6.2: A Cascade of Mix Nodes
messageM to the recipientB anonymously through a series of 1, ..., N mix nodes.
A will form a message M that is encrypted by the public key of B. Then A will
add an encryption layer for each mix node 1, ..., N using their public keys. As
each mix node receives the message it will wait to receive a batch of messages
before re-arranging, or mixing, the order of the messages, stripping off one of
the encryption layers, and forwarding it on to the next mix node. Finally, B will
receive a message encrypted with its public key.
Onion routing [88] differs from the standard mix network by establishing
a stream connection between the sender and recipient. Messages can be sent
to open or close a circuit through the network. Once a circuit is established,
messages with the same label are sent through the same circuit. The initial
message through the network is encrypted in layers and can only be decrypted
by the nodes chosen by the sender. Once the circuit has been established data
travelling through the network is encrypted with symmetric keys. The mixing
strategy used by each of the nodes is very close to a first in first out mixing. This
means that onion routing is susceptible to a traffic analysis attack, which is made
easier in the absence of large amounts of traffic. This minimal mixing strategy
was employed to provide maximum real time performance.
TOR [28] is a second generation onion router. TOR is also designed to provide
real time anonymous web browsing. Instead of the layered onion approach used
by the original onion network to establish a circuit through the network, TOR
uses an iterative mechanism. A sender in the TOR network connects to the
first node in the circuit it wants to establish, then requests that node connects
to the next one. An authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange is used to
establish symmetric keys for the stream. The TOR network does not claim to
provide anonymity in the presence of passive global adversaries but TOR does
provide low latency and there are currently over 2000 TOR publicly available
TOR nodes 4.
The type of anonymous communication channel provided by mix networks
4https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html
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and the TOR network prevent any party from being able to build up records of
the identities of the senders of messages sent to the TGC. This is in contrast to
the TGC providing anonymity or two party anonymity where the information to
link the sender with a message is held by the TGC or anonymity service. A mix
network has no way of revealing the identity of a reseller if malicious actions are
detected by the TGC.
6.2 TGC Distribution and Verification
The choice of the distribution of the TGC affects the verification mechanism used
to verify the actions of the TGC. I present two main distributions and methods of
verification for the TGC.
1. Single party TGC. The TGC is a single well known party or a group of well
known parties where only one is chosen as the TGC for a certain supplier.
Verification of the TGC uses a public bulletin board.
2. Multiple party TGC. The TGC is a group of independent servers. Verifica-
tion is provided by threshold trust, as long as a threshold number of the
servers are acting correctly the TGC can be trusted to be acting correctly.
6.2.1 Single Party TGC
A single party TGC is the simplest distribution. All requests from resellers and
suppliers for tag generation use this single party TGC. Only one public key is
needed to check tags used as part of the tagged transaction protocol. Although
a single party is in charge of the TGC, it can be implemented as a distributed
service similar to services such as gmail5 or hotmail6.
A single party TGC without verification would be a trusted third party. To
prevent this, I introduce a verification technique for the TGC. The TGC has access
to a public bulletin board. Only the TGC can write to the board but any party
can read what is written on the board. The TGC then posts all messages it sends
or receives to the bulletin board. When a reseller or customer receives a tag, they
can check the bulletin board to make sure that the tag was originally produced by
the supplier and that the tag has not been cloned. While this provides a method
5gmail.com
6hotmail.com
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Figure 6.3: Single TGC Verification
to verify the TGC, it leaks the number of resellers between the customer and
supplier. It also reveals the terms of the license produced by the supplier.
Figure 6.3 shows the verification process with the TGC publishing all the
messages it sends or receives to the bulletin board. A verifier will want to check
that the tag they have received was first created by the supplier and that it has not
been cloned. The tag the customer receives will be part of a chain of tags denoted
{tagcustomer, tagreseller1, ..., tagresellern} where there are n resellers in the chain. To
verify the actions of the TGC, a customer will need to check that, for each tag in
the chain, the old tag has only been used to generate one new tag. The customer
will also check that the initial tag tagresellern was generated by a request from
the supplier. Assuming the chance of the TGC cheating is 1
n
, and the chance
of a customer verifying the TGC is 1
m
, then the chance of a cheating TGC being
caught is 1
mn
. If the TGC cheats every time and every customer verifies the TGC,
then the chance of a cheating TGC being caught is 1. If the TGC cheats once every
thousand times, and one of every thousand customers verifies the TGC, then the
chance of a cheating TGC being caught is 1
1000000
. The TGC hasmoremotivation to
act maliciously for high value items, so customers should verify the actions of the
TGC more often for high value items to detect cheating with higher probability.
A second option for a single party TGC is to use multiple independent TGCs.
When a supplier first registers an item, it will choose a TGC to use for this
item. The supplier then advertises this choice using some out of band method
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such as its website. When a customer purchases an item from a supplier, they
check on the supplier’s web site to see what TGC they should use. This allows
suppliers to use a TGC that they trust. For example, if Google was in charge
of the TGC, Microsoft may not want to use it for their products. The use of
multiple independent TGCs also spreads the load over the group. To usemultiple
independent TGCs, the suppliers must be known: having multiple independent
TGCs does not support supplier anonymity. The supplier could provide their
own TGC for their items. If the supplier provides their own TGC, then the
supplier must be online for transactions. This removes the offline supplier
property of the tagged transactions protocol.
6.2.2 Multiple Party TGC
Rather than having the TGC as a single party, the TGC can be distributed as a
group of independent heterogeneous servers. A customer will only accept a tag
if it has been signed by a threshold value of the multiple TGCs. For example,
the customer could accept a tag if it is signed by three out of five TGCs. This
would improve availability by only requiring a threshold number of the TGCs to
be online to generate a license. To sign a tag using a threshold value of TGCs,
either each TGC has a separate key that they use to sign a tag, or the TGCs use a
threshold group signature scheme.
Group signature schemes were first introduced by Desmedt et al [27]. In a
threshold group signature scheme, a group of n signers each have access to a
part of a shared secret. To sign a message requires the co operation of t out of
n signers. It is known that t of the n signers were involved in generating the
signature but not which of the t out of n signers. The development of threshold
group signatures began with schemes that need a trusted centre [27] but later
schemes have removed this requirement [47, 54, 58, 70]. Some threshold group
signature schemes support traceability of a signer [54], this property could be
used to detect what TGC has signed an invalid tag. Threshold group signature
schemes involve broadcasting messages between the group of signers.
I use individual keys and signatures instead of threshold group signatures for
two reasons: it allows an individual TGC that is acting incorrectly to be easily
identified, and it requires less co-ordination between the multiple independent
TGCs to sign a tag. The use of individual signatures will result in more network
traffic between the TGCs and the reseller as each TGC will send an independent
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Figure 6.4: Supplier and Reseller Interacting with Multiple TGCs
signature over the network rather than having a single signature from the group.
When a supplier or reseller wants to generate a tag, they will have to send the tag
request message to at least the threshold number of TGCs. The TGCs will then
each independently reply as shown in Figure 6.4. When a reseller is generating a
tag, the reseller will need to include all tags signed by the group of TGCs (there
must be at least the threshold number of them).
In the multiple TGC distribution, the actions of an individual TGC are not
verified. As long as fewer than the threshold value of TGCs are actingmaliciously,
suppliers, resellers, and customers can have confidence that the TGCs are acting
correctly.
When using a group of TGCs, it is possible that the information seen over
the network may be different for each TGC. This could be caused by a network
outage for one of the TGCs, or malicious actions such as a denial of service attack.
This would result in the state of the TGCs being different, so it is possible that one
of the TGCs has not seen a reseller generating a tag and still has the old tag in its
database. If the TGC is acting correctly and it receives a tag generation request
using a new tag that it does not have in its database, it will not generate the new
tag.
If a TGC receives a tag request for a tag that is not in its database, it queries
the other TGCs for the tag chain for the tag. The other TGCs will send all the
messages they have received from suppliers and resellers for this tag. The other
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TGCs do not need to send a record of what they have sent as these messages can
be recreated from the messages received from the suppliers and resellers. Each of
the TGCs sign the messages with their own private key. The TGC that has been
offline must receive the records of messages from at least the threshold number of
other TGCs to preventmalicious TGCs from being able to give it false information.
Using this method, a TGC in the group that goes offline for a period of time can
synchronise its view with the other TGCs.
A standard (t, n) threshold scheme has n = 2t− 1 as the threshold value. This
means that as long as the majority of participants are honest, the user can trust
the result. In the tagged transaction protocol, an adversary can clone a tag when
using multiple TGCs as shown in Figure 6.5 when using the standard threshold
value. Suppose a group of three TGCs (TGC 1, TGC 2, and TGC 3) and a threshold
value of two (a (2, 3) threshold scheme) are being used. One of these TGCs (TGC
2) is malicious and is acting together with an adversary trying to clone a tag.
Suppose the adversary already has tags:
tag1 = {px, Lx, pktag,r}skTGC1
tag2 = {px, Lx, pktag,r}skTGC2
tag3 = {px, Lx, pktag,r}skTGC3
The adversary then wants to use the malicious TGC to clone two new tags with
the values pktag,c1 and pktag,c2. The adversary sends the followingmessage to TGC
3 and the malicious TGC 2:
{tag1, tag2, tag3, pktag,c1}sktag,r
As TGC 3 is acting correctly it will generate and return the message:
{pkx, Lx, pktag,c1}skTGC3
The malicious TGC will return:
{pkx, Lx, pktag,c1}skTGC2
The adversary sends the following message to TGC 1 and the malicious TGC 2:
{tag1, tag2, tag3, pktag,c2}sktag,r
As TGC 1 is acting correctly it will generate and return the message:
{pkx, Lx, pktag,c2}skTGC1
108 CHAPTER 6. ANONYMITY, DISTRIBUTION, AND VERIFICATION
TGC 1
Malicious
TGC
(TGC 2)
TGC 3
Adversary
{tag1
,tag2
,tag3
,pk ta
g,c1
}sk tag
,r
{pkx,
Lx,p
k tag,c
1}skT
GC3
{tag1,tag2,tag3,pktag,c1}sktag,r
{tag1,tag2,tag3,pktag
,c2}sktag,r
{pk
x ,L
x ,pktag,c2}skTGC1
{pkx,Lx,pktag,c1}skTGC2
{tag1,tag2,tag3,pktag,c2}sktag,r
{pkx,Lx,pktag,c2}skTGC2
Figure 6.5: Adversary Cloning Tag with Multiple TGCs
The malicious TGC will clone the tag and generate the message:
{pkx, Lx, pktag,c2}skTGC2
The adversary then has cloned two tags from an initial tag using a single
malicious TGC. This has broken the tagged transaction protocol by allowing a
cloning attack when only one out of three TGCs was malicious.
To prevent the attack shown in Figure 6.5, I alter the threshold value that is
used. The adversary (or adversaries) are able to split the honest parties in to
two partitions and give both different information. To prevent this, the threshold
must be set so that all the malicious parties and half the honest parties are not
enough to sign tags. The formula for calculating the number of participants n
when given a threshold t is n < 2t−b t
2
c. Examples of safe threshold values to use
include (4, 5), (5, 7), (7, 9), and (9, 13).
To use multiple independent heterogeneous TGCs, the TGCs have to be pre-
selected and well known. The multiple party TGC distribution I have shown
is not dynamic. It does not require all the TGCs to be online at the same time,
but the set of TGCs remains static. The parties in charge of the TGCs must be
carefully chosen. While the threshold model prevents a single malicious or faulty
TGC from breaking the protocol, it is best to choose parties to run the TGCs
that are trustworthy. The choice of TGCs may also reflect commercial interests
where the TGCs may be run by a group of the biggest companies in a particular
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industry. Other issues include ensuring diversity among the multiple TGCs to
prevent them being sensitive to the same attack.
Introducing multiple TGCs will increase the computational and communica-
tion complexity of both the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged
transaction protocol. The growth in the complexity of the tagged transaction
protocol when using multiple TGCs is caused by:
• When the reseller sends a tag generation request to the TGCs it must send
the request to at least the threshold number of TGCs and it must include at
least a threshold number of signed tags with the request.
• When a TGC receives a tag generation request from a reseller it needs to
check at least a threshold number of signed tags before it will generate the
new tag.
The design decision to use multiple TGCs with individual signing keys will
result in the complexity of both the tagged transaction protocol and the extended
tagged transaction protocol being O(t2). The use of a threshold group signature
scheme will only require a single tag be sent to the group of TGCs but will
increase the complexity of the TGCs co-operating to sign a tag. More details on
the complexity and performance impacts of increasing the number of TGCs can
be found in chapter 7.
The group of TGCs will be constant and chosen before the protocol starts. The
purpose of multiple TGCs is to distribute the trust over multiple independent
parties. If an increase in the number of customers or transactions creates a large
load on the TGCs and reduces performance then the TGCs would need to be
replicated. It is important to differentiate the replication of a TGC from an
increase in the number of TGCs in the group. Replicating a TGC will involve
using a technique such as a server cluster to increase the performance of the TGC
but will not result in an increase in the number of TGCs in the group. The cost
of adding replicas is maintaining consistency between replicas of the TGC so that
each replica would return the same answer to a query.
Another method of handling scalability issues is to separate the marketplace
in to separate sub-marketplaces. For example, one marketplace could deal with
music, one with video, and one with eBooks. One group of multiple TGCs could
then be in charge of each sub-marketplace. This would split the load of the whole
marketplace over several groups of multiple TGCs in charge of sub-marketplaces.
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6.3 Summary
In this chapter, I have presented options for the anonymous communication
channel and the distribution and verification of the TGC. The choices for both
the anonymity and the distribution provide different characteristics in terms
of computational and communication complexity, verification and anonymity
properties, and legal aspects of anonymity.
I describe three options for the anonymous communication channel: the
use of the TGC as an anonymity server, the use of a third party anonymity
server, and the use of an anonymous communication channel based on mix
networks. The use of the TGC or a third party as the anonymity server
allows revocable anonymity for suppliers and resellers in the tagged transaction
protocol. Depending on legal requirements, this may be a necessary property.
Anonymous communication using a mix network, such as the TOR network,
provides the strongest anonymity properties. However, it is not possible to
provide perfect anonymity with any anonymous communication channel. When
viewing the anonymity network as a black box that provides perfect anonymity, if
an adversary can watch both ends of the anonymous communication, persistent
communication between two parties will be detected. I use both the TGC and
the TOR network to provide anonymity for the tagged transaction protocol. The
TOR network has a large number of active nodes that can be used for testing. I
compare the performance of the tagged transaction protocol using both of these
approaches in the next chapter.
The distribution of the TGC affects the properties and mechanism of the
verification of the TGC. A contribution of this work is to provide methods to
prevent the TGC acting as a trusted third party. I have presented two main
options for verification. The first option is a single (or many single independent)
TGC that uses a public bulletin board to provide verification. This technique leaks
the number of links between the supplier and the customer. To verify the actions
of the TGC the reseller will have a higher communication and computational
complexity as it has to download and verify the signatures of the messages on
the board. The second option is to use multiple TGCs with a threshold value of
them assumed to be acting correctly. As long as this threshold value of TGCs
are acting correctly, the actions of the TGC are verified. The multiple party TGC
distribution does not leak the number of links between the supplier and customer
or require a public bulletin board and customer verification of data. However,
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the multiple party TGC distribution has a greater communication complexity
between the TGCs to prevent cloning attacks and provide methods for an offline
TGC to synchronise with the other TGCs. The multiple party TGC distribution
also provides fault tolerance as a certain percentage of the TGCs (depending on
the threshold value) can fail and suppliers and resellers can still generate tags. In
the following chapter, I present complexity and performance results for the two
distribution options.
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Chapter 7
Complexity and Performance
This chapter presents complexity and performance results for both the tagged
transaction protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol. These results
show the relationship between the distribution of the TGC and the anonymous
communication channel presented in the previous chapter and the performance
of the protocol. This chapter initially shows the computational and communi-
cation complexity. These results are used to compare the tagged transaction
protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol to anonymous credentials,
a protocol that can anonymously provide provenance in reseller chains.
The second part of this chapter details the implementation of the tagged
transaction protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol. The details
of the experimental setup are described and the results of the performance tests
done on both the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged transaction
protocol are presented. The performance tests shows the effects of changing the
key size of the signature scheme, the distribution of the TGC, the number of
resellers in the chain, and the use of the TOR anonymous communication channel
on the time taken to complete the protocol.
7.1 Complexity
In this section I present the computational and communication complexity of the
tagged transaction protocol. This does not include any extra communication or
computation that is necessary to provide an anonymous communication channel.
Table 7.1 shows the computational complexity for the tagged transaction protocol
and Table 7.2 shows the computational complexity for the extended tagged
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transaction protocol. These tables use the following notation:
• p and q are large primes where p = 2q + 1. The operations for the digital
signature scheme are done in the group Gp.
• n is the size of the modulus used for the encryption scheme.
• x is the complexity of modular exponentiation.
• y is the complexity of modular division.
• t is the threshold number of TGCs used.
• T is the total number of TGCs used.
• r is the number of resellers in the chain.
The complexity results make the following assumptions: the size of the modulus
for the encryption and group for the signatures are equal (|n| = |p|), and the
registration uses the worse case (|p| = |n| = 1024) value.
Customer Reseller Supplier TGC Total
Registering Item y + 3xT 3xT y + 6xT
Verifying Tag 4xt 4xt
Generating Tag y + 4xt 6xt 5xt y + 15xt
Reseller y + 4xt ry + 9xrt 4xt2 + xrt y + 4xt+ 6xrt+ 4xt2
Generating Tag
Total (no registration) y + 4xt ry + 9xrt 6xt 5xt+ xrt+ 4xt2 y + ry + 15xt+ 10xrt+ 4xt2
Table 7.1: Tagged Transaction Protocol Computational Complexity
There is a linear relationship between the computational complexity of regis-
tering an item and the total number of Tag Generation Centres (TGCs). This is
because the item needs to be registered with every TGC.
To verify a tag requires verifying two separate digital signatures on each tag.
This will require four modular exponentiations for each tag returned by one of
the threshold number of TGCs.
The relationship between the computational complexity of generating a tag
and the threshold number of TGCs is linear. A signed tag request will have to be
sent from the supplier to the threshold number of TGCs who will sign and return
the tag.
To regenerate a tag, all the resellers in the chain have to verify a signature on a
tag for the threshold number of TGCs and sign a tag regeneration request for the
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threshold number of TGCs, whichwould lead to a linear relationship between the
computational complexity and the threshold number of TGCs. However, each
TGC has to check the signature on a threshold number of signed tags for each
reseller. This means that there is a linear relationship between the computational
complexity and the square of the threshold number of TGCs.
The final total value shows the computational complexity of the entire reseller
chain, not including the registration of the item. The registration step is not
included as this only needs to be done once by the supplier and not for every
transaction. There is a linear relationship between the square of the threshold
number of TGCs and the computational complexity of the tagged transaction
protocol and a linear relationship between the number of resellers in the chain
and the computational complexity.
Customer Reseller Supplier TGC Total
Verifying Tag 8xt 8xt
Registering x x 2x
Account
Generating y + 12x 2x y + 14x
ID Token
Checking 4x 4x
ID Token
Generating Tag y + yt+ 18xt 10xt 9xt y + yt+ 37xt
Reseller y + yt+ 16xt ry + ryt+ 35xrt 8xt2 + 6xrt y + 2yt+ 28xt+
Generating Tag 11xrt+ 8xt2
Total y + yt+ 24xt ry + ryt+ 35xrt 10xt 9xt+ 6xrt+ 8xt2 y + yt+ ry + ryt+
(no registration) 41xrt+ 43xt+ 8xt2
Table 7.2: Extended Tagged Transaction Protocol Computational Complexity
To verify a tag requires verifying two separate digital signatures on each tag
and the signed identity token. This will require eight modular exponentiations
for each tag returned by one of the threshold number of TGCs.
Registering an account only requires one modular exponentiation by the
customer (or reseller) registering the account and the TGC. Generating an
ID Token requires twelve modular exponentiation and one modular division
from the customer (or reseller) and two modular exponentiation from the TGC.
Checking an ID Token requires four modular exponentiations.
Generating a tag has a linear relationship between the computational com-
plexity and the threshold number of TGCs. This is because the tag generation
request has to be sent to the threshold number of TGCs from the supplier.
To regenerate a tag requires each TGC to check the signatures for a tag for
a threshold number of tags before they will generate a new tag. This causes a
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linear relationship between the computational complexity and the square of the
threshold number of TGCs.
There is a linear relationship between the computational complexity of the
extended tagged transaction protocol and the number of resellers. There is a
linear relationship between the computational complexity of the extended tagged
transaction protocol and the square of the threshold number of TGCs. The extra
computations compared to the tagged transaction protocol are required as each
customer and reseller must generate a signed identity tokenwith the TGCs before
getting signed tags. This increases the number of modular exponentiations and
modular divisions that need to be done to generate a tag.
Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 show the communication complexity for the tagged
transaction protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol. In this
analysis the communication complexity refers to the amount of data that is sent
by each participant in the protocol. The following notation is used to show the
communication complexity:
• p and q are large primes where p = 2q + 1. The operations for the digital
signature scheme are done in the group Gp.
• n is the size of the modulus used for the encryption scheme.
• h is the size of the output of the hash function used to identify items (or the
size of the output of an alternate identification scheme).
• l is the size of the license for the item.
• t is the threshold number of TGCs used.
• T is the total number of TGCs used.
• r is the number of resellers in the chain.
Customer Reseller Supplier TGC Total
Size of Tag h + l + 2p + 4q
Registering Item 3Tn h + p + 2q 3Tn + h + p + 2q
Generating Tag h + p t(h + l + p + 4q) t(h + l + 2p + 4q) h + p + t(2h + 2l + 3p + 8q)
Reseller h + p t(p + 2q)+ t(h + l + 2p + 4q) h + p + t(h + l + 3p + 6q)+
Generating Tag t2(h + l + 2p + 5q) t2(h + l + 2p + 5q)
Total h + p h + p + t(p + 2q)+ t(h + l + 2p + 4q) 2t(h + l + 2p + 4q) 2h + 2p+
(Without t2(h + l + 2p + 5q) t(3h + 3l + 7p + 14q)+
Registration) t2(h + l + 2p + 5q)
Table 7.3: Tagged Transaction Protocol Communication Complexity
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Table 7.3 shows the communication complexity of the tagged transaction
protocol. There is a linear relationship between the total number of TGCs and
the communication complexity to register a tag. This is because the registration
message needs to be sent to every TGC in the group. There is a linear relationship
between the communication complexity of generating a tag and the threshold
number of TGCs as the supplier will need to send the generation request to the
threshold number of TGCs and return the threshold number of signed tags to the
reseller. The total communication complexity has a linear relationship with the
square of the threshold number of TGCs. This is because each TGC needs to be
sent a threshold number of tags before it will sign a new tag.
Customer Reseller Supplier TGC Total
Size of Tag h + l + 7p + 5q h + l + 7p + 5q
Registering tp tp 2tp
Account
Generating tq t(2p + q) t(2p + 2q)
ID Token
Generating h + 6p + q t(h + l + 6p + 5q) t(h + l + 7p + 5q) h + 6p + q+
Tag t(2h + 2l + 12p + 10q)
Reseller h + 6p + q t(5p + 3q)+ t(h + l + 7p + 5q) h + 6p + q+
Generating t2(h + l + 7p + 5q) t(h + l + 12p + 8q)+
Tag t2(h + l + 7p + 5q)
Total h + 6p + q h + 6p + q+ t(h + l + 6p + 5q) 2t(h + l + 7p + 5q) 2h + 12p + 2q+
(Without t(5p + 3q)+ t(3h + 3l + 25p + 18q)+
Registration) t2(h + l + 7p + 5q) t2(h + l + 7p + 5q)
Table 7.4: Extended Tagged Transaction Protocol Communication Complexity
Table 7.4 shows the communication complexity of the extended tagged trans-
action protocol. The communication complexity of registering an account and
generating an ID Token has a linear relationship with the threshold number of
TGCs because the customer or reseller will need to generate a threshold number
of blind signed identity tokens to request a tag. Similar to the tagged transaction
protocol, the communication complexity of the total protocol without registration
scales linearly with the square of the threshold number of TGCs. This is because
the TGCs must be sent a threshold number of tags before they will sign a new
one. The extra communication complexity is caused by the blind signed identity
tokens that must be sent as well as the tags.
7.1.1 Comparison to Anonymous Credentials
This section compares the computational complexity of the tagged transaction
protocol and anonymous credentials [15]. Anonymous credentials can provide
one-show credentials to users that can anonymously establish digital provenance
in reseller chains. One-show credentials can also provide global anonymity
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revocation if a one-show credential is replayed. I compare the computational
complexity of the tagged transaction protocol with the computational complexity
of one-show anonymous credentials. Both protocols assume a perfect anonymous
communication channel and these complexity figures do not include the com-
plexity for providing this anonymous communication channel. The second set of
figures compare the extended tagged transaction protocol that provides revocable
anonymity for a tag that is cloned with the one time anonymous credentials with
global anonymity revocation. The figures for the tagged transaction protocol and
the extended tagged transaction protocol do not include the registration step and
assume a single TGC is used. The figures for the anonymous credentials do not
include the generation of the pseudonyms that are used to provide anonymity. It
is assumed that both protocols are using the same key size.
Table 7.5 uses the following notation:
• x is the complexity for modular exponentiation.
• y is the complexity for modular division.
• r is the number of resellers.
Protocol Without Anonymity Revocation With Anonymity Revocation
Tagged Transactions y + 19x+ r(10x+ y) 2y + 51x+ r(2y + 41x)
Anonymous Credentials r(39x+ 6y) r(82x+ 10y)
Table 7.5: Tagged Transaction Protocol vs Anonymous Credentials
Table 7.5 shows the comparison between the computational complexity of the
tagged transactions protocol and anonymous credentials. For one reseller, the
tagged transaction protocol has a lower complexity than anonymous credentials
but the extended tagged transaction protocol has a higher complexity than
anonymous credentials with anonymity revocation. Both the tagged transaction
protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol scale more efficiently
with the number of resellers. The tagged transaction protocol was designed to
provide efficient transferring of tags from one reseller to another. The anonymous
credential protocol was designed to provide multiple show credentials with
one-show credentials being an extension to the original protocol. For a one-
show credential, each reseller must generate the anonymous credential and then
prove ownership of it using zero knowledge proofs of knowledge to generate
the credential for the next reseller in the chain. The zero knowledge proofs
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of knowledge used in anonymous credentials make it more expensive than the
tagged transaction protocol when using multiple resellers.
7.1.2 Summary
In this section I have presented the computational and communication com-
plexity of the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged transaction
protocol. The extended tagged transaction protocol has a higher computational
and communication complexity than the tagged transaction protocol due to the
extra operations needed to provide revocable anonymity for resellers that clone
tags using restricted blind signatures. The details of these complexity results
would change if a different signature, encryption, or restricted blind signature
scheme were used.
Both the computational and communication complexity of the protocols scale
linearly with the total number of TGCs when registering items. This is because
the item needs to be registered with every TGC. The complexity scales linearly
with the number of resellers in the chain. The complexity also scales quadratically
with the threshold number of TGCs.
The anonymous credentials protocol can provide one-show credentials to
users that can anonymously establish digital provenance in reseller chains.
Anonymous credentials can be used in two different modes, one without revoca-
ble anonymity and one that provides revocable anonymity. I have compared the
computational complexity of the tagged transaction protocol and the extended
tagged transaction protocol to anonymous credentials. The tagged transaction
protocol has less computational complexity when compared to anonymous
credentials without anonymity revocation and also scales better with the number
of resellers. The extended tagged transaction protocol has a higher computational
complexity than anonymous credentials with revocable anonymity when only
using one reseller but scales better with the number of resellers.
I now consider an example of the computational and communication com-
plexity of the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged transaction
protocol. I assume there are three resellers, a (4,5) threshold group of TGCs,
the output of the hash function is 512 bits, the size of the license is 3096 bytes,
and the size of the keys used in the encryption and signature schemes are 2048
bits. Then the computational complexity of the tagged transaction protocol is
5y + 562x and the extended tagged transaction protocol is 33y + 1336x where y
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Figure 7.1: Implementation Block Diagram
is the computational complexity of modular division and x is the computational
complexity of modular exponentiation. The communication complexity in this
example would be 342.1 KB and the size of a tag would be 4.6 KB. For the
extended tagged transaction protocol the communication complexity would be
459.7 KB and the size of a tag would be 6.1 KB.
7.2 Implementation Details
To measure the performance of the tagged transaction protocol I have imple-
mented both the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged transaction
protocol in Java. Figure 7.1 shows a block diagram for the Java implementation.
The classes implemented are divided in to the network servers, the main
processes, and utility functions.
The utility functions implement any signature or utility functions that are
not provided as part of the Java API. The Schnorr signature scheme is not
implemented as part of the Java API. I have implemented this as two Java classes.
The first class is called SchnorrSignatureScheme that contains all the methods
for generating keys, signing data, and verifying signatures. The second class is
called SchnorrSignature which contains the information that is needed to send
a Schnorr signature. This class is serializable. The class SignedIdentityToken in
the utility functions implements the restricted blind signature scheme. The class
SignedTag contains the information that is needed to send a signed tag across
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the network. This includes any information needed for the extended tagged
transaction protocol. This class is serializable. RSA encryption is implemented
using the bouncy castle Java cryptographyAPIs 1 (version 1.45). Random number
generation uses the Java SecureRandom class. The SHA-512 hash function is
implemented using the Java MessageDigest class.
The main process classes implement the TGC, suppliers, resellers, and cus-
tomers. Each of these is implemented in a separate class. These classes can make
use of the utility classes to create signatures or verify signed items. Keeping
the utility classes separate from the main process classes allows the type of
signature or encryption to be changed without needing major changes to these
main process classes. The customer and reseller class currently share some code
as both resellers and customers have to verify signed tags and signed identity
tokens. The TGC contains methods to generate, check, and sign tags using the
utility classes.
The network servers implement the communication of the various processes
using Sockets. Using separate classes for the network servers allows the method
of communication to be changed without needing to change the main classes.
Currently the network servers also include code to measure the time taken to
perform various actions which are written to files to allow the performance tests
to take place. The network servers contain the main method for each process
which can be configured using command line arguments to use a variable number
of TGCs to test the performance of the threshold version of the tagged transaction
protocol and a variable number of resellers to test the performance of the protocol
with multiple resellers. The command line interface is currently used to specify
the address and port of other processes that are needed. The customer and
resellers need to know the address and port number of the TGC as well as the
address and port number of the supplier or reseller that is adjacent to them in the
chain of resellers. The supplier needs to know the address and port number of
the TGC.
Tests have been done using the TOR anonymous communication channel us-
ing the TOR Linux client2 (version 2.2.34-2). Connections that requires anonymity
connect via a local proxy provided as part of the TOR library. The TOR library
retains the same anonymised IP address for 10 minutes before attaining a new
anonymised IP address. This means that, in this implementation, the actions of
1http://www.bouncycastle.org/java.html
2https://www.torproject.org/download/download.html.en
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Figure 7.2: Experimental Setup
an individual reseller or supplier are linkable within the 10 minute window.
7.3 Experimental Setup
Figure 7.2 shows the experimental setup for the performance tests. All three test
server machines are Dell Optiplex GX780s with an Intel Core 2 Duo E8400 3.0Ghz
CPU. Test Server 2 and 3 have 4GB of RAM and Test Server 1 has 16GB of RAM.
Test Server 1 runs the group of TGCs that are used. In these experiments this
number varies from 1 to 7. Test Server 2 runs a customer and a supplier. Test
Server 3 runs any resellers that are used in the protocol. In these experiments
this number varies from 1 to 5. The test servers are all connected to the same
local network. To measure the performance of the tagged transaction protocol
the experiments vary the key size used, the number of TGCs in the group, and
the number of resellers between the supplier and the customer. Table 7.6 shows
the default values of the parameters.
Parameter Value
Key Size 1024 bits
Number of TGCs 1
Number of Resellers 1
Table 7.6: Default Experimental Parameters
The performance measurements for registering an item includes the complete
time for the supplier to:
1. Generate the identity of the item.
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2. Generate a private and public key pair for the item.
3. Encrypt the public key and identity of the item with the public encryption
key of the TGC and send this item to the TGC.
4. Receive and check the signed receipt from the TGC.
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 for all the TGCs in the group.
The performance measurement for the tagged transaction protocol includes
the complete time for the following steps:
1. The customer generates a one time key pair for the transaction and sends
the one time public key and the identity of the item to the first reseller in
the chain.
2. The reseller generates a one time key pair for the transaction and sends the
one time public key and the identity of the item to the next reseller in the
chain (or the supplier if it is the end of the chain).
3. Step 2 is repeated for each reseller in the chain.
4. The supplier sends a signed purchase request including the one time public
key they received and a signed license to the TGC.
5. The TGC checks the signed tag request and generates and returns a signed
tag to the supplier.
6. Steps 4 and 5 are repeated for a threshold number of the TGCs in the group.
7. The supplier returns the signed tags it has received to the reseller.
8. The reseller sends the TGC a regeneration request signed using its one time
private key containing the public key of the participant before it in the
reseller chain. The TGC then signs the new tag and sends it to the reseller.
9. Step 8 is repeated for a threshold number of the TGCs in the group.
10. The customer checks the threshold number of signed tags it has received
from the reseller.
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The performance measurements for the tagged transaction protocol do not
include the registration of the item. The registration step only needs to be
completed once for every item and not for every transaction. The performance
results represent the worst case performance. Many of the steps in the protocol
could be pre-computed. For example, a reseller could pre-purchase a group of
tags from the supplier and so not need to complete this step when a customer
tries to purchase the item from them.
The performance measurement for the extended tagged transaction protocol
includes the complete time for the following steps:
1. The customer completes the withdrawal protocol with the TGC to get a
blind signed identity token.
2. Step 1 is repeated for a threshold number of the TGCs in the group.
3. The customer generates a one time key pair for the transaction and sends
the blind signed identity tokens, one time public key, and the identity of the
item to the first reseller in the chain.
4. The reseller completes the withdrawal protocol with the TGC to get a blind
signed identity token.
5. Step 4 is repeated for a threshold number of the TGCs in the group.
6. The reseller generates a one time key pair for the transaction and sends the
blind signed identity tokens, one time public key and the identity of the
item to the next reseller in the chain (or the supplier if it is the end of the
chain).
7. Step 4, 5, and 6 are repeated for each reseller in the chain.
8. The supplier sends a signed purchase request including the blind signed
identity token and one time public key they received and a signed license
to the TGC.
9. The TGC checks the signed tag request and blind signed identity token and
generates and returns a signed tag to the supplier.
10. Steps 8 and 9 are repeated for a threshold number of the TGCs in the group.
11. The supplier returns the signed tags it has received to the reseller.
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12. The reseller sends the TGC a regeneration request signed using its one time
private key containing the public key of the participant before it in the
reseller chain.
13. The reseller and TGC take part in a challenge response protocol to show the
reseller owns the blind signed identity token. The TGC then signs the new
tag and sends it to the reseller.
14. Steps 12 and 13 are repeated for a threshold number of the TGCs in the
group.
15. The customer checks the threshold number of signed tags it has received
from the reseller.
The performance measurements for the extended tagged transaction protocol do
not include the registration of the item or the opening of an account with the
TGCs. Both the registration of the item and the registering of accounts only
need to be completed once for every item and not for every transaction. The
performance results represent the worst case performance. Many of the steps in
the protocol could be pre-computed. For example, a reseller could pre-purchase
a group of tags from the supplier and so not need to complete this step when
a customer tries to purchase the item from them. Alternately, the blind signed
identity tokens could be withdrawn in bulk before the protocol began.
7.4 Experimental Results
This section shows the results of running performance experiments on the
implementation of the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged
transaction protocol. The measurements have been made while all the computers
are on the local network as well as using anonymous communication over the
TOR network. The graphs done over the local network are all coloured red and
the graphs using TOR are all shown in blue. Each run was done 30 times and the
averages and standard deviations are shown on the graphs.
7.4.1 Registering Items
Figure 7.3 shows the total time taken to register an item increasing exponentially
when the key size increases linearly. This is because increasing the key size lin-
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Figure 7.3: Key Size vs Total Time to Register Item
Figure 7.4: Number of TGCs vs Total Time to Register Item
early increases the time taken to complete the modular exponentiation required
exponentially.
Increasing the number of total TGCs linearly (note this is the total number
of TGCs and not the threshold number) increases the time taken to register the
items linearly as shown in Figure 7.4. When a supplier registers an item it has
to encrypt and decrypt the message to send for each individual TGC as they all
have individual keys. This increases the total time taken linearly.
Using TOR
When using TOR, the time taken to register an item remains almost constant as
the key size increases as shown in Figure 7.5. This indicates that the costs of
sending the information over the TOR network was the main component of the
time taken to register the item and the exponentially increasing time taken to
complete the modular exponentiations was not a large factor.
Figure 7.6 shows the time taken to register an item increasing linearly with
the total number of TGCs. The largest contributor to the time taken is the data
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Figure 7.5: Key Size vs Total Time to Register Item using TOR
Figure 7.6: Number of TGCs vs Total Time to Register Item using TOR
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Figure 7.7: Key Size vs Tagged Transaction Total Time
Figure 7.8: Threshold Number of TGCs vs Tagged Transaction Total Time (no
data point for the threshold value of 2)
being sent over the TOR network and this increases linearly as the total number
of TGCs increases.
7.4.2 Tagged Transaction Protocol
Figure 7.7 shows the time taken to complete the tagged transaction protocol
increasing exponentially as the key size increases linearly. This is because
as the size of the keys increases linearly, the time taken to do the modular
exponentiations and modular division increases exponentially.
The time taken to complete the tagged transaction protocol increases quadrat-
ically as the threshold value of TGCs is increased linearly as shown in Figure 7.8.
It is worth noting that there is no data point for the threshold number of TGCs of
two. Both the computation and communication complexity increase as a function
of the square of the threshold value of TGCs (as shown in Table 7.1 and Table 7.3).
This is the reason the time taken to complete the tagged transaction protocol
shows a quadratic growth as the threshold number of TGCs increases linearly.
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Figure 7.9: Number of Resellers vs Tagged Transaction Total Time
Figure 7.10: Key Size vs Tagged Transaction Total Time using TOR
Figure 7.9 shows the time taken to complete the tagged transaction protocol
increasing linearly as the number of resellers increases linearly. Unlike the
increase in the threshold number of TGCs, this is only an increase in series.
The number of operations performed and the amount of data sent both increase
linearly as the number of resellers increases linearly.
Using TOR
Figure 7.10 shows a small exponential increase in time taken for the tagged
transaction protocol using TOR as the key size is increased linearly. The shallow
slope of this graph as opposed to the steeper slope when increasing the key size
without TOR (Figure 7.7) shows that the communication over the TOR network
is still the major contributor to the time taken by the tagged transaction protocol.
The time taken to complete the tagged transaction protocol using TOR
increases quadratically as the threshold value of TGCs is increased linearly as
shown in Figure 7.11. It is worth noting that there is no data point for the
threshold number of TGCs of two. Both the computation and communication
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Figure 7.11: Threshold Number of TGCs vs Tagged Transaction Total Time using
TOR (no data point for the threshold value of 2)
Figure 7.12: Number of Resellers vs Tagged Transaction Total Time using TOR
complexity increasewith the square of the threshold number of TGCs causing this
quadratic growth in the time taken to complete the tagged transaction protocol.
Figure 7.12 shows the time taken to complete the tagged transaction protocol
using TOR increasing linearly as the number of resellers increases. This is because
the number of operations and the amount of data sent both increase linearly with
the number of resellers. The graph shows a slight curve, but the error bars show
that a linear relationship fits this data.
7.4.3 Extended Tagged Transaction Protocol
Figure 7.13 shows the time taken to complete the extended tagged transaction
protocol increasing exponentially as the key size increases linearly. This is
because as the size of the keys increases linearly, the time taken to do the modular
exponentiations and divisions increases exponentially.
The time taken to complete the extended tagged transaction protocol increases
quadratically as the threshold value of TGCs is increased linearly as shown in
7.4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 131
Figure 7.13: Key Size vs Extended Tagged Transaction Total Time
Figure 7.14: Threshold Number of TGCs vs Extended Tagged Transaction Total
Time (no data point for the threshold value of 2)
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Figure 7.15: Number of Resellers vs Extended Tagged Transaction Total Time
Figure 7.16: Key Size vs Extended Tagged Transaction Total Time using TOR
Figure 7.14. It is worth noting that there is no data point for the threshold number
of TGCs of two. Both the computation and communication complexity of the
extended tagged transaction protocol increase as a function of the square of the
threshold value of TGCs (as shown in Table 7.2 and Table 7.4).
Figure 7.15 shows the time taken to complete the extended tagged transaction
protocol increasing linearly as the number of resellers increases linearly. This is
because the number of operations performed and the amount of data sent both
increase linearly as the number of resellers increases linearly.
Using TOR
Figure 7.16 shows a small exponential increase in time taken for the extended
tagged transaction protocol using TOR as the key size is increased linearly. The
shallow slope of this graph as opposed to the steeper slope when increasing
the key size without TOR (Figure 7.13) shows that the communication over the
TOR network is the major contributor to the time taken by the extended tagged
transaction protocol.
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Figure 7.17: Threshold Number of TGCs vs Extended Tagged Transaction Total
Time using TOR (no data point for the threshold value of 2)
Figure 7.18: Number of Resellers vs Extended Tagged Transaction Total Time
using TOR
The time taken to complete the extended tagged transaction protocol using
TOR increases quadratically as the threshold value of TGCs is increased linearly
as shown in Figure 7.17. It is worth noting that there is no data point for the
threshold number of TGCs of two. The computational and communication com-
plexity increases with the square of the threshold number of TGCs causing the
quadratic growth in the time taken to complete the extended tagged transaction
protocol.
Figure 7.18 shows the time taken to complete the extended tagged transaction
protocol increasing with the number of resellers. This graph shows a great deal
of variance between different runs with a large standard deviation. As all the
resellers have to communicate with the TGC using the TOR network, when there
are more resellers and TOR is the major source of variance, then as the resellers
are increased the variance of the time taken to complete the protocol will increase.
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7.5 Summary
This chapter has shown the performance of the tagged transaction protocol.
The complexity results show that the amount of computation to complete both
the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol
increase linearly with the number of resellers in the chain. The computational
and communication complexity increase linearly with the square of the threshold
number of TGCs.
One-show anonymous credentials can provide anonymous provenance in
reseller chains. This chapter shows the computational complexity of the tagged
transaction protocol compared to anonymous credentials and the computational
complexity of the extended tagged transaction protocol compared to anonymous
credentials with revocable global anonymity. With one reseller in the chain, the
tagged transaction protocol has a lower complexity than anonymous credentials,
but the extended tagged transaction protocol has a higher complexity than
anonymous credentials with revocable anonymity. Both the tagged transaction
protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol scale more efficiently
when the number of resellers in the chain is increased.
The tagged transaction protocol has been implemented in Java. Using this
implementation tests have been conducted to show the effects of varying the pa-
rameters of the protocol on the time taken to execute the protocol. Increasing the
key size linearly increases the time taken to complete both the tagged transaction
protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol exponentially. Increasing
the threshold number of TGCs increase the time taken to compute both the tagged
transaction protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol quadratically.
This is due to the communication complexity of the protocol being increased
as a function of the square of the threshold number of TGCs. Increasing the
number of resellers results in a linear increase in the time taken to complete both
the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol.
The performance results follow what is expected given the complexity results
presented earlier in the chapter.
The performance of the tagged transaction protocol has also been shown using
the TOR anonymous communication network. Using the TOR network increases
the time taken to complete the protocol. The performance tests also show that
using TOR introduces a large variance in the time taken to complete the protocol.
The more connections made using the TOR network, the greater the variance.
Chapter 8
Provenance in Web Services
This chapter applies the ideas and mechanisms developed for the tagged transac-
tion protocol to providing provenance for web services. In web services, service
providers collate and present information from a collection of heterogeneous data
sources. These sources can include databases, web applications, and other service
providers.
The basic model for web services is shown in Figure 8.1. Consider an example
of a web service where users display their photos along with a map showing the
location the photo was taken. In this case, the service provider may be using
a storage provider and a mapping provider. So in this example, the service
provider is providing a service to the user that is a combination of the service
provider’s own algorithms and the functionality provided by two external service
providers.
A service may use information from several different service providers.
Depending on the reputation of the service provider being used, users may have
differing expectations of the quality of the data as well as the amount they are
willing to pay for the service. A service provider that is using a premium service
will want to be able to charge more for this service. However, a malicious service
provider could claim to be using a premium service when they are using free
services provided by a different service provider.
Provenance information for web services refers to the origin and modification
history of the data provided as a web service. There are several differences
between providing provenance for web services and for reseller transactions. In
web services, the service is provided as an ongoing series of service requests and
responses as opposed to a one-off item transaction. This means the provenance
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Figure 8.1: Web Services Model
for the service needs to be continually checked through the duration of the
service.
When providing provenance for digital items, a digital item will be the same
through the reseller chain and have a single supplier. In the web services model,
the result of the service may change as various operations are performed by the
service providers. Additionally, there is no single supplier for web services. The
data can be produced and combined by multiple service providers.
In the reseller model, the participants in the transaction were anonymous
and unlinkable to prevent the revelation of potentially commercially sensitive
data. In the web services model, these privacy requirements are relaxed. The
provenance information provided for a web service lists all the service providers
that provided a source of data or modified the data. The identity of a service
provider may influence the decision of a user to use the web service.
A subtle problem with providing provenance information for web services is
an exclusion attack. In an exclusion attack, the service provider misses out some
of the sources of data from the provenance record. In the reseller model, every
item has only one supplier and so they cannot be removed from the provenance
information without detection but in the web services model a service provider
may have many data sources. This chapter presents a discussion on methods to
prevent exclusion attacks.
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8.1 Domain Model
I define two roles that a participant in a web service can take: service providers
and users. A participant may change roles. For example, a user may become a
service provider by taking the service provided to it and combining it with some
other service or computation to produce a new service.
• Service Providers. Service Providers make use of a heterogeneous collection
of data sources to provide a service. A service provider is uniquely
identified by a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). All service providers
have a private and public key pair. The public keys of service providers
are well known values.
• Users. Users are the end user of the service provided by a service provider.
The terms and actions defined in the Open Provenance Model (OPM) [59]
are used to create a model of provenance for web services (similar to the model
created for resellers in Section 3.2). The web services model uses the following
terms:
• Artifact: An immutable piece of state. In the web services model an artifact
is the result of a service. Artifacts are created by service providers and
passed to other service providers or users.
• Process: An action or series of actions performed on or caused by an
artifact. In the web services model a process is either Generate where a
service provider generates some data or TransformCombinewhere a service
provider takes some artifacts and performs some actions on them to create
a new artifact.
• Agents: A contextual entity controlling a process. In the web services
model all agents are service providers as users do not create provenance
information.
The OPM also defines actions, most of which are parametrised by the role of
the process or agent that is performing the action. The web services model uses
the following actions:
• wascontrolledby(Role): A process is controlled by an agent. The Role
parameter is the role the agent is taking in the protocol. SP defines the role
of service provider.
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Figure 8.2: Web Services Provenance Graph
• wasgeneratedby(Role): An artifact is generated by a process. The Role
parameter is the process that is generating the artifact, in this model this
is Generate or TransformCombine.
• usedby(Role): An artifact is used by a process. The Role parameter is the
process that uses the artifact, in this model this is the TransformCombine
process.
• wasderivedfrom: Artifacts can be derived from other artifacts. There is no
role associated with this action.
In the Open Provenance Model, provenance is represented as a provenance
graphwhich is a directed graphwhere agents are shown as octagons, processes as
rectangles, and artifacts as circles. Directed edges in the graph represent an action
with the source of the action being the end point of the arrow and the start of the
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arrow showing the result of the action. Figure 8.2 shows a provenance graph for
a service with two service providers acting as input to a third service provider.
The user does not feature in the provenance graph as they are not a source
of provenance information. Artifact A1 and A2 are generated by the Generate
process controlled by Service Provider 1 and Service Provider 2 respectively.
Artifact A3 is generated by the TransformCombine process controlled by Service
Provider 3 using A1 and A2. The graph also shows that A3 is derived from A1
and A2.
8.2 Threat Model
There are many ways a malicious service provider could try and defraud a user
with incorrect provenance information. This threat model groups them in to the
following categories:
1. Fabrication. The adversary tries to create provenance information for an
honest participant in the protocol when it has never obtained the service
from the participant.
2. Cloning. The adversary tries to providemultiple users the same provenance
information they have obtained from an honest participant in the protocol.
3. Network Sniffing. The adversary replays legitimate provenance informa-
tion it has seen on the network (possibly intended for a different service
provider).
4. Exclusion. The adversary tries to provide information to a user from an hon-
est participant in the protocol without providing providence information.
The service providers are untrusted and may be active adversaries, attempt-
ing to create false provenance data, or modify and delete existing provenance
data. If a service provider is honest and correctly provides provenance informa-
tion, then it should not be possible for an adversary to fabricate, clone, network
sniff, or exclude the honest service providers provenance information. A service
provider may also provide incorrect provenance information to try and discredit
another service provider.
While a service provider should provide provenance information for every
step in the chain to the user, if a set of service providers on the chain colludes
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together they canmake it appear as though they are acting as one service provider.
We do not consider this an attack as the group is colluding and acting as one party.
Side channel attacks are out of the scope of this threat model.
8.3 Provenance Chains
Each time information is created or used by a service provider a provenance tag
is created and passed along with the result. The tag is created by the source of
the provenance information and signed using the secret key of the source. The
tag should contain enough information to recreate the provenance information as
shown in the graph in Section 8.1.
A tag is a tuple: tag = {A,B,C,D,E}sksource . The definitions of the parameters
in the tag are:
• A = source: the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of the source of this
provenance tag.
• B = destination: the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of the destination
of this provenance tag.
• C = serial: The randomly chosen serial number of this service request. This
is created by the user and sent along with the request for service.
• D = H(data): A hash of the service result that is associated with this
provenance tag.
• E = action: What process was performed on the data, either Generate or
TransformCombine.
The tags are signed using the secret key of the source service provider. The
notation {A}skB denotes the message A signed using the key skB . It is assumed
that all public keys for service providers are well known or discoverable from a
certificate authority.
Figure 8.3 shows the process for passing tags between a user and two service
providers.
1. The user randomly generates a serial number for this request and sends the
request for service to its service provider (Service Provider) along with the
serial number. The serial number is to prevent service providers from being
able to replay provenance information.
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Figure 8.3: Provenance Chains
2. The service provider (Service Provider) generates the request for service
from the second service provider (Service Provider 2) and sends it along
with the serial number and the URI of the second service provider to the
second service provider (Service Provider 2). All the requests sent to service
providers are signed using the private key of the sending service provider.
The service provider (Service Provider) will send a request to every service
provider it uses as input in this step, this example shows one for clarity.
3. The second service provider (Service Provider 2) generates a provenance
tag to return to the first service provider. The tag contains the source and
destination, the serial number, a hash of the data returned, and the action
taken, in this case Generate. The tag is then signed using its secret key skSP2.
4. The signed provenance tag is returned to the first service provider.
5. The service provider creates a provenance tag to send to the user. The tag
contains the source and destination, the serial number, a hash of the data to
return to the user, and the action TransformCombine. The service provider
then signs this tag using its secret key skSP .
6. The service provider (Service Provider) sends the user the two signed tags.
The user checks that all provenance information contains the correct serial
number, a tag from all registered inputs, and an unbroken chain of provenance
information.
142 CHAPTER 8. PROVENANCE INWEB SERVICES
8.4 Analysis
The protocol for providing provenance for web services is now compared to our
requirements discussed in Section 8.1 and Section 8.2. The analysis examines the
protocol in terms of completeness requirements to check that it contains enough
provenance information to recreate the provenance graph. A security analysis is
then completed to check that incorrect provenance information can be detected
in the presence of malicious service providers.
8.4.1 Completeness
A protocol that has complete provenance information should allow the creation
of a provenance graph. Completeness is shown by considering the relationships
shown in the open provenance model and how the provenance tags show these
relationships.
• Artifact: identified by the hash value of the artifact in the provenance tag.
• Process: identified by the process name (either Generate or TransformCom-
bine) in the provenance tag.
• Agent: identified by the source of the provenance tag.
• wascontrolledby(role): is represented by the source of the provenance tag
and the role is identified by the process name.
• wasgeneratedby(role): is represented by the hash of the artifact and the role
by the process name.
• usedby(role): is represented by the set of tags with the destination set as the
controller for the operation of the role.
• wasderivedfrom: can be generated using the source and destination values
of the provenance tags and the hash values of the artifacts. wasderivedfrom
may be over approximated when there are multiple inputs and outputs for
a service provider for a single service request. In this case, the tags show
that the output artifacts were derived from the input artifacts, but not what
individual input artifacts an output artifact was derived from.
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8.4.2 Security Analysis
Service providers may provide incorrect provenance information or respond
incorrectly to audit requests. This analysis assumes a signature scheme that has
provable security against existential forgeries under adaptive chosen message
attacks in the random oracle model such as PSS RSA [7], the triplet El-Gamal
scheme [74], or the Schnorr signature scheme [83]. If the signature scheme is
secure against existential forgeries, then given a public key pk it is infeasible
to forge a pair (m,σ) where σ is a valid signature on m using the secret key
corresponding to the public key pk. It is assumed that serial numbers are chosen
at random from a large set and that the chance of two users choosing the same
serial number is negligible. Side channel attacks or the possibility of an adversary
gaining access to the secret key of an honest participant are not considered.
Fabrication
If the adversary is able to construct provenance information from an honest
participant in the protocol that they have never used then they must create a tag
signed using the secret key for the participant. This adversary can then be used to
break the signature scheme. The adversary is given as input the public key of the
participant pk. The adversary will then produce a valid provenance tag {tag}sk.
This creates a valid message signature pair for pk, (m = tag, σ = {tag}sk).
Cloning
If the adversary is able to clone provenance information from an honest partici-
pant then the adversary must modify a valid signed tag with a new serial number.
If the adversary can complete this modification, we can use the adversary to break
the signature scheme. The adversary is given as input the public key of the honest
participant and the signed tag to clone {tagoriginal}sk. The adversary will then
produce a new tag that has a different serial number denoted {tagnew}sk. This
creates a valid message signature pair for pk, (m = tagnew, σ = {tagnew}sk).
Network Sniffing
If the adversary is able to use network sniffing to claim ownership of some
provenance information then, similar to a cloning attack, the adversary will have
to alter the tag to have the correct serial number. The adversary is given as
144 CHAPTER 8. PROVENANCE INWEB SERVICES
S e rv ic e
P r o v id e r
R e g is t r a t io n
S e rv e r
1 )  { U R I S P , p k S P ,U R I 1 ,… ,U R I N } p k R S
2 )  { U R I S P , p k S P ,U R I 1 ,… ,U R I N } s k R S
Figure 8.4: Service Provider Registration
input the public key of the honest participant and the tag they have sniffed
{tagoriginal}sk. The adversary will then produce a new tag that has a different
serial number denoted {tagnew}sk. This creates a valid message signature pair for
pk, (m = tagnew, σ = {tagnew}sk).
8.5 Preventing Exclusion Attacks
To prevent exclusion attacks, a service provider registers the URIs of service
providers it uses as input with a third party called a Registration Server which
records these details and is queried by the users to discover the provenance
information it should be receiving from a service. All service providers register
with the registration server even if they have no input services. The auditing
process presented in this section assumes that all input service providers are used
for every service request by the service provider.
8.5.1 Service Provider Registration
Figure 8.4 shows the process used by a service provider to register their service
with the registration server. The service provider submits a record with their URI
URISP , their public key pkSP and the list of URIs of all service providers they
use as inputs URI1, ..., URIN . This record is encrypted with the public key of the
registration server to prevent it being modified by a third party. The registration
server then returns a signed receipt. The inputs that a service provider uses may
also change over time. In this case the service provider should re-register the
service with the new inputs.
8.5.2 User Requesting Service Provider Data
Figure 8.5 shows a user requesting the data on a specific service provider from the
registration server. The user sends a request with the URI of the service provider
URISP to the registration server. The registration server then returns a signed
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message with the list of input service providers registered by the service provider
identified by URISP . The user will not need to perform this action every time it
uses the service, it will only need to periodically check for changes to the inputs
to the service provider.
8.5.3 Auditing Registration Information
A service provider may submit incorrect information by excluding some of the
service providers it uses to provide its service, thereby hiding a source of data. A
user can request an audit for a particular query it has done. The user will submit
the serial number it used in the request to the registration server which carries out
checks to confirm the registration information provided by the service provider.
Figure 8.6 shows the process for requesting the audit. The registration server
broadcasts an audit request with the serial number provided by the user. Service
providers then return a signed message containing either false and the serial
number if they did not take part in the request, or the the signed request that was
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Figure 8.7: Example Exclusion Attack
sent to them when they first responded to the service {request, serial, URI}skSP .
The service providers return the signed request so that a dishonest service
provider cannot frame another service provider in an exclusion attack. These
messages are put together by the registration server to check the information it
has registered for a service provider.
A broadcast request has to be sent to all service providers, but users do not
request an audit for every service request. The registration server could also
return a time stamp of the last audit time for the service provider with the
information it returns to the user.
If the registration server is acting honestly, then it will send the audit message
to all service providers that have registered. All honest participants will have
registered with the registration server and so will receive the audit message and
respond to it. The registration server can then check the information that is
returned to confirm the registration information that has been provided by the
service provider.
If the registration server is not trusted and may act maliciously, then some
mechanism is needed to verify the actions of the registration server. This analysis
briefly discusses two possible mechanisms for implementing a verifiable registra-
tion server: a public bulletin board and the use of a group of registration servers.
The registration server could publish all its actions to a public bulletin board.
Users could then check that the audits they requested have been completed
and responders to the audit message can check that their response is correctly
recorded. A second option is to use a group of registration servers where a
threshold value of the group is required to sign values sent to the user. As long as
less than this threshold value of registration servers are acting correctly the user
can be confident of receiving correct responses to its queries and audits.
One method for a malicious web service to carry out an exclusion attack in
this model is for the service provider to change the serial number during the
service. The user sends a web service request with a serial number S1 to a service
provider. The service provider then creates a newweb service request with a new
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serial number S2 to send to the service provider. When the audit request is made
with the serial number S1, the service provider that received the request with
the serial number S2 will return false even if it is acting honestly. This attack is
shown in Figure 8.7.
To prevent this kind of exclusion attack, service providers need to be pre-
vented or discouraged from being able to generate a serial number. Suppose the
registration server is the only party able to generate serial numbers. An honest
service provider will only provide the service and provenance information if the
service request has a valid serial number signed by the registration server and
users will need to apply to the registration server for valid serial numbers.
To discourage dishonest service providers from generating a serial number a
participant that requests a serial number can be required to solve a computational
challenge or captcha. A user will then need to solve this computational challenge
for every service request they make. This punishes service providers that try to
provide web services that exclude their input services by the loss of computation
that they require to generate serial numbers. While users will also need complete
the computational challenge, it is reasonable to assume that a service provider
will have many users and will need to contribute more computational time for an
exclusion attack.
A second option would be to charge a participant that generates a serial
number a micro-payment. This will mean that an honest user will need to pay
a micro-payment every time they request a service. Again it is reasonable to
assume that a service provider will need to generate more serial numbers than
the users resulting in a significant financial penalty. These micro-payments can
be used to fund the resources required for the registration servers. If the web
service is non-interactive then a captcha will not be possible and a computational
challenge or micro-payment will be necessary.
8.6 Summary
This chapter has applied the techniques and ideas from the tagged transaction
protocol to providing provenance for web services. There are several differences
between web services and static items: a web service is provided as an ongoing
series of requests and responses as opposed to a single item, a web service
may dynamically change the service providers they are using, and web services
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do not have the same privacy requirements as reseller transactions. A model
of provenance for web services has been constructed using the definitions and
actions of the Open Provenance Model as well as a list of potential attacks.
A protocol for providing provenance for web services has been constructed
using tags that include the source and destination address, a one time serial
number, a hash of the data, and what action was performed on the data. These
provenance tags are then passed from service provider to service provider before
being sent to the user. The user can check the tags contain the correct provenance
information. An analysis of the protocol has been completed showing that the
protocol provides enough information to reconstruct the provenance graph and
that it is secure against fabrication, cloning, and network sniffing attacks.
Exclusion attacks on provenance for web services involve a malicious service
provider missing some of the honest input service providers from the provenance
information. A registration server can be used to audit the inputs to a web service.
To prevent a malicious web service from generating new serial numbers the use
of computational puzzles and micropayments has been discussed.
The work presented in this chapter on provenance for web services has many
avenues for future work. Future work includes: a more in depth security analysis,
morework on preventing exclusion attacks, andmeasurements on the complexity
and performance of the protocol.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis has addressed the problem of anonymously establishing provenance
for digital items in reseller chains. Increasingly digital items are purchased online
through resellers providing many benefits such as 24-hour access to items and
never having stores sell out of items. However, some properties of bricks and
mortar stores have been lost when purchasing items through online resellers such
as the ability to resell items once customers have finished with them.
Adversaries have many ways to try and defraud suppliers and customers by
trying to pass themselves of as the supplier, fabricate licenses for items, clone
licenses for items, and sniff a valid license on the network and claim it as their
own. There are also privacy issues where a reseller maywant to keep their supply
chain anonymous and not allow tracking of their transactions.
Secure provenance has been formally defined in this thesis as anonymously
establishing provenance of digital items in reseller chains in the presence of active
adversaries. The tagged transaction protocol developed in this thesis provides
secure provenance. The tagged transaction protocol uses a third party called
a Tag Generation Centre (TGC) and data structures called tags to provide
secure provenance. A second protocol called the extended tagged transaction
protocol has also been developed that provides secure provenancewhile allowing
revocable anonymity if a reseller tries to clone a tag. The extended tagged
transaction protocol uses ideas from digital cash to provide revocable anonymity
for resellers that try to clone tags while preserving the privacy of participants that
do not clone tags. Methods have been presented to verify the actions of the TGC
to remove the reliance on the TGC acting as a trusted third party.
Table 9.1 shows the properties of the tagged transactions protocol, the ex-
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Protocol Model R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
Tagged Transactions Digital Items X X X X X X X X
Extended Tagged Digital Items X X X X X X X X
Transactions
Web Services Web Services X X X X X
Table 9.1: Properties of Developed Protocols
tended tagged transaction protocol, and the protocol for providing provenance
in web services compared to the requirements listed in Section 1.2. These
requirements are briefly restated here as:
• R1: Establish Provenance of Digital Items/Web Services
• R2: Support Multiple Resellers/Service Providers
• R3: Support Customer Reselling
• R4: Provide Anonymity
• R5: Unlinkability of Actions
• R6: Efficient for Low Powered Devices
• R7: Agnostic to Deliver Method
• R8: Allow Bulk Buying
Both the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged transaction
protocol achieve all the requirements. The protocol for providing provenance in
web services does not provide anonymity or unlinkability as these requirements
are not required in the model of web services provenance in this work. In the
tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol the
complexity for a customer increases linearly with the threshold number of TGCs
and is constant for the number of resellers. The complexity of the protocol for
providing provenance for web services scales linearly with the number of service
providers that are contributing to the service.
A thorough security analysis has been performed on both the tagged trans-
action protocol and the extended tagged transaction protocol. This security
analysis uses a provable security style argument of contradiction. If an adversary
can break the properties of secure provenance for either the tagged transaction
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protocol or the extended tagged transaction protocol then this adversary can be
used to solve a problem thought to be hard. The tagged transaction protocol and
the extended tagged transaction protocol have been shown to be secure against
spoofing, fabrication, cloning, and network sniffing attacks using the Casper
compiler and the Failures Divergences Refinement (FDR) state based model
checker. The FDR model checker takes a description of the protocol and checks
all possible states of the protocol to show that it does not violate a specification.
The adversary in the FDRmodel checker has complete control of the network and
can add, drop, intercept, and fake messages.
A computational complexity and communication complexity analysis has
been completed on the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged
transaction protocol. These results show that the both the computational and
communication complexity scale linearly with the number of resellers. When
multiple TGCs are used the computational and communication complexity scale
linearly with the square of the number of TGCs. A comparison has been done
between the computational complexity of the tagged transaction protocol and
the extended tagged transaction protocol and a protocol called anonymous cre-
dentials. Anonymous credentials can also be used to provide secure provenance
for digital items in reseller chains. This analysis shows that the tagged transaction
protocol has less computational complexity than anonymous credentials, and
scales better with the number of resellers. The extended tagged transaction
protocol has more computational complexity than anonymous credentials when
one reseller is used, but scales better with the number of resellers.
The tagged transaction protocol and extended tagged transaction protocol
have been implemented in Java. Experimental tests have examined the effect of
varying the key size, threshold value of TGCs when using a multiple party TGC
distribution, number of resellers, and degree of anonymity on the time taken
to complete the protocols. These tests show that the time taken to complete
the protocols increases exponentially with the key size, and linearly with the
number of resellers. Implementing threshold-based trust for the TGCs means
that whenever an additional TGC is added the number of tags that each TGC
must receive and check each time a tag is generated by a reseller is increased.
This causes the time taken to increase quadratically with the threshold number
of TGCs. Tests were conducted using the TOR communication network which
showed that most of the time taken was in the communication over TOR and a
large variance in the time taken to send data over the TOR network.
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The ideas and mechanisms from the tagged transaction protocol have been
applied to providing provenance for web services. The web services model has
several differences to the digital item model. Web services provide a service
that is on going and do not have the same privacy requirements as reseller
transactions. The tag data structure has been modified to provide provenance
for web services. A basic analysis of the protocol for providing provenance in
web services has been completed showing that the protocol provides complete
provenance information and security against spoofing, cloning, and network
sniffing attacks. This work defines an exclusion attack where the service provider
misses out some of the sources of data from the provenance record and a
discussion of methods to prevent exclusion attacks.
9.1 Contributions
The main contributions in this thesis are:
1. Formalising the requirements and algorithms for a protocol for anony-
mously providing provenance in reseller chains. Based on the possible
attacks, this results in a formal definition of secure provenance.
2. Development of the tagged transaction protocol and the extended tagged
transaction protocol. Both protocols use tags and a third party called the Tag
Generation Centre (TGC) to anonymously provide provenance in reseller
chains.
3. Security analysis of the tagged transaction protocol using arguments by
contradiction and model checking.
4. Implementation and performance measurements of the tagged transaction
protocol showing the effects of the choice of distribution and anonymous
communication channel used.
5. Application of the ideas from the tagged transaction protocol to provide
secure provenance in web services. This includes the definition and
discussion of methods to prevent exclusion attacks.
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9.2 Future Work
There are several areas in this thesis that would provide interesting avenues
for future work. For the tagged transaction protocol and extended tagged
transaction protocol extending the FDR modelling results to include anonymity
and unlinkability would provide a more complete security analysis. The FDR
model checker has been used in the past to model anonymity properties and it
would be good to apply these techniques to these protocols.
The experimental results for the tagged transaction protocol and the extended
tagged transaction protocol currently have only been completed with all the
participants on the local network or communicating through TOR. Extending
these results by distributing the parties in global locations would provide a more
realistic test bed for the protocol. Distributing the parties would also provide a
base line for the results using the TOR network and show whether the variance
and extra time are caused by the TOR network or the communication over the
global network.
An opportunity exists to do a more in depth analysis of provenance in web
services through the application of the FDR model checker as used with the
tagged transaction protocol.
Currently solving exclusion attacks on provenance in web services is an
open problem. While this work has suggested some mechanisms to discourage
service providers from doing exclusion attacks, a mechanism to detect or prevent
exclusion attacks would be interesting to explore.
In the current design of the protocol for providing provenance in web services,
when there are multiple inputs and outputs for a service provider, the protocol
shows that the outputs were derived from the inputs but not what individual
input an output was derived from. Changing the protocol to show the individual
inputs that resulted in an output would provide a more fine-grained view of the
provenance information.
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Appendix A
CSP Models
This appendix details the CSP models that are created to check the security
properties of the tagged transaction protocol. The second section shows the
models for the extended tagged transaction protocol.
A.1 Tagged Transaction Protocol
The tagged transaction protocol has three CSP models: registration, the supplier
generating a tag, and a reseller generating a tag.
A.1.1 Registration
In the registration phase, the supplier is registering the identity of a new item
with the TGC along with a public key for the item.
Sets
Agents = {S, T,A}
Items = {item}
ItemKeys = {itemkey, intruderkey}
Key = {PKS, SKS, PKT , SKT , PKA, SKA}
The set Agents is composed of the participants in the registration phase and
the processes in the CSP model. The values S, T , and A represent the supplier,
TGC, and the adversary respectively. The set Items is composed of the items the
supplier wants to register. The set ItemKeys is composed of the public keys that
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are associated with the item. The set Key is the set of public and private keys
associated with each Agent where PK is the public key and SK is the private
key.
Messages
The two messages that are part of the registration phase of the tagged transaction
protocol are denotedMSG1 andMSG2:
MSG1 =̂ {Msg1.a.b.Encrypt.k.item.itemkey |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, k ∈ Key, item ∈ Items, itemkey ∈ ItemKeys}
MSG2 =̂ {Msg2.a.b.Encrypt.k.item.itemkey |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, k ∈ Key, item ∈ Items, itemkey ∈ ItemKeys}
The set of all messages in this phase of the protocol is defined as:
MSG =̂ MSG1 ∪MSG2
The channels defined in this system are send, receive, intercept, fake, running,
and commit. The channels send and receive are used by the processes to exchange
messages. The channels intercept and fake are used by the adversary to intercept
messages and insert new messages. The channels running and commit are used
to represent the state of the processes. Formally in CSP the channels are defined
as:
channel send, receive, intercept, fake : MSG
channel running, commit
Processes
The supplier is defined as:
SUPPLIER(item, itemkey, PKT ) =̂
send.Msg1.S.T.Encrypt.PKT .item.itemkey →
running.S.T.item.itemkey →
receive.Msg2.T.S.Encrypt.SKT .item.itemkey → SKIP
and the TGC is defined as:
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TGC(SKT , PKT ) =̂
receive.Msg1.S.T.Encrypt.PKT .item.itemkey →
send.Msg2.T.S.Encrypt.SKT .item.itemkey →
commit.T.S.item.itemkey → SKIP
A renaming is applied to the definitions of the supplier and the TGC to allow
the adversary to intercept and fake messages on the communication channels.
The renaming allows the input to come from either the channel receive or from
the channel fake and the output to go to either send or intercept. The supplier
and TGC cannot tell whether a message has been sent from the other party or
from the adversary.
SUPPLIER0 =̂ SUPPLIER(item, itemkey, PKT )
[[send.Msg1 ← send.Msg1, send.Msg1 ← intercept.Msg1,
receive.Msg2 ← receive.Msg2, receive.Msg2← fake.Msg2]]
TGC0 =̂ TGC(SKT , PKT )
[[receive.Msg1 ← receive.Msg1, receive.Msg1← fake.Msg1,
send.Msg2 ← send.Msg2, send.Msg2 ← intercept.Msg2]]
The Adversary
The adversary is parametrised by the information it knows. In this process the
adversary is parametrised bym1swhich is the set of all message 1s the adversary
knows, m2s which is the set of all message 2s the adversary knows, i which is
the set of all Items the adversary knows, and ik which is the set of all ItemKeys
the adversary knows. If the adversary knows the key to decrypt a message it
learns the contents of the message, otherwise the adversary learns the encrypted
content of the message. The adversary can fake new messages using any values
it has learnt, it can also fake messages by replaying the encrypted content of a
message it has seen. The CSP definition is:
I(m1s,m2s, i, ik) =̂
receive.Msg1?a.b.Encrypt.k.i′.ik′ →
if k ∈ {SKS, SKT , SKA, PKA} then I(m1s,m2s, i ∪ {i
′}, ik ∪ {ik′})
else I(m1s ∪ {Encrypt.k.i′.ik′},m2s, i, ik)
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Figure A.1: CSP Network Model: Registration
2 intercept.Msg1?a.b.Encrypt.k.i′.ik′ →
if k ∈ {SKS, SKT , SKA, PKA} then I(m1s,m2s, i ∪ {i
′}, ik ∪ {ik′})
else I(m1s ∪ {Encrypt.k.i′.ik′},m2s, i, ik)
2 receive.Msg2?b.a.Encrypt.k.i′.ik′ →
if k ∈ {SKS, SKT , SKA, PKA} then I(m1s,m2s, i ∪ {i
′}, ik ∪ {ik′})
else I(m1s,m2s ∪ {Encrypt.k.i′.ik′}, i, ik)
2 intercept.Msg2?b.a.Encrypt.k.i′.ik′ →
if k ∈ {SKS, SKT , SKA, PKA} then I(m1s,m2s, i ∪ {i
′}, ik ∪ {ik′})
else I(m1s,m2s ∪ {Encrypt.k.i′.ik′}, i, ik)
fake.Msg1?a.b?m : m1s→ I(m1s,m2s, i, ik)
fake.Msg2?b.a?m : m2s→ I(m1s,m2s, i, ik)
fake.Msg1?a.b!Encrypt?k?i′ : i?ik′ : ik → I(m1s,m2s, i, ik)
fake.Msg2?b.a!Encrypt?k?i′ : i?ik′ : ik → I(m1s,m2s, i, ik)
This model considers an adversary with the initial knowledge of intruderkey:
INTRUDER =̂ I({}, {}, {}, {intruderkey})
Verification
The model of the protocol is now put together with the intruder:
AGENTS =̂ SUPPLIER0|[{|send, receive|}]|TGC0
SY STEM =̂ AGENTS|[{|send, receive, fake, intercept|}]|INTRUDER
Figure A.1 illustrates the processes and channels in the model of the protocol.
The supplier and the TGC process have access to the channels send and receive.
The supplier also has access to the channel running and the TGC has access to the
channel commit. The adversary has access to the channels fake and intercept.
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FDR takes as input an implementation of the protocol and a specification and
checks that the implementation refines the specification. The registration step
has to prevent a spoofing attack where an adversary registers the item before
the supplier. Informally, if the TGC receives a registration message for an item,
the supplier must have sent the registration message. In CSP the specification is
defined as:
SPEC0 =̂ running.S.T.item.itemkey → commit.T?S.item.itemkey → SPEC
SPEC1 =̂ {|running.S.T.item.itemkey, commit.T.S.item.itemkey|}
SPEC =̂ SPEC0 |||RUN (Σ \ SPEC1)
The term Σ is the set of all possible events. The FDR model checker checks
SPEC vT SY STEM and returns TRUE after 10 states with 20 transitions.
A.1.2 Supplier Generating Tag
In this phase, the supplier generates a tag for a reseller with the TGC.
Sets
Agents = {S, T,R,A}
Items = {item}
Tags = {pktagreseller, pktagwrong}
ItemKeys = {PKItemitem, SKItemitem}
Key = {PKS, SKS, PKT , SKT , PKC , SKC , PKA, SKA}
The set Agents is composed of the participants involved when the supplier
generates the tag with the TGC and the processes in the CSP model. The values
S, T , R, and A represent the supplier, TGC, reseller, and adversary respectively.
The set Items is composed of the items that reseller wants to purchase. The set
Tags is composed of the one time keys that are in the tags. The set ItemKeys is
composed of the private and public keys that are associated with the item where
PKItem is the public key and SKItem is the private key. The setKey is the set of
public and private keys associated with each Agent where PK is the public key
and SK is the private key.
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Messages
The four messages that are part of the registration phase of the tagged transaction
protocol denotedMSG1,MSG2,MSG3, andMSG4 are:
MSG1 =̂ {Msg1.a.b.tag |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, tag ∈ Tags}
MSG2 =̂ {Msg2.a.b.Encrypt.k.tag |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, k ∈ ItemKeys, tag ∈ Tags}
MSG3 =̂ {Msg3.a.b.Encrypt.k.itemkey.tag |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, k ∈ Key, itemkey ∈ ItemKeys, tag ∈ Tags}
MSG4 =̂ {Msg4.a.b.Encrypt.k.itemkey.tag |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, k ∈ Key, itemkey ∈ ItemKeys, tag ∈ Tags}
The set of all messages in this phase of the protocol is defined as:
MSG =̂ MSG1 ∪MSG2 ∪MSG3 ∪MSG4
The channels defined in this system are send, receive, intercept, fake, running,
and commit. The channels send and receive are used by the processes to exchange
messages. The channels intercept, and fake are used by the adversary to intercept
messages and insert new messages. The channels running and commit are used
to represent the state of the processes. Formally in CSP the channels are defined
as:
channel send, receive, intercept, fake : MSG
channel running, commit
Processes
The reseller is defined as:
RESELLER(item, pktagreseller, PKT ) =̂
send.Msg1.R.S.pktagreseller →
receive.Msg4.S.R.Encrypt.SKT .PKItemitem.pktagreseller →
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commit.R.S.pktagcustomer → SKIP
The supplier is defined as:
SUPPLIER(item, SKItemitem, PKItemitem, PKT ) =̂
receive.Msg1.R.S.pktagreseller →
running.R.S.pktagreseller →
send.Msg2.S.T.Encrypt.SKItemitem.pktagreseller →
receive.Msg3.T.S.Encrypt.SKT .PKItem(item).pktagreseller →
send.Msg4.S.R.Encrypt.SKT .PKItem(item).pktagreseller → SKIP
and the TGC is defined as:
TGC(SKT , PKT ) =̂
receive.Msg2.S.T.Encrypt.SKItemitem.pktagreseller →
send.Msg3.T.S.Encrypt.SKT .PKItem(item).pktagreseller → SKIP
A renaming is applied to the definitions of the reseller, supplier and the TGC
to allow the adversary to intercept and fake messages on the communication
channels. The input can come either from the channel receive or from the channel
fake and the output can go to either send or intercept. The supplier, reseller, and
TGC cannot tell whether a message has been sent from the other party or from
the adversary.
RESELLER0 =̂ RESELLER(item, pktagreseller, PKT )
[[send.Msg1 ← send.Msg1, send.Msg1 ← intercept.Msg1,
receive.Msg4 ← receive.Msg4, receive.Msg4← fake.Msg4]]
SUPPLIER0 =̂ SUPPLIER(item, SKItemitem, PKItemitem, PKT )
[[receive.Msg1 ← receive.Msg1, receive.Msg1← fake.Msg1,
send.Msg2 ← send.Msg2, send.Msg2 ← intercept.Msg2,
receive.Msg3 ← receive.Msg3, receive.Msg3← fake.Msg3,
send.Msg4 ← send.Msg4, send.Msg4 ← intercept.Msg4]]
TGC0 =̂ TGC(SKT , PKT )
[[receive.Msg2 ← receive.Msg2, receive.Msg2← fake.Msg2,
162 APPENDIX A. CSP MODELS
send.Msg3 ← send.Msg3, send.Msg3 ← intercept.Msg3]]
The Adversary
The adversary is parametrised by the information it knows. In this process the
adversary is parametrised bym1swhich is the set of all message 1s the adversary
knows,m2swhich is the set of all message 2s the adversary knows,m3swhich is
the set of all message 3s the adversary knows,m4swhich is the set of all message
4s the adversary knows, and tk which is the set of all Tags the adversary knows.
If the adversary knows the key to decrypt a message it learns the contents of the
message, otherwise the adversary learns the encrypted content of the message.
The adversary can fake new messages using any values it has learnt, it can also
fake messages by replaying the encrypted content of a message it has seen. The
value KnownKeys = {SKItemitem, SKS, SKT , SKA, PKA} is the set of all keys
the adversary knows. The CSP definition is:
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk) =̂
receive.Msg1?a.b.tk′ →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′})
2 intercept.Msg1?a.b.tk′ →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′})
2 receive.Msg2?b.a.Encrypt.k.tk′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′})
else I(m1s,m2s ∪ {Encrypt.k.tk′},m3s,m4s, tk)
2 intercept.Msg2?b.a.Encrypt.k.tk′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′})
else I(m1s,m2s ∪ {Encrypt.k.tk′},m3s,m4s, tk)
2 receive.Msg3?b.a.Encrypt.k.pk.tk′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′})
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s ∪ {Encrypt.k.pk.tk′},m4s, tk)
2 intercept.Msg3?b.a.Encrypt.k.pk.tk′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′})
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s ∪ {Encrypt.k.pk.tk′},m4s, tk)
2 receive.Msg4?b.a.Encrypt.k.pk.tk′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′})
A.1. TAGGED TRANSACTION PROTOCOL 163
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s ∪ {Encrypt.k.pk.tk′}, tk)
2 intercept.Msg4?b.a.Encrypt.k.pk.tk′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′})
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s ∪ {Encrypt.k.pk.tk′}, tk)
fake.Msg1?a.b?m : m1s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk)
fake.Msg2?b.a?m : m2s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk)
fake.Msg3?b.a?m : m3s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk)
fake.Msg4?b.a?m : m4s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk)
fake.Msg1?a.b?tk′ : tk → I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk)
fake.Msg2?a.b!Encrypt?k?tk′ : tk → I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk)
fake.Msg3?a.b!Encrypt?k?pk?tk′ : tk → I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk)
fake.Msg4?a.b!Encrypt?k?pk?tk′ : tk → I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk)
In this model the adversary has the initial knowledge of pktagwrong:
INTRUDER =̂ I({}, {}, {}, {}, {pktagwrong})
Verification
The model of the protocol is now put together with the intruder:
CHANS =̂ {|send, receive|}
AGENTS =̂ RESELLER0|[CHANS]|SUPPLIER0|[CHANS]|TGC0
SY STEM =̂ AGENTS|[{|send, receive, fake, intercept|}]|INTRUDER
Figure A.4 illustrates the processes and channels in the model of the protocol.
The supplier, reseller, and the TGC processes have access to the channels send
and receive. The supplier also has access to the channel running and the reseller
has access to the channel commit. The adversary has access to the channels fake
and intercept.
FDR takes as input an implementation of the protocol and a specification and
checks that the implementation refines the specification. The generation of a tag
has to resist a fabrication attack. Informally, if the reseller receives a tag that it
accepts, the supplier must have sent a message to the TGC requesting the tag. In
CSP the specification is defined as:
SPEC0 =̂ running.S.R.pktagcustomer → commit.R?S.pktagcustomer → SPEC
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Figure A.2: CSP Network Model: Supplier Generating a Tag
SPEC1 =̂ {|running.S.R.pktagcustomer, commit.R.S.pktagcustomer|}
SPEC =̂ SPEC0 |||RUN (Σ \ SPEC1)
The term Σ is the set of all possible events. The FDR model checker checks
SPEC vT SY STEM and returns TRUE after 111 states with 387 transitions.
A.1.3 Reseller Generating Tag
In this phase the reseller generates a tag for a customer with the TGC.
Sets
Agents = {C, T,R,A}
Items = {item}
Tags = {pktag, pktag2, pktagwrong, pktagwrong2}
ActualTags = {tag, tag2, tagwrong, tagwrong2}
ItemKeys = {PKItemitem, SKItemitem}
Key = {PKR, SKR, PKT , SKT , PKC , SKC , PKA, SKA}
The set Agents is composed of the participants involved when the reseller
generates the tag with the TGC and the processes in the CSP model. The values
C, T , R, and A represent the customer, TGC, reseller, and adversary respectively.
The set Items is composed of the items that the customer wants to purchase.
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The set Tags is composed of the one time keys in the tags. The set ItemKeys is
composed of the private and public keys that are associated with the item where
PKItem is the public key and SKItem is the private key. The setKey is the set of
public and private keys associated with each Agent where PK is the public key
and SK is the private key.
Messages
The three messages that are used when the reseller generates a tag in the tagged
transaction protocol are denotedMSG1,MSG2, andMSG3:
MSG1 =̂ {Msg1.a.b.pktag.pktag2 |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, pktag ∈ Tags, pktag2 ∈ Tags}
MSG2 =̂ {Msg2.a.b.Encrypt.k.tag.pktag.tag2.pktag2 |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, k ∈ Keys, tag ∈ ActualTags, pktag ∈ Tags,
tag2 ∈ ActualTags, pktag2 ∈ Tags}
MSG3 =̂ {Msg3.a.b.Encrypt.k.itemkey.pktag.Encrypt.k.itemkey.pktag2 |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, k ∈ Key, itemkey ∈ ItemKeys,
pktag ∈ Tags, pktag2 ∈ Tags}
The set of all messages in this phase of the protocol is defined as:
MSG =̂ MSG1 ∪MSG2 ∪MSG3
The channels defined in this system are send, receive, intercept, fake, running,
running2, commit, and commit2. The channels send and receive are used by the
processes to exchangemessages. The channels intercept, and fake are used by the
adversary to intercept messages and insert new messages. The channels running,
running2, commit and commit2 are used to represent the state of the processes.
Formally in CSP the channels are defined as:
channel send, receive, intercept, fake : MSG
channel running, commit
channel running2, commit2
Processes
The customer is defined as:
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CUSTOMER(item, pktag, pktag2, PKT ) =̂
send.Msg1.C.R.pktag.pktag2→
receive.Msg3.T.C.Encrypt.SKT .PKItemitem.pktag.
Encrypt.SKT .PKItemitem.pktag2 →
commit.C.T.pktag.pktag2→
commit2.C.R.pktag.pktag2→ SKIP
the reseller is defined as:
RESELLER(item, tag, tag2, SKR, PKR, PKT ) =̂
receive.Msg1.C.R.pktag.pktag2→
send.Msg2.R.T.Encrypt.SKR.tag.pktag.tag2.pktag2→
running2.R.C.pktag.pktag2 → SKIP
and the TGC is defined as:
TGC(SKT , PKT , PKR) =̂
receive.Msg2.R.T.Encrypt.SKR.tag.pktag.tag2.pktag2→
running.T.C.pktag.pktag2 →
send.Msg3.T.C.Encrypt.SKT .PKItemitem.pktag.
Encrypt.SKT .PKItemitem.pktag2 → SKIP
A renaming is applied to the definitions of the customer, reseller, and the TGC
to allow the adversary to intercept and fake messages on the communication
channels. The input can come either from the channel receive or from the channel
fake and the output can go to either send or intercept. The customer, reseller, and
TGC cannot tell whether a message has been sent from the other party or from
the adversary.
CUSTOMER0 =̂ CUSTOMER(item, pktag, pktag2, PKT )
[[send.Msg1 ← send.Msg1, send.Msg1 ← intercept.Msg1,
receive.Msg3← receive.Msg3, receive.Msg3← fake.Msg3]]
RESELLER0 =̂ RESELLER(item, tag, tag2, SKR, PKR, PKT )
[[receive.Msg1 ← receive.Msg1, receive.Msg1← fake.Msg1,
send.Msg2 ← send.Msg2, send.Msg2 ← intercept.Msg2]]
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TGC0 =̂ TGC(SKT , PKT , PKR)
[[receive.Msg2 ← receive.Msg2, receive.Msg2← fake.Msg2,
send.Msg3 ← send.Msg3, send.Msg3 ← intercept.Msg3]]
The Adversary
The adversary is parametrised by the information it knows. In this process the
adversary is parametrised bym1swhich is the set of all message 1s the adversary
knows,m2swhich is the set of all message 2s the adversary knows,m3swhich is
the set of all message 3s the adversary knows, tk which is the set of all Tags the
adversary knows, and at which is the set of all ActualTags the adversary knows.
If the adversary knows the key to decrypt a message it learns the contents of the
message, otherwise the adversary learns the encrypted content of the message.
The adversary can fake new messages using any values it has learnt, it can also
fake messages by replaying the encrypted content of a message it has seen. The
value KnownKeys = {SKItemitem, SKC , SKR, SKT , SKA, PKA} is the set of all
keys known by the adversary. The CSP definition is:
I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk, at) =̂
receive.Msg1?a.b.tk′.tk2′ →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk ∪ {tk′, tk2′}, at)
2 intercept.Msg1?a.b.tk′.tk2′ →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk ∪ {tk′, tk2′}, at)
2 receive.Msg2?b.a.Encrypt.k.at′.tk′.at2′.tk2′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk ∪ {tk′, tk2′},
at ∪ {at′, at2′})
else I(m1s,m2s ∪ {Encrypt.k.at′.tk′.at2′.tk2′},m3s, tk, at)
2 intercept.Msg2?b.a.Encrypt.k.at′.tk′.at2′.tk2′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk ∪ {tk′, tk2′},
at ∪ {at′, at2′})
else I(m1s,m2s ∪ {Encrypt.k.at′.tk′.at2′.tk2′},m3s, tk, at)
2 receive.Msg3?b.a.Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.Encrypt.k.pk.tk2′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk ∪ {tk′, tk2′}, at)
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s ∪ {Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.Encrypt.k.pk.tk2′},
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tk, at)
2 intercept.Msg3?b.a.Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.Encrypt.k.pk.tk2′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk ∪ {tk′, tk2′}, at)
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s ∪ {Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.Encrypt.k.pk.tk2′},
tk, at)
fake.Msg1?a.b?m : m1s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk, at)
fake.Msg2?b.a?m : m2s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk, at)
fake.Msg3?b.a?m : m3s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk, at)
fake.Msg1?a.b?tk′ : tk?tk2′ : tk → I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk, at)
fake.Msg2?a, b!Encrypt?k?at′ : at?tk′ : tk?at2′ : at?tk2′ : tk →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk, at)
fake.Msg3?a.b!Encrypt?k?pk?tk′ : tk!Encrypt?k?pk?tk2′ : tk →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s, tk, at)
This model considers an adversary with the initial knowledge of pktagwrong,
pktagwrong2, tagwrong, and tagwrong2:
INTRUDER =̂ I({}, {}, {}, {pktagwrong, pktagwrong2}, {tagwrong, tagwrong2})
Verification
The model of the protocol is now put together with the intruder:
CHANS =̂ {|send, receive|}
AGENTS =̂ CUSTOMER0|[CHANS]|RESELLER0|[CHANS]|TGC0
SY STEM =̂ AGENTS|[{|send, receive, fake, intercept|}]|INTRUDER
Figure A.5 illustrates the processes and channels in the model of the protocol.
The customer, reseller, and the TGC processes have access to the channels send
and receive. The TGC has access to the channel running, the reseller has access
to the channel running2 and the customer has access to the channels commit and
commit2. The adversary has access to the channels fake and intercept.
FDR takes as input an implementation of the protocol and a specification and
checks that the implementation refines the specification. This model has two
specifications for the reseller generating the tag. The first specification prevents
replay. Informally, if the customer receives a tag then two different values must
have been signed by the TGC. In CSP the specification is defined as:
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Figure A.3: CSP Network Model: Reseller Generating a Tag
SPEC0 =̂
running.T.C.pktagcustomer.pktagcustomer2 →
commit.C?T.pktagcustomer.pktagcustomer2→ SPEC
SPEC1 =̂
{|running.T.C.pktagcustomer.pktagcustomer2,
commit.C.T.pktagcustomer.pktagcustomer2|}
SPEC =̂ SPEC0 |||RUN (Σ \ SPEC1)
The term Σ is the set of all possible events. The FDR model checker checks
SPEC vT SY STEM and returns TRUE after 457 states with 2005 transitions.
The second specification checks for a network sniffing attack. Informally, if
a customer receives tags signed by the TGC then the reseller must have sent a
message to the TGC to request the generation of the tags. In CSP the specification
is defined as:
SPEC20 =̂
running2.R.C.pktagcustomer.pktagcustomer2→
commit2.C?R.pktagcustomer.pktagcustomer2→ SPEC
SPEC21 =̂
{|running2.R.C.pktagcustomer.pktagcustomer2,
commit2.C.R.pktagcustomer.pktagcustomer2|}
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SPEC2 =̂ SPEC20 |||RUN (Σ \ SPEC21)
The term Σ is the set of all possible events. The FDR model checker checks
SPEC2 vT SY STEM and returns TRUE after 1423 states with 4835 transitions.
A.2 Extended Tagged Transaction Protocol
The extended tagged transaction protocol has two models: the supplier generat-
ing the tag, and a reseller generating a tag. The registration model is not repeated
as it is the same as in the tagged transaction protocol.
A.2.1 Supplier Generating Tag
In this phase the supplier is generating a tag for a reseller with the TGC.
Sets
Agents = {S, T,R,A}
Items = {item}
Tags = {pktagreseller, pktagwrong}
ItemKeys = {PKItemitem, SKItemitem}
Token = tokenreseller
Key = {PKS, SKS, PKT , SKT , PKC , SKC , PKA, SKA}
The set Agents is composed of the participants involved when the supplier
generates the tag with the TGC and the processes in the CSP model. The values
S, T , R, and A represent the supplier, TGC, reseller, and adversary respectively.
The set Items is composed of the items that the reseller wants to purchase. The set
Tags is composed of the one time keys in the tags. The set ItemKeys is composed
of the private and public keys that are associated with the item where PKItem
is the public key and SKItem is the private key. The set Key is the set of public
and private keys associated with each Agent where PK is the public key and SK
is the private key.
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Messages
The four messages that are part of the registration phase of the tagged transaction
protocol are denotedMSG1,MSG2,MSG3, andMSG4:
MSG1 =̂ {Msg1.a.b.token.tag |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, token ∈ Token, tag ∈ Tags}
MSG2 =̂ {Msg2.a.b.Encrypt.k.token.tag |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, k ∈ ItemKeys, token ∈ Token,
tag ∈ Tags}
MSG3 =̂ {Msg3.a.b.Encrypt.k.itemkey.token.tag |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, k ∈ Key, itemkey ∈ ItemKeys,
token ∈ Token, tag ∈ Tags}
MSG4 =̂ {Msg4.a.b.Encrypt.k.itemkey.token.tag |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, k ∈ Key, itemkey ∈ ItemKeys,
token ∈ Token, tag ∈ Tags}
The set of all messages in this phase of the protocol is defined as:
MSG =̂ MSG1 ∪MSG2 ∪MSG3 ∪MSG4
The channels defined in this system are send, receive, intercept, fake, running,
and commit. The channels send and receive are used by the processes to exchange
messages. The channels intercept, and fake are used by the adversary to intercept
messages and insert new messages. The channels running and commit are used
to represent the state of the processes. Formally in CSP the channels are defined
as:
channel send, receive, intercept, fake : MSG
channel running, commit
Processes
The reseller is defined as:
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RESELLER(item, tokenreseller, pktagreseller, PKT ) =̂
send.Msg1.R.S.tokenreseller.pktagreseller →
receive.Msg4.S.R.Encrypt.SKT .PKItemitem.tokenreseller.pktagreseller →
commit.R.S.tokenreseller.pktagcustomer → SKIP
The supplier is defined as:
SUPPLIER(item, SKItemitem, PKItemitem, PKT ) =̂
receive.Msg1.R.S.tokenreseller.pktagreseller →
running.R.S.tokenreseller.pktagreseller →
send.Msg2.S.T.Encrypt.SKItemitem.tokenreseller.pktagreseller →
receive.Msg3.T.S.Encrypt.SKT .PKItem(item).tokenreseller.
pktagreseller →
send.Msg4.S.R.Encrypt.SKT .PKItem(item).tokenreseller.
pktagreseller → SKIP
and the TGC is defined as:
TGC(SKT , PKT ) =̂
receive.Msg2.S.T.Encrypt.SKItemitem.tokenreseller.pktagreseller →
send.Msg3.T.S.Encrypt.SKT .PKItem(item).tokenreseller.
pktagreseller → SKIP
A renaming is applied to the definitions of the reseller, supplier and the TGC
to allow the adversary to intercept and fake messages on the communication
channels. The input can come either from the channel receive or from the channel
fake and the output can go to either send or intercept. The supplier, reseller, and
TGC cannot tell whether a message has been sent from the other party or from
the adversary.
RESELLER0 =̂ RESELLER(item, pktagreseller, PKT )
[[send.Msg1 ← send.Msg1, send.Msg1 ← intercept.Msg1,
receive.Msg4 ← receive.Msg4, receive.Msg4← fake.Msg4]]
SUPPLIER0 =̂ SUPPLIER(item, SKItemitem, PKItemitem, PKT )
[[receive.Msg1 ← receive.Msg1, receive.Msg1← fake.Msg1,
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send.Msg2 ← send.Msg2, send.Msg2 ← intercept.Msg2,
receive.Msg3 ← receive.Msg3, receive.Msg3← fake.Msg3,
send.Msg4 ← send.Msg4, send.Msg4 ← intercept.Msg4]]
TGC0 =̂ TGC(SKT , PKT )
[[receive.Msg2 ← receive.Msg2, receive.Msg2← fake.Msg2,
send.Msg3 ← send.Msg3, send.Msg3 ← intercept.Msg3]]
The Adversary
The adversary is parametrised by the information it knows. In this process
the adversary is parametrised by m1s which is the set of all message 1s the
adversary knows, m2s which is the set of all message 2s the adversary knows,
m3s which is the set of all message 3s the adversary knows, m4s which is the
set of all message 4s the adversary knows, tg which is the set of all Tags the
adversary knows, and tk which is the set of all Token the adversary knows. If
the adversary knows the key to decrypt a message it learns the contents of the
message, otherwise the adversary learns the encrypted content of the message.
The adversary can fake new messages using any values it has learnt, it can also
fake messages by replaying the encrypted content of a message it has seen. The
value KnownKeys = {SKItemitem, SKS, SKT , SKA, PKA}is defined as the keys
the adversary knows. The CSP definition is:
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk, tg) =̂
receive.Msg1?a.b.tk′.tg′ →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′}, tg ∪ {tg′})
2 intercept.Msg1?a.b.tk′.tg′ →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′}, tg ∪ {tg′})
2 receive.Msg2?b.a.Encrypt.k.tk′.tg′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′},
tg ∪ {tg′})
else I(m1s,m2s ∪ {Encrypt.k.tk′.tg′},m3s,m4s, tk, tg)
2 intercept.Msg2?b.a.Encrypt.k.tk′.tg′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′},
tg ∪ {tg′})
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else I(m1s,m2s ∪ {Encrypt.k.tk′.tg′},m3s,m4s, tk, tg)
2 receive.Msg3?b.a.Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.tg′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′},
tg ∪ {tg′})
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s ∪ {Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.tg′},m4s, tk, tg)
2 intercept.Msg3?b.a.Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.tg′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′},
tg ∪ {tg′})
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s ∪ {Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.tg′},m4s, tk, tg)
2 receive.Msg4?b.a.Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.tg′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′},
tg ∪ {tg′})
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s ∪ {Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.tg′}, tk, tg)
2 intercept.Msg4?b.a.Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.tg′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk ∪ {tk′},
tg ∪ {tg′})
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s ∪ {Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.tg′}, tk, tg)
fake.Msg1?a.b?m : m1s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk, tg)
fake.Msg2?b.a?m : m2s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk, tg)
fake.Msg3?b.a?m : m3s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk, tg)
fake.Msg4?b.a?m : m4s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk, tg)
fake.Msg1?a.b?tk′ : tk?tg′ : tg → I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk, tg)
fake.Msg2?a.b!Encrypt?k?tk′ : tk?tg′ : tg →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk, tg)
fake.Msg3?a.b!Encrypt?k?pk?tk′ : tk?tg′ : tg →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk, tg)
fake.Msg4?a.b!Encrypt?k?pk?tk′ : tk?tg′ : tg →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s, tk, tg)
In this model the adversary has the initial knowledge of pktagwrong and
tokenreseller:
INTRUDER =̂ I({}, {}, {}, {}, {tokenreseller}, {pktagwrong})
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Figure A.4: CSP Network Model: Supplier Generating a Tag
Verification
The model of the protocol is now put together with the intruder:
CHANS =̂ {|send, receive|}
AGENTS =̂ RESELLER0|[CHANS]|SUPPLIER0|[CHANS]|TGC0
SY STEM =̂ AGENTS|[{|send, receive, fake, intercept|}]|INTRUDER
Figure A.4 illustrates the processes and channels in the model of the protocol.
The supplier, reseller, and the TGC processes have access to the channels send
and receive. The supplier also has access to the channel running and the reseller
has access to the channel commit. The adversary has access to the channels fake
and intercept.
FDR takes as input an implementation of the protocol and a specification and
checks that the implementation refines the specification. The generation of a tag
has to resist a fabrication attack. Informally, if the reseller receives a tag that it
accepts, the supplier must have sent a message to the TGC requesting the tag. In
CSP the specification is defined as:
SPEC0 =̂
running.S.R.tokenreseller.pktagcustomer →
commit.R?S.tokenreseller.pktagcustomer → SPEC
SPEC1 =̂
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{|running.S.R.pktagcustomer.tokenreseller,
commit.R.S.pktagcustomer.tokenreseller|}
SPEC =̂ SPEC0 |||RUN (Σ \ SPEC1)
The term Σ is the set of all possible events. The FDR model checker checks
SPEC vT SY STEM and returns TRUE after 111 states with 387 transitions.
A.2.2 Reseller Generating Tag
In this phase, the reseller is generating a tag for the customer with the TGC.
Sets
Agents = {C, T,R,A}
Items = {item}
Tags = {pktag, pktag2, pktagwrong, pktagwrong2}
ActualTags = {tag, tag2, tagwrong, tagwrong2}
Token = {tktag, tktag2}
Challenge = {c1, c2}
Response = {r1, r2}
ItemKeys = {PKItemitem, SKItemitem}
Key = {PKR, SKR, PKT , SKT , PKC , SKC , PKA, SKA}
The set Agents is composed of the participants involved when the reseller
generates the tag with the TGC and the processes in the CSP model. The values
C, T , R, and A represent the customer, TGC, reseller, and adversary respectively.
The set Items is composed of the items that the customer wants to purchase.
The set Tags is composed of the one time keys in the tags. The set ActualTags
is composed of the tags that have previously been generated and sent to the
reseller. The set Token represents the identity tokens. The sets Challenge and
Response represent the challenge and response values used in the protocol. The
set ItemKeys is composed of the private and public keys that are associated with
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the item where PKItem is the public key and SKItem is the private key. The set
Key is the set of public and private keys associated with each Agent where PK
is the public key and SK is the private key.
Messages
The five messages that are used when the reseller generates a tag in the extended
tagged transaction protocol are denoted MSG1, MSG2, MSG3, MSG4, and
MSG5:
MSG1 =̂ {Msg1.a.b.token.pktag.token2.pktag2 |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, token ∈ Token, pktag ∈ Tags,
token2 ∈ Token, pktag2 ∈ Tags}
MSG2 =̂ {Msg2.a.b.Encrypt.k.tag.token.pktag.tag2.token2.pktag2 |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, k ∈ Keys, tag ∈ ActualTags,
token ∈ Token, pktag ∈ Tags,
tag2 ∈ ActualTags, token2 ∈ Token, pktag2 ∈ Tags}
MSG3 =̂ {Msg3.a.b.c1.c2} |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, c1 ∈ Challenge, c2 ∈ Challenge
MSG4 =̂ {Msg4.a.b.Encrypt.k.c1.c2.r1.r2} |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, c1 ∈ Challenge, c2 ∈ Challenge,
r1 ∈ Response, r2 ∈ Response
MSG5 =̂ {Msg5.a.b.Encrypt.k.itemkey.token.pktag.Encrypt.k.itemkey.
token2.pktag2 |
a ∈ Agents, b ∈ Agents, k ∈ Key, itemkey ∈ ItemKeys,
token ∈ Token, pktag ∈ Tags, token2 ∈ Token, pktag2 ∈ Tags}
The set of all messages in this phase of the protocol is defined as:
MSG =̂ MSG1 ∪MSG2 ∪MSG3 ∪MSG4 ∪MSG5
The channels defined in this system are send, receive, intercept, fake, running,
running2, commit, and commit2. The channels send and receive are used by the
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processes to exchangemessages. The channels intercept, and fake are used by the
adversary to intercept messages and insert new messages. The channels running,
running2, commit and commit2 are used to represent the state of the processes.
Formally in CSP the channels are defined as:
channel send, receive, intercept, fake : MSG
channel running, commit
channel running2, commit2
Processes
The customer is defined as:
CUSTOMER(item, tktag, pktag, tktag2, pktag2, PKT ) =̂
send.Msg1.C.R.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2→
receive.Msg5.T.C.Encrypt.SKT .PKItemitem.tktag.pktag.
Encrypt.SKT .PKItemitem.tktag2.pktag2 →
commit.C.T.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2→
commit2.C.R.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2→ SKIP
the reseller is defined as:
RESELLER(item, tag, tag2, r1, r2, SKR, PKR, PKT ) =̂
receive.Msg1.C.R.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2→
send.Msg2.R.T.Encrypt.SKR.tag.tktag.pktag.tag2.tktag2.pktag2→
running2.R.C.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2 →
receive.Msg3.T.R.c1.c2 →
send.Msg4.R.T.Encrypt.SKR.c1.c2.r1.r2 → SKIP
and the TGC is defined as:
TGC(SKT , PKT , PKR, c1, c2) =̂
receive.Msg2.R.T.Encrypt.SKR.tag.tktag.pktag.tag2.tktag2.pktag2→
running.T.C.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2 →
send.Msg3.T.R.c1.c2 →
receive.Msg4.R.T.Encrypt.SKR.c1.c2.r1.r2 →
send.Msg5.T.C.Encrypt.SKT .PKItemitem.tktag.pktag.
Encrypt.SKT .PKItemitem.tktag2.pktag2→ SKIP
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A renaming is applied to the definitions of the customer, reseller, and the TGC
to allow the adversary to intercept and fake messages on the communication
channels. The input can come either from the channel receive or from the channel
fake and the output can go to either send or intercept. The customer, reseller, and
TGC cannot tell whether a message has been sent from the other party or from
the adversary.
CUSTOMER0 =̂ CUSTOMER(item, pktag, pktag2, PKT )
[[send.Msg1 ← send.Msg1, send.Msg1 ← intercept.Msg1,
receive.Msg5← receive.Msg5, receive.Msg5← fake.Msg5]]
RESELLER0 =̂ RESELLER(item, tag, tag2, SKR, PKR, PKT )
[[receive.Msg1 ← receive.Msg1, receive.Msg1← fake.Msg1,
send.Msg2 ← send.Msg2, send.Msg2 ← intercept.Msg2,
receive.Msg3← receive.Msg3, receive.Msg3← fake.Msg3,
send.Msg4 ← send.Msg4, send.Msg4 ← intercept.Msg4]]
TGC0 =̂ TGC(SKT , PKT , PKR)
[[receive.Msg2 ← receive.Msg2, receive.Msg2← fake.Msg2,
send.Msg3 ← send.Msg3, send.Msg3 ← intercept.Msg3,
receive.Msg4← receive.Msg4, receive.Msg4← fake.Msg4,
send.Msg5 ← send.Msg5, send.Msg5 ← intercept.Msg5]]
The Adversary
The adversary is parametrised by the information it knows. In our process
the adversary is parametrised by m1s which is the set of all message 1s the
adversary knows, m2s which is the set of all message 2s the adversary knows,
m3s which is the set of all message 3s the adversary knows, m4s which is the
set of all message 4s the adversary knows, m5s which is the set of all message
5s the adversary knows, tk which is the set of all Token the adversary knows,
tg which is the set of all Tags the adversary knows, at which is the set of all
ActualTags the adversary knows, cwhich is the set of all Challenge the adversary
knows, and r which is the set of all Response the adversary knows. If the
adversary knows the key to decrypt a message it learns the contents of the
message, otherwise the adversary learns the encrypted content of the message.
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The adversary can fake new messages using any values it has learnt, it can also
fake messages by replaying the encrypted content of a message it has seen. The
valueKnownKeys = {SKItemitem, SKC , SKR, SKT , SKA, PKA} is defined as the
keys the adversary knows. The CSP definition is:
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c, r) =̂
receive.Msg1?a.b.tk′.tg′.tk2′.tg2′ →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk ∪ {tk′, tk2′}, tg ∪ {tg′, tg2′}, at, c, r)
2 intercept.Msg1?a.b.tk′.tg′.tk2′.tg2′ →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk ∪ {tk′, tk2′}, tg ∪ {tg′, tg2′}, at, c, r)
2 receive.Msg2?b.a.Encrypt.k.at′.tk′.tg′.at2′.tk2′.tg2′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s,
tk ∪ {tk′, tk2′}, tg ∪ {tg′, tg2′}, at ∪ {at′, at2′}, c, r)
else I(m1s,m2s ∪ {Encrypt.k.at′.tk′.at2′.tk2′},m3s,m4s,m5s,
tk, tg, at, c, r)
2 intercept.Msg2?b.a.Encrypt.k.at′.tk′.tg′.at2′.tk2′.tg2′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s,
tk ∪ {tk′, tk2′}, tg ∪ {tg′, tg2′}, at ∪ {at′, at2′}, c, r)
else I(m1s,m2s ∪ {Encrypt.k.at′.tk′.at2′.tk2′},m3s,m4s,m5s,
tk, tg, at, c, r)
2 receive.Msg3?a.b.c1′.c2′ →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c ∪ {c1′, c2′}, r)
2 intercept.Msg3?a.b.c1′.c2′ →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c ∪ {c1′, c2′}, r)
2 receive.Msg4?b.a.Encrypt.k.c1′c2′.r1′.r2′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at,
c ∪ {c1′, c2′}, r ∪ {r1′, r2′})
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s ∪ {Encrypt.k.c1′c2′.r1′.r2′},m5s,
tk, tg, at, c, r)
2 intercept.Msg4?b.a.Encrypt.k.c1′c2′.r1′.r2′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at,
c ∪ {c1′, c2′}, r ∪ {r1′, r2′})
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s ∪ {Encrypt.k.c1′c2′.r1′.r2′},m5s,
tk, tg, at, c, r)
2 receive.Msg5?b.a.Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.tg′.Encrypt.k.pk.tk2′.tg2′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s,
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tk ∪ {tk′, tk2′}, tg ∪ {tg′, tg2′}, at, c, r)
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s ∪ {Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.tg′.
Encrypt.k.pk.tk2′.tg2′}, tk, tg, at, c, r)
2 intercept.Msg5?b.a.Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.tg′.Encrypt.k.pk.tk2′.tg2′ →
if k ∈ KnownKeys then I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s,
tk ∪ {tk′, tk2′}, tg ∪ {tg′, tg2′}, at, c, r)
else I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s ∪ {Encrypt.k.pk.tk′.tg′.
Encrypt.k.pk.tk2′.tg2′}, tk, tg, at, c, r)
fake.Msg1?a.b?m : m1s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c, r)
fake.Msg2?b.a?m : m2s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c, r)
fake.Msg3?b.a?m : m3s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c, r)
fake.Msg4?b.a?m : m4s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c, r)
fake.Msg5?b.a?m : m5s→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c, r)
fake.Msg1?a.b?tk′ : tk?tg′ : tg?tk2′ : tk?tg2′ : tg →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c, r)
fake.Msg2?a, b!Encrypt?k?at′ : at?tk′ : tk?at2′ : at?tk2′ : tk →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c, r)
fake.Msg3?a.b?c1′ : c?c2′ : c→ I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c, r)
fake.Msg4?a.b!Encrypt?k?c1′ : c?c2′ : c?r1′ : r?r2′ : r →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c, r)
fake.Msg5?a.b!Encrypt?k?pk?tk′ : tk!Encrypt?k?pk?tk2′ : tk →
I(m1s,m2s,m3s,m4s,m5s, tk, tg, at, c, r)
This model considers an adversary who has the initial knowledge of
pktagwrong, pktagwrong2, tagwrong, tagwrong2, tktag, tktag2, c1, c2, r1, and r2:
INTRUDER =̂ I({}, {}, {}, {}, {}, {tktag, tktag2}, {pktagwrong, pktagwrong2},
{tagwrong, tagwrong2}, {c1, c2}, {r1, r2})
Verification
The model of the protocol can now be put together with the intruder:
CHANS =̂ {|send, receive|}
AGENTS =̂ CUSTOMER0|[CHANS]|RESELLER0|[CHANS]|TGC0
182 APPENDIX A. CSP MODELS
TG C
Adversary
receive
receivesend
sendfake
intercept
learn say
Reseller
Custom er
send receive
running com m it, com m it2
running2
Figure A.5: CSP Network Model: Reseller Generating a Tag
SY STEM =̂ AGENTS|[{|send, receive, fake, intercept|}]|INTRUDER
Figure A.5 illustrates the processes and channels in the model of the protocol.
The customer, reseller, and the TGC processes have access to the channels send
and receive. The TGC has access to the channel running, the reseller has access
to the channel running2 and the customer has access to the channels commit and
commit2. The adversary has access to the channels fake and intercept.
FDR takes as input an implementation of the protocol and a specification
and checks that the implementation refines the specification. This phase of the
protocol has two specifications for the reseller generating the tag. The first
specification prevents replay. Informally, if the customer receives a tag then two
different values must have been signed by the TGC. In CSP we the specification
is defined as:
SPEC0 =̂
running.T.C.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2 →
commit.C?T.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2→ SPEC
SPEC1 =̂
{|running.T.C.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2,
commit.C.T.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2|}
SPEC =̂ SPEC0 |||RUN (Σ \ SPEC1)
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The term Σ is the set of all possible events. The FDR model checker checks
SPEC vT SY STEM and returns TRUE after 457 states with 2005 transitions.
The second specification checks for a network sniffing attack. Informally, if
a customer receives tags signed by the TGC then the reseller must have sent a
message to the TGC to request the generation of the tags. In CSP the specification
is defined as:
SPEC20 =̂
running2.R.C.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2→
commit2.C?R.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2→ SPEC
SPEC21 =̂
{|running2.R.C.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2,
commit2.C.R.tktag.pktag.tktag2.pktag2|}
SPEC2 =̂ SPEC20 |||RUN (Σ \ SPEC21)
The term Σ is the set of all possible events. The FDR model checker checks
SPEC2 vT SY STEM and returns TRUE after 1423 states with 4835 transitions.
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